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arXiv:2202.02615

In defense of Relational Quantum Mechanics: A note on `Qubits are not observers'

Aurélien Drezet

Published Feb 5, 2022• 1 citation
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

This is a short note to answer Brukner's objection [see arXiv:2107.03513] to Rovelli's theory and concerning the preferred basis problem.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2202.02615

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•Jan 1, 2016•0 citations
In this chapter Rovelli’s relational interpretation of quantum mechanics (RQM) is defended from some foreseeable objections, so as to clarify its distinctive philosophical implications. In particular, the chapter considers whether RQM presupposes a duality of evolutions and of ontology (the relationality of quantum world and the intrinsicality of the classical world). It then concentrates on the pluralistic, anti-monistic metaphysical consequences of the theory, due to the impossibility of assigning a quantum state to the entire universe. Finally interesting consequences of RQM with respect to the possibility of defining a local, quantum relativistic becoming are noted. Given the difficulties with the cosmic form of becoming required by priority monism, RQM seems to present an important advantage with respect to monistic views, at least as far as the possibility of explaining our experience of time is concerned.
In this paper I present and defend Rovelli's relation quantum mechanics from some foreseeable objections, so as to clarify its philosophical implications vis a vis rival interpretations. In particular I ask whether RQM presupposes a hidden recourse to both a duality of evolutions and of ontology (the relationality of quantum world and the intrinsicness of the classical world, which in the limit must be recovered from the former). I then concentrate on the pluralistic, antimonistic metaphysical consequences of the theory, due to the impossibility of assigning a state to the quantum universe. Finally, in the last section I note interesting consequences of RQM with respect to the possibility of defining a local, quantum relativistic becoming (in flat spacetimes).Given the difficulties of having the cosmic form of becoming that would be appropriate for priority monism, RQM seems to present an important advantage with respect to monistic views, at least as far as the possibility of explaining our experience of time is concerned.
In the first section I present in some details Rovelli’s RMQ. In the second I defend it from some foreseeable objections, so as to clarify its philosophical implications vis à vis some rival but closely related interpretations. In particular I ask whether RQM presupposes a hidden recourse to a duality of both temporal evolutions and ontology (the relationality of quantum world and the intrinsicness of the classical world, which in the limit must be recovered from the former world). In the fourth section I concentrate on the pluralistic, antimonistic metaphysical consequences of the theory, due to the impossibility of assigning a state to the quantum universe. Finally, in the last section I note some interesting consequences of RQM with respect to the possibility of defining a local, quantum relativistic becoming (in flat spacetimes). Given the difficulties of having the cosmic form of becoming that would be appropriate for priority monism, RQM seems to present an important advantage with respect to monistic views, at least insofar far as the possibility of explaining our experience of time is concerned.