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arXiv:2106.07312

On the paper "Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself"

Antonio Bernal

Published Jun 14, 2021• 0 citations
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Abstract

In the paper "Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself" by D. Frauchiger and R. Renner an atempt is made at proving a "no-go theorem" that states that either quantum theory cannot be universally applied, even to macroscopic systems, or some very intuitive properties concerning recursive reasoning and uniquenes of physical values must be false. In this paper, we give a concise description of the paper's result, and expose a detail in the proof.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2106.07312

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In the paper "Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself" by D. Frauchiger and R. Renner an atempt is made at proving a "no-go theorem" that states that either quantum theory cannot be universally applied, even to macroscopic systems, or some very intuitive properties concerning recursive reasoning and uniquenes of physical values must be false. In this paper, we give a concise description of the paper's result, and expose a detail in the proof.
In a recent publication in Nature Communications by Frauchiger and Renner (Nat. Commun. 9, 3711 (2018)), a Gedankenexperiment was proposed, which was claimed to be able to lead to inconsistent conclusions with a self-referential use of quantum theory. Thus it seems to prove that quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself. Shortly after, Chen and Zhang suggested an improvement (arXiv:1810.01080) which can made the explanation of the Gedankenexperiment become consistent. Here we show that from the viewpoint of any quantum interpretation theory which agrees that there is collapse of the wavefunction when being measured (e.g., the Copenhagen interpretation), the original conclusions of Frauchiger and Renner actually came from an incorrect description of some quantum states. With the correct description there will be no inconsistent results, even without modifying the original Gedankenexperiment.
Theoretical physics has faced many challenges since the advent of quantum mechanics. Recently, Frauchiger and Renner have presented a no-go theorem, which makes quantum mechanics more controversial. However, from our perspective, the process of proving appears questionable. Therefore, we discuss the validity of their proof approach in this letter. Here, we propose a simple thought experiment that clarifies how correctly the attributed quantum state can be written in problems similar to Frauchiger and Renner's Gedankenexperiment. In the next step, with the help of the correct form of the quantum state, it is demonstrated that a fallacy occurred in the proof of the no-go theorem, which means it cannot be valid because of the wrong proof. Ultimately, getting help from Hardy's paradox, we investigate whether there is an approach to modify their proof in order to lend the no-go theorem validity.
We discuss the no-go theorem of Frauchiger and Renner based on an "extended Wigner's friend" thought experiment which is supposed to show that any single-world interpretation of quantum mechanics leads to inconsistent predictions if it is applicable on all scales. We show that no such inconsistency occurs if one considers a complete description of the physical situation. We then discuss implications of the thought experiment that have not been clearly addressed in the original paper, including a tension between relativity and nonlocal effects predicted by quantum mechanics. Our discussion applies in particular to Bohmian mechanics.
Considering a complicated extension of a Wigner's friend scenario, Frauchiger and Renner (FR) allegedly showed that "quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself". However, such a result has been under severe criticism, as it has been convincingly argued to crucially depend on an implicit, non-trivial assumption regarding details of the collapse mechanism. In consequence, the result is not as robust or general as intended. On top of all this, in this work we show that a much simpler arrangement--basically an EPR setting--is sufficient to derive a result fully analogous to that of FR. Moreover, we claim that all lessons learned from FR's result are essentially contained within the original EPR paper. We conclude that FR's result does not offer any novel insights into the conceptual problems of quantum theory.
In the history of quantum physics several no-go theorems have been proved, and many of them have played a central role in the development of the theory, such as Bell's or the Kochen-Specker theorem. A recent paper by F. Laudisa has raised reasonable doubts concerning the strategy followed in proving some of these results, since they rely on the standard framework of quantum mechanics, a theory that presents several ontological problems. The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, I intend to reinforce Laudisa's methodological point by critically discussing Malament's theorem in the context of the philosophical foundation of Quantum Field Theory; secondly, I rehabilitate Gisin's theorem showing that Laudisa's concerns do not apply to it.