Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:2106.09045 · Physical Review Letters

Contextuality without Incompatibility

John H. Selby, David Schmid, Elie Wolfe, Ana Belén Sainz, Ravi Kunjwal, Robert W. Spekkens

Published Jun 6, 2023• 30 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The existence of incompatible measurements is often believed to be a feature of quantum theory which signals its inconsistency with any classical worldview. To prove the failure of classicality in the sense of Kochen-Specker noncontextuality, one does indeed require sets of incompatible measurements. However, a more broadly applicable notion of classicality is the existence of a generalized-noncontextual ontological model. In particular, this notion can imply constraints on the representation of outcomes even within a single nonprojective measurement. We leverage this fact to demonstrate that measurement incompatibility is neither necessary nor sufficient for proofs of the failure of generalized noncontextuality. Furthermore, we show that every proof of the failure of generalized noncontextuality in a quantum prepare-measure scenario can be converted into a proof of the failure of generalized noncontextuality in a corresponding scenario with no incompatible measurements.

DOI
10.1103/physrevlett.130.230201

Related papers

Contextuality beyond the Kochen-Specker theorem

Ravi Kunjwal

When it isn't possible to tell two distinct experimental procedures apart purely from their input/output statistics, then it seems a plausible hypothesis that the two procedures must be physically identical. We call such a hypothesis "noncontextuality", an instance of Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Read in the contrapositive, this hypothesis entails that any physical distinctions between two experimental procedures must necessarily lead to a difference in their operational statistics. The results I present in this thesis concern the failure of this hypothesis -- a failure dubbed "contextuality" -- when one tries to embed an operational theory (such as quantum theory) in the ontological models framework. The Kochen-Specker theorem demonstrates the failure of noncontextuality for deterministic ontological models of quantum theory, i.e., those ontological models where the ontic/physical state of the system fixes the outcome of any projective measurement on the system in a deterministic manner. This thesis goes beyond the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem by asking what operational facts must be verified in experiments to conclude that Nature does not admit noncontextual ontological models, not even indeterministic ones. This leads to noncontextuality inequalities that are robust to noise in the preparations and measurements. In the particular case of quantum theory, these inequalities are meaningful even when unsharp measurements (or POVMs) are allowed, a feature not shared by the traditional approach to KS-noncontextuality where unsharp measurements are excluded by fiat: allowing them renders even trivial POVMs (proportional to identity) maximally KS-contextual. The sense in which trivial POVMs are indeed "trivial" (or "noncontextual") is clear in our approach: they are simply too noisy to lead to violation of our noncontextuality inequalities.

arXiv:1612.07250•Dec 21, 2016•9 citations

Contextuality under weak assumptions

Andrew W. Simmons, Joel J. Wallman, Hakop Pashayan +2 more

The presence of contextuality in quantum theory was first highlighted by Bell, Kochen and Specker, who discovered that for quantum systems of three or more dimensions, measurements could not be viewed as deterministically revealing pre-existing properties of the system. More precisely, no model can assign deterministic outcomes to the projectors of a quantum measurement in a way that depends only on the projector and not the context (the full set of projectors) in which it appeared, despite the fact that the Born rule probabilities associated with projectors are independent of the context. A more general, operational definition of contextuality introduced by Spekkens, which we will term 'probabilistic contextuality', drops the assumption of determinism and allows for operations other than measurements to be considered contextual. Even two-dimensional quantum mechanics can be shown to be contextual under this generalised notion. Probabilistic noncontextuality represents the postulate that elements of an operational theory that cannot be distinguished from each other based on the statistics of arbitrarily many repeated experiments (they give rise to the same operational probabilities) are ontologically identical. In this paper, we introduce a framework that enables us to distinguish between different noncontextuality assumptions in terms of the relationships between the ontological representations of objects in the theory given a certain relation between their operational representations. This framework can be used to motivate and define a 'possibilistic' analogue, encapsulating the idea that elements of an operational theory that cannot be unambiguously distinguished operationally can also not be unambiguously distinguished ontologically. We then prove that possibilistic noncontextuality is equivalent to an alternative notion of noncontextuality proposed by Hardy. Finally, we demonstrate that these weaker noncontextuality assumptions are sufficient to prove alternative versions of known 'no-go' theorems that constrain ψ -epistemic models for quantum mechanics.

arXiv:1610.06897•New Journal of Physics•Feb 9, 2017•9 citations

Measurement incompatibility and steering are necessary and sufficient for operational contextuality

Armin Tavakoli, Roope Uola

Two fundamental features of quantum theory are that measurements cannot be performed jointly and that entangled states can be steered through action-at-a-distance. Here it is shown that both these phenomena are in one-to-one correspondence with the failure of noncontextual models to explain the predictions of quantum theory.

