In this study, I argue that the future is not open if quantum mechanics is complete. An open future means that the value observed when measuring a physical quantity in the future is not determined. At first glance, quantum mechanics seems to support the open future thesis, because it cannot always predict measurement value with certainty. However, many interpretations regard quantum mechanics as deterministic. These interpretations only suggest that the quantum mechanical world can be deterministic. I argue that, although quantum mechanics cannot predict the future with certainty, the quantum mechanical world must bedeterministic, and the value observed by the observer is determined. I examine the following two cases: (1) the wave-function completely describes the physical state and (2) the wave-function does not describe the physical state. Then, I argue that the future cannot be open in either case when quantum mechanics is complete.
In this study, I argue that the future is not open if quantum mechanics is complete. An open future means that the value observed when measuring a physical quantity in the future is not determined. At first glance, quantum mechanics seems to support the open future thesis, because it cannot always predict measurement value with certainty. However, many interpretations regard quantum mechanics as deterministic. These interpretations only suggest that the quantum mechanical world can be deterministic. I argue that, although quantum mechanics cannot predict the future with certainty, the quantum mechanical world must bedeterministic, and the value observed by the observer is determined. I examine the following two cases: (1) the wave-function completely describes the physical state and (2) the wave-function does not describe the physical state. Then, I argue that the future cannot be open in either case when quantum mechanics is complete.
In a complete theory there is an element corresponding to each element of reality. A sufficient condition for the reality of a physical quantity is the possibility of predicting it with certainty, without disturbing the system. In quantum mechanics in the case of two physical quantities described by non-commuting operators, the knowledge of one precludes the knowledge of the other. Then either (1) the description of reality given by the wave function in quantum mechanics is not complete or (2) these two quantities cannot have simultaneous reality. Consideration of the problem of making predictions concerning a system on the basis of measurements made on another system that had previously interacted with it leads to the result that if (1) is false then (2) is also false. One is thus led to conclude that the description of reality as given by a wave function is not complete.
It is argued that although quantum theory isn't an absolutely deterministic theory, it is partially deterministic. The approach followed here is in the framework of the standard (Copenhagen interpretation of) quantum mechanics without any additional assumption or alternative interpretation. The argument is based on the conceptual meaning of determinism and by means of some well-known phenomena in the quantum world (measurement of a quantum particle spin, energy values and spatial states of an electron in atoms, the so-called wavefunction collapse problem) which are usually considered in rejecting determinism.
Classical science and in fact Post-Newtonian science up till the early twentieth century were mired in a deterministic interpretation of realities. The deterministic hypothesis in science holds that everything in nature has a cause and if one could know the antecedent causes, he could predict the future with certainty. But quantum mechanics holds that sub-atomic particles, though the ultimate materials from which all the complexity of existence in the universe emerges, do not obey deterministic laws, hence, their activities are causally indeterminate and could only be understood with probability. This paper argues that quantum mechanics can not totally be free from determinism, for it has subtly conceded to determinism in holding that the sub-atomic particles are the building blocks of the macro world, and that there is interconnection between entities in the universe, even at the nonmanifest level. The probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics only betray our human limitation of the knowledge of nature, which, I believe still have lots of tricks in our sleeves over mankind. Sophia: An African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 8(1) 2005:72-79 Keywords: Keywords:
Determinism is related to other fundamental concepts such as causality. However, with the growth of quantum physics, determinism became a scientific "dilemma" and has created many challenges in various contemporary sciences. Most of modern physicists chose elimination of determinism. The basic question is: Is determinism completely removable? To answer this question, this paper is to investigate this concept analytically. At first we consider different aspects of the terminology and definition of determinism. Particularly, we pay attention to different kinds of determinism including global/local domain, complete/incomplete form, and the main factor in the formation of events. It is discussed that although determinism took a complete and universal form in classical physics, because of some philosophical ideas, determinism changed into a different concept, even as a problem and an undesirable element, in the standard (Copenhagen interpretation of) quantum mechanics. It is explained that determinism is a complex concept with a number of aspects and characteristics. Prediction, the world accessibility, and connection between the past and the future are the characteristics of the concept of determinism which cannot be set aside from the science. The final result is that, without any pre-assumption or alternative interpretation as what is done in already known realistic and deterministic theories as Bohmian quantum mechanics and/or many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, determinism cannot be completely denied in the standard (Copenhagen interpretation of) quantum mechanics.
The dissertation is a defense of the following conditional claim: if there are objective collapses of the wavefunction, then the future is genuinely open. Although this is no radically new idea, the strategy I shall use to defend it is a new one. It proceeds in two main steps. First, building upon the recent literature on metaphysical indeterminacy in quantum mechanics, I argue for the view that systems in superposition have be interpreted as objectively indeterminate state of affairs. Second, I propose an alternative way to think of openness, according to which the future is open as of t, if and only if there is an indeterminate state of affair S at t, and S becomes determinate at t? (with t? later than t). To argue for the second step, I will give an analysis of the objective collapses of the wavefunction as the becoming determinate of previously indeterminate systems. Furthermore, in developing my arguments, I will also make some remarks concerning the ontology of objective collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics, the issue of whether metaphysical indeterminacy can be at some derivate level of reality, and the possibility of the openness of the future being an emergent phenomenon.
Abstract We discuss the possibilities of determinism in reality, taking under consideration both quantum and classical physics. We present this firstly by questioning the supposed nature of quantum physics as non-deterministic, following the proposal of Penrose: the collapse of the wavefunction interpreted as particular measurements which seem to indicate certain contingency does not actually give the full picture of the reality of the former. In addition to what Penrose suggests, we consider this collapse as part of a bigger deterministic picture. Secondly, we analyse the distinction between this microphysical scenario and our macrophysical experience, in the light of determinism as well. We suggest that this experience can be understood as particular “measurements” similar to what happens in quantum mechanics. For instance, the image of a person with certain identity features is a highlight or particularization of all the possibilities the identity of this person experienced, experiences and will experience through time. The “collapse” is thus linked to individuation, not less real, but incomplete of reality. By linking the domain of quantum physics in a deterministic fashion to the phenomenological or macrophysical realm, we aim to show that a non-contingent character of reality is possible when accepting measurements or particular instances of things as forms of comprehension given by the physical world (thus not just mere subjective interventions). We argue that the complete picture (closer to the wavefunction) cannot give distinctive information (understanding this as differentiation of elements, such as particles in the microphysical domain and a certain colour in the macrophysical one).