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arXiv:2202.01438

How the Many Worlds Interpretation brings Common Sense to Paradoxical Quantum Experiments

Kelvin J. McQueen, Lev Vaidman A

Published Feb 3, 2022• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) states that the world we live in is just one among many parallel worlds. It is widely believed that because of this commitment to parallel worlds, the MWI violates common sense. Some go so far as to reject the MWI on this basis. This is despite its myriad of advantages to physics (e.g. consistency with relativity theory, mathematical simplicity, realism, determinism, etc.). Here, we make the case that common sense in fact favors the MWI. We argue that causal explanations are commonsensical only when they are local causal explanations. We present several quantum mechanical experiments that seem to exhibit nonlocal "action at a distance". Under the assumption that only one world exists, these experiments seem immune to local causal explanation. However, we show that the MWI, by taking all worlds together, can provide local causal explanations of the experiments. The MWI therefore restores common sense to physical explanation.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2202.01438

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The many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) states that the world we live in is just one among many parallel worlds. It is widely believed that because of this commitment to parallel worlds, the MWI violates common sense. Some go so far as to reject the MWI on this basis. This is despite its myriad of advantages to physics (e.g. consistency with relativity theory, mathematical simplicity, realism, determinism, etc.). Here, we make the case that common sense in fact favors the MWI. We argue that causal explanations are commonsensical only when they are local causal explanations. We present several quantum mechanical experiments that seem to exhibit nonlocal "action at a distance". Under the assumption that only one world exists, these experiments seem immune to local causal explanation. However, we show that the MWI, by taking all worlds together, can provide local causal explanations of the experiments. The MWI therefore restores common sense to physical explanation.
This chapter argues that locality is a necessary condition for causal explanations to be commonsensical. It takes it as a requirement on an adequate physical theory that it be able to offer local causal explanations of all experimental outcomes. The chapter discusses how the demand for local causal explanation shaped classical physics. It introduces quantum physics in the context of a simple experiment, which although strange, can be explained locally. It specifies three refined common sense principles of locality. These principles are satisfied by classical physics and by the simple quantum experiment. The chapter also presents several quantum experiments that do seem to violate the principles and therefore defy common sense. It shows that common sense can be restored to quantum theory if we adopt the many worlds interpretation. The chapter also discusses the significance of our results to debates over the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
n their contribution to this book, McQueen and Vaidman argue that common sense requires that explanations in physics be not only causal1 but also local. Their main claim is that the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics (originally due to Everett) provides local explanations of the outcomes of experiments that in other interpretations of quantum mechanics seem to require (some sort of) nonlocality. Particles in the MWI leave traces both in the world where they exist but also in other worlds in which they do not exist. So the explanation is said to be local because spacetime splits together with the particles so that there is no influence at space-like separation within a world, but the causal influence literally travels across ‘parallel’ worlds. This seems to stretch the concept of locality beyond common sense, if not beyond breaking point, even if one understands causation weakly in terms of counterfactual dependence rather than by straightforward physical interaction.
Quantum nonlocality is shown to be an artifact of the Copenhagen interpretation, in which each observed quantity has exactly one value at any instant. In reality, all physical systems obey quantum mechanics, which obeys no such rule. Locality is restored if observed and observer are both assumed to obey quantum mechanics, as in the many-worlds interpretation (MWI). Using the MWI, I show that the quantum side of Bell's inequality, generally believed nonlocal, is really due to a series of three measurements (not two as in the standard, oversimplified analysis), all three of which have only local effects. Thus, experiments confirming "nonlocality" are actually confirming the MWI. The mistaken interpretation of nonlocality experiments depends crucially on a question-begging version of the Born interpretation, which makes sense only in "collapse" versions of quantum theory, about the meaning of the modulus of the wave function, so I use the interpretation based on the MWI, namely that the wave function is a world density amplitude, not a probability amplitude. This view allows the Born interpretation to be derived directly from the Schrödinger equation, by applying the Schrödinger equation to both the observed and the observer.
Quantum nonlocality may be an artifact of the assumption that observers obey the laws of classical mechanics, while observed systems obey quantum mechanics. I show that, at least in the case of Bell's Theorem, locality is restored if observed and observer are both assumed to obey quantum mechanics, as in the Many-Worlds Interpretation. Using the MWI, I shall show that the apparently "non-local" expectation value for the product of the spins of two widely separated particles --- the "quantum" part of Bell's Theorem --- is really due to a series of three purely local measurements. Thus, experiments confirming "nonlocality" are actually confirming the MWI.
As cutting-edge experiments display ever more extreme forms of non-classical behavior, the prevailing view on the interpretation of quantum mechanics appears to be gradually changing. A (highly unscientific) poll taken at the 1997 UMBC quantum mechanics workshop gave the once all-dominant Copenhagen interpretation less than half of the votes. The Many Worlds interpretation (MWI) scored second, comfortably a head of the Consistent Histories and Bohm interpretations. It is argued that since all the above-mentioned approaches to nonrelativistic quantum mechanics give identical cookbook prescriptions for how to calculate things in practice, practical-minded experimentalists, who have traditionally adopted the “shut-up-and-calculate interpretation”, typically show little interest in whether cozy classical concepts are in fact real in some untestable metaphysical sense or merely the way we subjectively perceive a mathematically simpler world where the Schrödinger equation describes everything – and that they are therefore becoming less bothered by a profusion of worlds than by a profusion of words. Common objections to the MWI are discussed. It is argued that when environment-induced decoherence is taken into account, the experimental predictions of the MWI are identical to those of the Copenhagen interpretation except for an experiment involving a Byzantine form of “quantum suicide”. This makes the choice between them purely a matter of taste, roughly equivalent to whether one believes mathematical language or human language to be more fundamental.