•Jan 1, 2020•47 citations

Measurement incompatibility and steering are necessary and sufficient for operational contextuality

Armin Tavakoli, Roope Uola

Two fundamental features of quantum theory are that measurements cannot be performed jointly and that entangled states can be steered through action-at-a-distance. Here it is shown that both these phenomena are in one-to-one correspondence with the failure of noncontextual models to explain the predictions of quantum theory.

arXiv:1905.03614•Physical Review Research•Jan 6, 2020•62 citations

Constrained measurement incompatibility from generalised contextuality of steered preparation

Sumit Mukherjee, A. K. Pan

Abstract In a bipartite Bell scenario involving two local measurements per party and two outcomes per measurement, the measurement incompatibility in one wing is both necessary and sufficient to reveal the nonlocality. However, such a one-to-one correspondence fails when one of the observers performs more than two measurements. In such a scenario, the measurement incompatibility is necessary but not sufficient to reveal the nonlocality. In this work, within the formalism of general probabilistic theory (GPT), we demonstrate that unlike the nonlocality, the incompatibility of N arbitrary measurements in one wing is both necessary and sufficient for revealing the generalised contextuality for the sub-system in the other wing. Further, we formulate an elegant form of inequality for any GPT that is necessary for N-wise compatibility of N arbitrary observables. Moreover, we argue that any theory that violates the proposed inequality possess a degree of incompatibility that can be quantified through the amount of violation. We claim that it is the generalised contextuality that provides a restriction to the allowed degree of measurement incompatibility of any viable theory of nature and thereby super-select the quantum theory. Finally, we discuss the geometrical implications of our results.

arXiv:2406.16095•New Journal of Physics•Nov 25, 2024•5 citations

Addressing some common objections to generalized noncontextuality

David Schmid, John H. Selby, Robert W. Spekkens

When should a given operational phenomenology be deemed to admit of a classical explanation? When it can be realized in a generalized-noncontextual ontological model. The case for answering the question in this fashion has been made in many previous works and motivates research on the notion of generalized noncontextuality. Many criticisms and concerns have been raised, however, regarding the definition of this notion and of the possibility of testing it experimentally. In this work, we respond to some of the most common of these objections. One such objection is that the existence of a classical record of which laboratory procedure was actually performed in each run of an experiment implies that the operational equivalence relations that are a necessary ingredient of any proof of the failure of noncontextuality do not hold, and consequently that conclusions of nonclassicality based on these equivalences are mistaken. We explain why this concern is unfounded. Our response affords the opportunity for us to clarify certain facts about generalized noncontextuality, such as the possibility of having proofs of its failure based on a consideration of the subsystem structure of composite systems. Similarly, through our responses to each of the other objections, we elucidate some under-appreciated facts about the notion of generalized noncontextuality and experimental tests thereof.

