The formalism of generalized probabilistic theories (GPTs) was originally developed as a way to characterize the landscape of conceivable physical theories. Thus, the GPT describing a given physical theory necessarily includes all physically possible processes. We here consider the question of how to provide a GPT-like characterization of a particular experimental setup within a given physical theory. We show that the resulting characterization is not generally a GPT in and of itself, rather, it is described by a more general mathematical object that we introduce and term an accessible GPT fragment. We then introduce an equivalence relation, termed cone equivalence, between accessible GPT fragments (and, as a special case, between standard GPTs). We give a number of examples of experimental scenarios that are best described using accessible GPT fragments, and where moreover, cone-equivalence arises naturally. We then prove that an accessible GPT fragment admits of a classical explanation if and only if every other fragment that is cone equivalent to it also admits of a classical explanation. Finally, we leverage this result to prove several fundamental results regarding the experimental requirements for witnessing the failure of generalized noncontextuality. In particular, we prove that neither incompatibility among measurements nor the assumption of freedom of choice is necessary for witnessing failures of generalized noncontextuality, and moreover, that such failures can be witnessed even when using arbitrarily inefficient detectors.
The formalism of generalized probabilistic theories (GPTs) was originally developed as a way to characterize the landscape of conceivable physical theories. Thus, the GPT describing a given physical theory necessarily includes all physically possible processes. We here consider the question of how to provide a GPT-like characterization of a particular experimental setup within a given physical theory. We show that the resulting characterization is not generally a GPT in and of itself, rather, it is described by a more general mathematical object that we introduce and term an accessible GPT fragment. We then introduce an equivalence relation, termed cone equivalence, between accessible GPT fragments (and, as a special case, between standard GPTs). We give a number of examples of experimental scenarios that are best described using accessible GPT fragments, and where moreover, cone-equivalence arises naturally. We then prove that an accessible GPT fragment admits of a classical explanation if and only if every other fragment that is cone equivalent to it also admits of a classical explanation. Finally, we leverage this result to prove several fundamental results regarding the experimental requirements for witnessing the failure of generalized noncontextuality. In particular, we prove that neither incompatibility among measurements nor the assumption of freedom of choice is necessary for witnessing failures of generalized noncontextuality, and moreover, that such failures can be witnessed even when using arbitrarily inefficient detectors.
It is commonly believed that failures of tomographic completeness undermine assessments of nonclassicality in noncontextuality experiments. In this work, we study how such failures can indeed lead to mistaken assessments of nonclassicality. We then show that proofs of the failure of noncontextuality are robust to a very broad class of failures of tomographic completeness, including the kinds of failures that are likely to occur in real experiments. We do so by showing that such proofs actually rely on a much weaker assumption that we term relative tomographic completeness : namely, that one's experimental procedures are tomographic for each other . Thus, the failure of noncontextuality can be established even with coarse-grained, effective, emergent, or virtual degrees of freedom. This also implies that the existence of a deeper theory of nature (beyond that being probed in one's experiment) does not in and of itself pose any challenge to proofs of nonclassicality. To prove these results, we first introduce a number of useful new concepts within the framework of generalized probabilistic theories (GPTs). Most notably, we introduce the notion of a GPT s u b s y s t e m , generalizing a range of preexisting notions of subsystems (including those arising from tensor products, direct sums, decoherence processes, virtual encodings, and more). We also introduce the notion of a s h a d o w of a GPT fragment, which captures the information lost when one's states and effects are unknowingly not tomographic for one another.
To make precise the sense in which the operational predictions of quantum theory conflict with a classical worldview, it is necessary to articulate a notion of classicality within an operational framework.A widely applicable notion of classicality of this sort is whether or not the predictions of a given operational theory can be explained by a generalized-noncontextual ontological model.We here explore what notion of classicality this implies for the generalized probabilistic theory (GPT) that arises from a given operational theory, focusing on prepare-measure scenarios.We first show that, when mapping an operational theory to a GPT by quotienting relative to operational equivalences, the constraint of explainability by a generalized-noncontextual ontological model is mapped to the constraint of explainability by an ontological model.We then show that, under the additional assumption that the ontic state space is of finite cardinality, this constraint on the GPT can be expressed as a geometric condition which we term simplex embeddability.Whereas the traditional notion of classicality for a GPT is that its state space be a simplex and its effect space be the dual of this simplex, simplex embeddability merely requires that its state space be embeddable in a simplex and its effect space in the dual of that simplex.We argue that simplex embeddability constitutes an intuitive and freestanding notion of classicality for GPTs.Our result also has applications to witnessing nonclassicality in prepare-measure experiments.
