Currently, due to the high scalability and global coverage of space information network (SIN), more service providers and users are willing to provide or subscribe to personal services through the satellite network. However, the messages are transmitted in public satellite-ground links, which makes access users vulnerable to various forms of attacks. Existing authentication protocols do not meet the expected security and short delay requirements to ensure the security of real-time user access and the confidentiality of communication content. Moreover, with the development of quantum computers, the difficult problems such as ECDLP and DLP have also been proven to be solvable in polynomial time, leading to new threats. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a provably secure and anti-quantum authentication protocol based on randomized RLWE. The protocol not only meets the pre-defined security requirements, but also reduces the total delay of the authentication phase based on the pre-negotiation and fewer authentication transmission. In addition, a concise handover scheme is designed for signal handover scenarios caused by satellite dynamic topology. Further rigorous formal and informal security proofs and performance analysis show that our proposed protocol is more applicable to SIN, while ensuring higher security and resisting various attacks with lower authentication delay.
Currently, due to the high scalability and global coverage of space information network (SIN), more service providers and users are willing to provide or subscribe to personal services through the satellite network. However, the messages are transmitted in public satellite-ground links, which makes access users vulnerable to various forms of attacks. Existing authentication protocols do not meet the expected security and short delay requirements to ensure the security of real-time user access and the confidentiality of communication content. Moreover, with the development of quantum computers, the difficult problems such as ECDLP and DLP have also been proven to be solvable in polynomial time, leading to new threats. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a provably secure and anti-quantum authentication protocol based on randomized RLWE. The protocol not only meets the pre-defined security requirements, but also reduces the total delay of the authentication phase based on the pre-negotiation and fewer authentication transmission. In addition, a concise handover scheme is designed for signal handover scenarios caused by satellite dynamic topology. Further rigorous formal and informal security proofs and performance analysis show that our proposed protocol is more applicable to SIN, while ensuring higher security and resisting various attacks with lower authentication delay.
Currently, space information network (SIN) has become an increasingly important role in real life. As a large heterogeneous wireless network, SIN can better provide global mobile services to users anytime and anywhere, even in extreme geographic environments. In addition, there is no need to build the communication base-stations every few kilometers on the ground to ensure high service quality, which greatly reduces the construction costs and can be used as an economical communication method in sparsely populated areas. So there is a trend that more and more end users are more likely to get SIN services than traditional terrestrial cellular networks. However, due to the openness and publicity of the satellite wireless channel and the limited resources of the satellite nodes, the privacy and security cannot be perfectly guaranteed and may even be vulnerable to attacks initiated by the adversary such as replay attacks, impersonation attacks, and eavesdropping attacks. To improve the access security of SIN, researchers have proposed a series of authentication protocols based on different cryptographic assumptions. Nevertheless, existing research shows that these protocols cannot meet the requirements of higher and higher security and short authentication delay. In addition, these protocols are mainly based on public key cryptography mechanisms such as DLP and ECDLP, which can be solved by postquantum computers in polynomial time, so these protocols will no longer be secure. To solve the vulnerability of these protocols, in this paper, we propose a new RLWE-based anonymous mutual authentication and key agreement protocol, which guarantees higher security with low computational overhead even in the postquantum era. Detailed security analysis shows that our protocol meets security requirements and is resistant to a variety of known attacks. Besides, combining security comparison and performance analysis, our proposed protocol is more practical than other protocols in SIN.
With the continuous development of satellite communication and Internet of things technology, more and more devices can access space information networks (SIN) and enjoy satellite services everywhere in the world. However, due to the openness of the air-to-ground channel, the device will face a series of security threats when accessing SIN, such as replay attacks, eavesdropping attacks, impersonation attacks, and man-in-the-middle attacks. These security threats will lead to illegal entity access and further endanger the reliability and availability of the system. Although scholars have proposed many enhanced security access authentication protocols, most of them have been proved to have security vulnerabilities. In addition, with the development of quantum computing, the previous authentication protocols based on some asymmetric cryptographic mechanisms such as discrete logarithm and elliptic curve cryptographic mechanisms may face new security challenges. In this context, this paper proposes a novel anti-quantum access authentication protocol based on ring learning with errors (RLWE), which meets more security requirements and greatly reduces the authentication delay through pre-negotiation. Through the security analysis and performance analysis, it is shown that our protocol can be more suitable for delay-sensitive IoT devices to access SIN while ensuring higher security.
