The conspiracy of ontic states responding to measurements contextually to comply with noncontextual quantum mechanical probabilities is analyzed for general ontological models. A general physical picture of ontological space structure and how ontic states are disturbed by measurement contexts is presented. A common assumption in ontological models called $\ensuremath{\lambda}$ sufficiency is analyzed and argued to be inconsistent with measurement contextuality for ontological models with certain symmetry in ontic space with respect to quantum states and measurements.
The conspiracy of ontic states responding to measurements contextually to comply with noncontextual quantum mechanical probabilities is analyzed for general ontological models. A general physical picture of ontological space structure and how ontic states are disturbed by measurement contexts is presented. A common assumption in ontological models called \ensuremathλ sufficiency is analyzed and argued to be inconsistent with measurement contextuality for ontological models with certain symmetry in ontic space with respect to quantum states and measurements.
Studying the extent to which realism is compatible with quantum mechanics teaches us something about the quantum mechanical universe, regardless of the validity of such realistic assumptions. It has also recently been appreciated that these kinds of studies are fruitful for questions relating to quantum information and computation. Motivated by this, we extend the ontological model formalism for realistic theories to describe a set of theories emphasizing the role of measurement and preparation devices by introducing `hidden variables' to describe them. We illustrate both the ontological model formalism and our generalization of it through a series of example models taken from the literature. Our extension of the formalism allows us to quantitatively analyze the meaning contextuality (a constraint on successful realistic theories), finding that - taken at face-value - it can be realized as a natural interaction between the configurations of a system and measurement device. However, we also describe a property that we call deficiency, which follows from contextuality, but does not admit such a natural interpretation. Loosely speaking, deficiency breaks a symmetry between preparations and measurements in quantum mechanics. It is the property that the set of ontic states which a system prepared in quantum state psi may actually be in, is strictly smaller than the set of ontic states which would reveal the measurement outcome psi with certainty.
The presence of contextuality in quantum theory was first highlighted by Bell, Kochen and Specker, who discovered that for quantum systems of three or more dimensions, measurements could not be viewed as deterministically revealing pre-existing properties of the system. More precisely, no model can assign deterministic outcomes to the projectors of a quantum measurement in a way that depends only on the projector and not the context (the full set of projectors) in which it appeared, despite the fact that the Born rule probabilities associated with projectors are independent of the context. A more general, operational definition of contextuality introduced by Spekkens, which we will term 'probabilistic contextuality', drops the assumption of determinism and allows for operations other than measurements to be considered contextual. Even two-dimensional quantum mechanics can be shown to be contextual under this generalised notion. Probabilistic noncontextuality represents the postulate that elements of an operational theory that cannot be distinguished from each other based on the statistics of arbitrarily many repeated experiments (they give rise to the same operational probabilities) are ontologically identical. In this paper, we introduce a framework that enables us to distinguish between different noncontextuality assumptions in terms of the relationships between the ontological representations of objects in the theory given a certain relation between their operational representations. This framework can be used to motivate and define a 'possibilistic' analogue, encapsulating the idea that elements of an operational theory that cannot be unambiguously distinguished operationally can also not be unambiguously distinguished ontologically. We then prove that possibilistic noncontextuality is equivalent to an alternative notion of noncontextuality proposed by Hardy. Finally, we demonstrate that these weaker noncontextuality assumptions are sufficient to prove alternative versions of known 'no-go' theorems that constrain ψ -epistemic models for quantum mechanics.
The main question under investigation in this thesis was the reality of the quantum state. We approached this problem by studying a recent no-go result by Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph, namely the PBR theorem. In Section 1 we provided a short introduction to quantum theory. A few relevant examples were covered, namely decompositions of quantum states, impossibility of the ignorance interpretation and the distinguishability of pure quantum states. Section 2 developed measure theoretic tools needed in the framework of ontological models. The Radon-Nikodym theorem was proven in order to justify the use of an alternative expression of the variational distance of probability measures. In Section 3 we developed a general framework for ontological models. In short, the ontological models framework can be considered the most general framework currently available for hidden variable theories and no-go results. We used the measure theoretic tools of Section 2 to make the formalism rigorous. Original research included in Section 3 was the characterization of a property called antidistinguishability for qubit states. A necessary and sufficient condition for antidistinguishability was given. It was then proven that any set of pure qubit states that is not antidistinguishable can be made antidistinguishable by adding a single carefully chosen state into the set. In the end of Section 3, some original observations were presented. Namely, a specific connection with contextuality was proven for sometimes ψ-ontic and never ψ-ontic ontological models. However, it was then noted that these observations were not enough to exclude never ψ-ontic ontological models, a feat that would have provided a new no-go theorem on its own. Contextuality in the ontological models framework was studied in Section 4. The main results were establishing preparation contextuality from the failure of maximal ψ-epistemicity and a proof of Bell's theorem based on preparation contextuality established this way. We concluded that ψ-ontic models cannot be Bell local based on these results. Finally in Section 5 the implications of ψ-ontology were discussed. By careful analysis of the results, it was noted that accepting the reality of the quantum state exposes explanatory gaps in the formalism. Possible solutions to the challenges introduced by these explanatory gaps were discussed through interpretations of quantum mechanics and the so-called measurement problem.