arXiv:2302.07282•Physical Review A•Feb 20, 2024•13 citations
The existence of incompatible measurements is often believed to be a feature of quantum theory which signals its inconsistency with any classical worldview. To prove the failure of classicality in the sense of Kochen-Specker noncontextuality, one does indeed require sets of incompatible measurements. However, a more broadly applicable notion of classicality is the existence of a generalized-noncontextual ontological model. In particular, this notion can imply constraints on the representation of outcomes even within a single nonprojective measurement. We leverage this fact to demonstrate that measurement incompatibility is neither necessary nor sufficient for proofs of the failure of generalized noncontextuality. Furthermore, we show that every proof of the failure of generalized noncontextuality in a quantum prepare-measure scenario can be converted into a proof of the failure of generalized noncontextuality in a corresponding scenario with no incompatible measurements.
When it isn't possible to tell two distinct experimental procedures apart purely from their input/output statistics, then it seems a plausible hypothesis that the two procedures must be physically identical. We call such a hypothesis "noncontextuality", an instance of Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Read in the contrapositive, this hypothesis entails that any physical distinctions between two experimental procedures must necessarily lead to a difference in their operational statistics. The results I present in this thesis concern the failure of this hypothesis -- a failure dubbed "contextuality" -- when one tries to embed an operational theory (such as quantum theory) in the ontological models framework. The Kochen-Specker theorem demonstrates the failure of noncontextuality for deterministic ontological models of quantum theory, i.e., those ontological models where the ontic/physical state of the system fixes the outcome of any projective measurement on the system in a deterministic manner. This thesis goes beyond the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem by asking what operational facts must be verified in experiments to conclude that Nature does not admit noncontextual ontological models, not even indeterministic ones. This leads to noncontextuality inequalities that are robust to noise in the preparations and measurements. In the particular case of quantum theory, these inequalities are meaningful even when unsharp measurements (or POVMs) are allowed, a feature not shared by the traditional approach to KS-noncontextuality where unsharp measurements are excluded by fiat: allowing them renders even trivial POVMs (proportional to identity) maximally KS-contextual. The sense in which trivial POVMs are indeed "trivial" (or "noncontextual") is clear in our approach: they are simply too noisy to lead to violation of our noncontextuality inequalities.
The presence of contextuality in quantum theory was first highlighted by Bell, Kochen and Specker, who discovered that for quantum systems of three or more dimensions, measurements could not be viewed as deterministically revealing pre-existing properties of the system. More precisely, no model can assign deterministic outcomes to the projectors of a quantum measurement in a way that depends only on the projector and not the context (the full set of projectors) in which it appeared, despite the fact that the Born rule probabilities associated with projectors are independent of the context. A more general, operational definition of contextuality introduced by Spekkens, which we will term 'probabilistic contextuality', drops the assumption of determinism and allows for operations other than measurements to be considered contextual. Even two-dimensional quantum mechanics can be shown to be contextual under this generalised notion. Probabilistic noncontextuality represents the postulate that elements of an operational theory that cannot be distinguished from each other based on the statistics of arbitrarily many repeated experiments (they give rise to the same operational probabilities) are ontologically identical. In this paper, we introduce a framework that enables us to distinguish between different noncontextuality assumptions in terms of the relationships between the ontological representations of objects in the theory given a certain relation between their operational representations. This framework can be used to motivate and define a 'possibilistic' analogue, encapsulating the idea that elements of an operational theory that cannot be unambiguously distinguished operationally can also not be unambiguously distinguished ontologically. We then prove that possibilistic noncontextuality is equivalent to an alternative notion of noncontextuality proposed by Hardy. Finally, we demonstrate that these weaker noncontextuality assumptions are sufficient to prove alternative versions of known 'no-go' theorems that constrain ψ -epistemic models for quantum mechanics.
Abstract In a bipartite Bell scenario involving two local measurements per party and two outcomes per measurement, the measurement incompatibility in one wing is both necessary and sufficient to reveal the nonlocality. However, such a one-to-one correspondence fails when one of the observers performs more than two measurements. In such a scenario, the measurement incompatibility is necessary but not sufficient to reveal the nonlocality. In this work, within the formalism of general probabilistic theory (GPT), we demonstrate that unlike the nonlocality, the incompatibility of N arbitrary measurements in one wing is both necessary and sufficient for revealing the generalised contextuality for the sub-system in the other wing. Further, we formulate an elegant form of inequality for any GPT that is necessary for N-wise compatibility of N arbitrary observables. Moreover, we argue that any theory that violates the proposed inequality possess a degree of incompatibility that can be quantified through the amount of violation. We claim that it is the generalised contextuality that provides a restriction to the allowed degree of measurement incompatibility of any viable theory of nature and thereby super-select the quantum theory. Finally, we discuss the geometrical implications of our results.
When should a given operational phenomenology be deemed to admit of a classical explanation? When it can be realized in a generalized-noncontextual ontological model. The case for answering the question in this fashion has been made in many previous works and motivates research on the notion of generalized noncontextuality. Many criticisms and concerns have been raised, however, regarding the definition of this notion and of the possibility of testing it experimentally. In this work, we respond to some of the most common of these objections. One such objection is that the existence of a classical record of which laboratory procedure was actually performed in each run of an experiment implies that the operational equivalence relations that are a necessary ingredient of any proof of the failure of noncontextuality do not hold, and consequently that conclusions of nonclassicality based on these equivalences are mistaken. We explain why this concern is unfounded. Our response affords the opportunity for us to clarify certain facts about generalized noncontextuality, such as the possibility of having proofs of its failure based on a consideration of the subsystem structure of composite systems. Similarly, through our responses to each of the other objections, we elucidate some under-appreciated facts about the notion of generalized noncontextuality and experimental tests thereof.