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arXiv:2101.05560 · Quantum Information and Computation

Secure multi-party quantum conference and XOR computation

Nayana Das, Goutam Paul

Published Feb 10, 2021• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Quantum conference is a process of securely exchanging messages between three or more parties, using quantum resources. A Measurement Device Independent Quantum Dialogue (MDI-QD) protocol, which is secure against information leakage, has been proposed (Quantum Information Processing 16.12 (2017): 305) in 2017, is proven to be insecure against intercept-and-resend attack strategy. We first modify this protocol and generalize this MDI-QD to a three-party quantum conference and then to a multi-party quantum conference. We also propose a protocol for quantum multi-party XOR computation. None of these three protocols proposed here use entanglement as a resource and we prove the correctness and security of our proposed protocols.

DOI
10.26421/qic21.3-4-2

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Quantum conference is a process of securely exchanging messages between three or more parties, using quantum resources. A Measurement Device Independent Quantum Dialogue (MDI-QD) protocol, which is secure against information leakage, has been proposed (Quantum Information Processing 16.12 (2017): 305) in 2017, is proven to be insecure against intercept-and-resend attack strategy. We first modify this protocol and generalize this MDI-QD to a three-party quantum conference and then to a multi-party quantum conference. We also propose a protocol for quantum multi-party XOR computation. None of these three protocols proposed here use entanglement as a resource and we prove the correctness and security of our proposed protocols.
Abstract In this paper, we propose a measurement-device-independent (MDI) quantum secure multiparty summation protocol based on entanglement swapping. The protocol is capable of providing a secure modulo-2 summation method for n parties. Our protocol uses Bell states as the information vehicle and establishes encryption through entanglement swapping, and each party encodes the information orderly to complete the summation process through the simple single-qubit operation. In contrast to previous protocols, there is no pre-shared private key sequence and key storage process in our protocol, which helps to reduce the possibility of information leakage in transmission. Our protocol supports multiple summations by n participants, which improves quantum resource utilization. The protocol can be implemented with linear-optical devices. Furthermore, it can resist multiple attack modes including the intercept-resend attack, entangle-and-measure attack, dishonest third-party attack, and parties’ attack. Most significantly, the protocol enables to eliminate all side-channel attacks against detectors based on the MDI principle. Therefore, the protocol has advantages of high security, high efficiency, and good feasibility.
Quantum dialogue is a process of two-way secure and simultaneous communication using a single channel. Recently, a Measurement Device Independent Quantum Dialogue (MDI-QD) protocol has been proposed [A. Maitra, Measurement device independent quantum dialogue,Quantum Inf. Process. 16(12) (2017) 305]. To make the protocol secure against information leakage, the authors have discarded almost half of the qubits remaining after the error estimation phase. In this paper, we propose two modified versions of the MDI-QD protocol such that the number of discarded qubits is reduced to almost one-fourth of the remaining qubits after the error estimation phase. We use almost half of their discarded qubits along with their used qubits to make our protocol more efficient in qubits count. We show that both of our protocols are secure under the same adversarial model given in MDI-QD protocol.
Very recently, the experimental demonstration of Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC) with state-of-the-art atomic quantum memory has been reported (Phys. Rev. Lett., 2017). Quantum Dialogue (QD) falls under QSDC where the secrete messages are communicated simultaneously between two legitimate parties. The successful experimental demonstration of QSDC opens up the possibilities for practical implementation of QD protocols. Thus, it is necessary to analyze the practical security issues of QD protocols for future implementation. Since the very first proposal for QD by Nguyen (Phys. Lett. A, 2004) a large number of variants and extensions have been presented till date. However, all of those leak half of the secret bits to the adversary through classical communications of the measurement results. In this direction, motivated by the idea of Lo et al. (Phys. Rev. Lett., 2012), we propose a Measurement Device Independent Quantum Dialogue (MDI-QD) scheme which is resistant to such information leakage as well as side channel attacks. In the proposed protocol, Alice and Bob, two legitimate parties, are allowed to prepare the states only. The states are measured by an untrusted third party (UTP) who may himself behave as an adversary. We show that our protocol is secure under this adversarial model. The current protocol does not require any quantum memory and thus it is inherently robust against memory attacks. Such robustness might not be guaranteed in the QSDC protocol with quantum memory (Phys. Rev. Lett., 2017).
An entanglement-based quantum dialogue protocol [Phys. Lett. A 328 (2004) 6] is proven to be insecure: that is, in the protocol an eavesdropper can steal the secret messages without being detected provided that he/she adopts the intercept-and-resend attack strategy. We modify the protocol, i.e. in the control mode, by introducing and randomly choosing two sets of measuring basis: the intercept-and-resend attack can be accordingly detected. Hence, within the present version two users can securely and simultaneously exchange their secret messages.
An entanglement-based quantum dialogue protocol [Phys. Lett. A 328 (2004) 6] is proven to be insecure: that is, in the protocol an eavesdropper can steal the secret messages without being detected provided that he/she adopts the intercept-and-resend attack strategy. We modify the protocol, i.e. in the control mode, by introducing and randomly choosing two sets of measuring basis: the intercept-and-resend attack can be accordingly detected. Hence, within the present version two users can securely and simultaneously exchange their secret messages.