Generalized contextuality refers to our inability of explaining measurement statistics using a contextindependent probabilistic and ontological model.On the other hand, measurement statistics can also be modeled using the framework of general probabilistic theories (GPTs).Here, starting from a construction of GPTs based on a Gleason-type theorem, we fully characterize these structures with respect to their permission and rejection of generalized (non)contextual ontological models.It follows that in any GPT construction the three insistence of (i) the no-restriction hypothesis, (ii) the ontological noncontextuality, and (iii) multiple nonrefinable measurements for any fixed number of outcomes are incompatible.Hence, any GPT satisfying the no-restriction hypothesis is ontologically noncontextual if and only if it is simplicial.We give a detailed discussion of GPTs for which the no-restriction hypothesis is violated, and show that they can always be considered as subtheories (subGPTs) of GPTs satisfying the hypothesis.It is shown that subGPTs are ontologically noncontextual if and only if they are subtheories of simplicial GPTs of the same dimensionality.Finally, we establish as a corollary the necessary and sufficient condition for a single resourceful measurement or state to promote an ontologically noncontextual (i.e., classical) general probabilistic theory to an ontologically contextual (i.e., nonclassical) one under the no-restriction hypothesis.
When it isn't possible to tell two distinct experimental procedures apart purely from their input/output statistics, then it seems a plausible hypothesis that the two procedures must be physically identical. We call such a hypothesis "noncontextuality", an instance of Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Read in the contrapositive, this hypothesis entails that any physical distinctions between two experimental procedures must necessarily lead to a difference in their operational statistics. The results I present in this thesis concern the failure of this hypothesis -- a failure dubbed "contextuality" -- when one tries to embed an operational theory (such as quantum theory) in the ontological models framework. The Kochen-Specker theorem demonstrates the failure of noncontextuality for deterministic ontological models of quantum theory, i.e., those ontological models where the ontic/physical state of the system fixes the outcome of any projective measurement on the system in a deterministic manner. This thesis goes beyond the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem by asking what operational facts must be verified in experiments to conclude that Nature does not admit noncontextual ontological models, not even indeterministic ones. This leads to noncontextuality inequalities that are robust to noise in the preparations and measurements. In the particular case of quantum theory, these inequalities are meaningful even when unsharp measurements (or POVMs) are allowed, a feature not shared by the traditional approach to KS-noncontextuality where unsharp measurements are excluded by fiat: allowing them renders even trivial POVMs (proportional to identity) maximally KS-contextual. The sense in which trivial POVMs are indeed "trivial" (or "noncontextual") is clear in our approach: they are simply too noisy to lead to violation of our noncontextuality inequalities.
What does quantum physics tell us about the nature of reality, specifically the parts of reality we do not directly perceive called hidden variables? One may think it could tell us a lot because of our enhanced technological sensing abilities that delve into the realms that quantum physics covers so well. Surprisingly, it seems to surround us in a deeper mystery rather than reveal more of nature's secrets. It seems that we cannot escape from philosophical consideration when dealing with what is hidden in quantum physics. In Part I we will look at how Epistemology and Ontology bear upon Hidden Variables. In Part II we will consider Hidden Variables in the light of Contextuality, and Non-Classicality. Inevitably questions of subjectivity and objectivity arise in dealing with states of observation. How should we think about these states? Perhaps it is a question of the meaning associated with our knowledge of a state-that is, a question of ontology or epistemology. The issue of ontic and epistemic states is particularly important when considering hidden variables in quantum physics because, as one may argue, the interpretation of quantum states as either ontic or epistemic will naturally lead to different assumptions about how reality is constructed; if it is constructed or not. It also raises the question of what attributes we are able to observe simultaneously and that brings contextuality into the discussion. If it turns out that reality is constructed contextually what does that imply about ontological realism? If on the other hand reality is constructed non-contextually what does that imply about ontological realism? Many implications can arise when considering these questions from a quantum physical point of view. In this paper I shall discuss how quantum physics provides some answers to these questions by considering quantum physical states and their measurements.