Generalized contextuality refers to our inability of explaining measurement statistics using a contextindependent probabilistic and ontological model.On the other hand, measurement statistics can also be modeled using the framework of general probabilistic theories (GPTs).Here, starting from a construction of GPTs based on a Gleason-type theorem, we fully characterize these structures with respect to their permission and rejection of generalized (non)contextual ontological models.It follows that in any GPT construction the three insistence of (i) the no-restriction hypothesis, (ii) the ontological noncontextuality, and (iii) multiple nonrefinable measurements for any fixed number of outcomes are incompatible.Hence, any GPT satisfying the no-restriction hypothesis is ontologically noncontextual if and only if it is simplicial.We give a detailed discussion of GPTs for which the no-restriction hypothesis is violated, and show that they can always be considered as subtheories (subGPTs) of GPTs satisfying the hypothesis.It is shown that subGPTs are ontologically noncontextual if and only if they are subtheories of simplicial GPTs of the same dimensionality.Finally, we establish as a corollary the necessary and sufficient condition for a single resourceful measurement or state to promote an ontologically noncontextual (i.e., classical) general probabilistic theory to an ontologically contextual (i.e., nonclassical) one under the no-restriction hypothesis.
To date, quantum theory is the most successful physical theory that has been discovered. However, there is still the possibility that an inconsistency between experimental observations and the predictions of quantum theory may one day be found, thus prompting the replacement of quantum theory with a superior, post-quantum theory. To narrow down the scope of possibilities for the true theory that describes nature, one can perform experiments that falsify other physical theories, by demonstrating an incompatibility between experimental observations and the predictions of these theories. This thesis details two such experiments. First we provide relevant background information, beginning with a review of experimental quantum optics. Next, we review noncontextual ontological theories and discuss requirements for experimental tests of such theories. Finally, we discuss the framework of generalised probabilistic theories before introducing the two experiments. \n \n \nThe first experiment is a test of noncontextual ontological (or hidden-variable) models of nature. An ontological model of a physical theory is one in which systems have preexisting properties, and a noncontextual ontological model is one in which systems that are indistinguishable experimentally are represented identically in the model. Physical theories that cannot be represented by a noncontextual ontological model are said to be nonclassical; quantum theory is an example of such a physical theory that is nonclassical in this sense. Prior to this thesis, experimental tests of the assumption of noncontextuality had assumed that the experiments were free of both systematic and statistical errors, which is not justifiable for any experiment. We introduce new analytical techniques that allow us to avoid making these assumptions, and perform an experiment with single photons that, with high confidence, rules out the possibility of describing nature with a noncontextual ontological model. \n \n \nThe second experiment is a demonstration of self-consistent state and measurement tomography in the framework of generalised probabilistic theories (GPTs). The GPT framework is a very general, operationally-motivated framework for describing a physical theory in terms of the observable events predicted by the theory. We develop a technique for inferring the GPT description of a set of states and measurements directly from experimental data. By analysing our data in this general framework, we are able to test various candidate physical theories of nature. We perform an experiment with single photons, and quantify the size of possible variations between quantum theory and the true physical theory that describes nature.
Inspired by its fundamental importance in quantum mechanics, we define and study the notion of entanglement for abstract physical theories, investigating its profound connection with the concept of superposition. We adopt the formalism of general probabilistic theories (GPTs), encompassing all physical models whose predictive power obeys minimal requirements. Examples include classical theories, which do not exhibit superposition and whose state space has the shape of a simplex, quantum mechanics, as well as more exotic models such as Popescu-Rohrlich boxes. We call two GPTs entangleable if their composite admits either entangled states or entangled measurements, and conjecture that any two non-classical theories are in fact entangleable. We present substantial evidence towards this conjecture by proving it (1) for the simplest case of 3-dimensional theories; (2) when the local state spaces are discrete, which covers foundationally relevant cases; (3) when one of the local theories is quantum mechanics. Furthermore, (4) we envision the existence of a quantitative relation between local non-classicality and global entangleability, explicitly describing it in the geometrically natural case where the local state spaces are centrally symmetric.
When should a given operational phenomenology be deemed to admit of a classical explanation? When it can be realized in a generalized-noncontextual ontological model. The case for answering the question in this fashion has been made in many previous works and motivates research on the notion of generalized noncontextuality. Many criticisms and concerns have been raised, however, regarding the definition of this notion and of the possibility of testing it experimentally. In this work, we respond to some of the most common of these objections. One such objection is that the existence of a classical record of which laboratory procedure was actually performed in each run of an experiment implies that the operational equivalence relations that are a necessary ingredient of any proof of the failure of noncontextuality do not hold, and consequently that conclusions of nonclassicality based on these equivalences are mistaken. We explain why this concern is unfounded. Our response affords the opportunity for us to clarify certain facts about generalized noncontextuality, such as the possibility of having proofs of its failure based on a consideration of the subsystem structure of composite systems. Similarly, through our responses to each of the other objections, we elucidate some under-appreciated facts about the notion of generalized noncontextuality and experimental tests thereof.