The Space Information Network (SIN) plays a crucial role in terrestrial communication, delivering time-bound services from ground stations to users. It relies on moving low-orbit earth (LEO) satellites for uninterrupted coverage. However, untrustworthy connectivity poses several security challenges during handover services for users maintained by the satellites. While traditional cryptographic techniques provide a degree of security, the advent of quantum computing exposes significant vulnerabilities. This work proposes a quantum-safe and continuous authentication mechanism with handover provision. The proposed authentication protocol uses post-quantum primitives of the Frodo key encapsulation mechanism, currently an approved mechanism under ISO/IEC 18033-2. It ensures privacy and ensures users’ anonymity. The security of the proposed protocol is analyzed using the quantum random oracle (QROM) model. Formal verification confirms its safety for practical adoption as a post-quantum candidate. Further, the performance evaluation shows an authentication delay and energy consumption of the proposed protocol within practical limits, making it a suitable candidate for privacy-preserved post-quantum adoption for SIN.
Space information network (SIN), which has the characteristics of large capacity, high reliability, and wide coverage, can be effectively applied to the Internet of Things (IoT) business. However, SIN is vulnerable to various attacks due to its highly exposed links, and the power and processing capacity of satellites and IoT devices (IoTDs) are usually limited. Meanwhile, massive IoTDs connecting to SIN in an instant incur a severe signaling congestion and there is no authentication protocol proposed for massive IoTDs in SIN. In this article, we first propose a novel semi-aggregated signature mechanism and session key agreement mechanism. Then, based on the above two mechanisms, we propose a novel access authentication scheme named lattice-based access authentication (LAA) which contains two types of lattice-based authentication protocols: 1) LAA for massive IoTDs and 2) LAA for a single IoTD. The security analysis by employing the formal provable security analysis, the automation verification tool named Scyther, the Burrows-Abadi-Needham-logic, and the informal security analysis demonstrate that our proposed protocols successfully achieve these security properties, including mutual authentication, conditional anonymity, unlinkability, data confidentiality, data integrity, unforgeability, undeniability, key establishment, perfect forward/backward secrecy (PFS/PBS), and resistance against protocol attacks and quantum attacks. We further evaluate the performance of our proposed protocols with regard to signaling overhead, transmission overhead, computational overhead, and authentication delay, which shows that our proposed protocols can provide high efficiency.
Summary Satellite's communication system is used to communicate under significant distance and circumstances where the other communication systems are not comfortable. Since all the data are exchanged over a public channel, so the security of the data is an essential component for the communicating parties. Both key exchange and authentication are two cryptographic tools to establish a secure communication between two parties. Currently, various kinds of authentication protocols are available to establish a secure network, but all of them depend on number–theoretical (discrete logarithm problem/factorization assumption) hard assumptions. Due to Shor's and Grover's computing algorithm number theoretic assumptions are breakable by quantum computers. Although Kumar and Garg have proposed a quantum attack‐resistant protocol for satellite communication, it cannot resist stolen smart card attack. We have analyzed that how Kumar and Garg is vulnerable to the stolen smart card attack using differential power analysis attack described in He et al and Chen and Chen. We have also analyzed the modified version of signal leakage attack and sometimes called improved signal leakage attack on Kumar and Garg's protocol. We have tried to construct a secure and efficient authentication protocol for satellites communication that is secure against quantum computing. This is more efficient as it requires only three messages of exchange. This paper includes security proof and performance of the proposed authentication and key agreement protocol.
Quantum Satellite Communications is a novel branch of transmissions which exploit quantum cryptography phenomena to guarantee the secrecy of quantum cryptographic keys. We report on the development of a Quantum Cryptographic Networks for approach to more secure space communications, including a Handover or Handoff systems and a faint pulse laser source. Through that can be used to encrypt classical message, it will allow the development of global communication with unprecedented security. A big step in the communications from the public service links between users all over the surface of the earth, how it is a major concern for all researchers to improve the yield and quality of telecommunications satellite in the world by improving the characteristics of the handover to achieve global coverage. The essential work carried in our research paper concerns approach development to implement Quantum Communications in satellite constellations networks, in object to reduce the telecommunication interruption risks and this will provide indeed of better free space communication quality.