Gleason-type theorems for quantum theory allow one to recover the quantum state space by assuming that (i) states consistently assign probabilities to measurement outcomes and that (ii) there is a unique state for every such assignment. We identify the class of general probabilistic theories which also admit Gleason-type theorems. It contains theories satisfying the no-restriction hypothesis as well as others which can simulate such an unrestricted theory arbitrarily well when allowing for post-selection on measurement outcomes. Our result also implies that the standard no-restriction hypothesis applied to effects is not equivalent to the dual no-restriction hypothesis applied to states which is found to be less restrictive.
Gleason-type theorems for quantum theory allow one to recover the quantum state space by assuming that (i) states consistently assign probabilities to measurement outcomes and that (ii) there is a unique state for every such assignment. We identify the class of general probabilistic theories which also admit Gleason-type theorems. It contains theories satisfying the no-restriction hypothesis as well as others which can simulate such an unrestricted theory arbitrarily well when allowing for post-selection on measurement outcomes. Our result also implies that the standard no-restriction hypothesis applied to effects is not equivalent to the dual no-restriction hypothesis applied to states which is found to be less restrictive.
The postulates of quantum theory are rather abstract in comparison with those of other physical theories such as special relativity. This thesis considers two tools for investigating this discrepancy and makes a connection between them. The first of these tools, Gleason-type theorems, illustrates the interplay between postulates concerning observables, states and probabilities of measurement outcomes, demonstrating that they need not be entirely independent. Gleason’s original and remarkable result applied to observables described by projection-valued measures; however, the theorem does not hold in dimension two. Busch generalised the idea to observables described by positive operator measures, proving a result which holds for all separable Hilbert spaces. We show that Busch’s assumptions may be weakened without affecting the result. The manner in which we weaken the assumptions brings them closer to Gleason’s original treatment of projection-valued measures. We will then demonstrate the connection between Gleason-type theorems and Cauchy’s functional equation, a connection which yields an alternative proof of Busch’s result. The second tool we consider is the family of general probabilistic theories which offers a means of comparing quantum theory with reasonable alternatives. We identify a general probabilistic theory which reproduces the set of non-local correlations achievable in quantum theory, a property often thought to be particular to quantum theory. Finally, we connect these two tools by determining the class of general probabilistic theories which admit a Gleason-type theorem.
Generalized contextuality refers to our inability of explaining measurement statistics using a context-independent probabilistic model. On the other hand, measurement statistics can also be modeled most generally within the framework of general probabilistic theories. Here, starting from a construction of general probabilistic theories based on a Gleason-type theorem, we show that for any such theory the three insistence of (i) the no-restriction hypothesis, (ii) the ontological noncontextuality, and (iii) multiple nonrefinable measurements for any fixed number of outcomes are incompatible. In other words, requiring any two of these properties for a general probabilistic theory implies the violation of the third one. We extensively discuss general probabilistic theories for which (ii) and (iii) are met while (i) is violated, exploring the role of the no-restriction hypothesis as a sufficient condition that enforces ontological contextuality on nonsimplicial general probabilistic theories. Finally, we establish as a corollary the necessary and sufficient condition for a single resourceful measurement or state to promote an ontologically noncontextual (i.e. classical) general probabilistic theory to an ontologically contextual (i.e. nonclassical) one under the no-restriction hypothesis.
Abstract Quantum theory is indeterministic, but not completely so. When a system is in a pure state there are properties it possesses with certainty, known as actual properties. The actual properties of a quantum system (in a pure state) fully determine the probability of finding the system to have any other property. We will call this principle, wherein the deterministic elements of a theory completely characterise the probabilistic elements, intermediate determinism. In dimensions of at least three, intermediate determinism in quantum theory is guaranteed by the structure of its lattice of properties. This observation follows from Gleason’s theorem, which is why it fails to hold in dimension two. In this work we extend the idea of intermediate determinism from properties to measurements. Under this extension intermediate determinism follows from the structure of quantum effects for separable Hilbert spaces of any dimension, including dimension two. Then, we find necessary and sufficient conditions for a general probabilistic theory to obey intermediate determinism. We show that, although related, both the no-restriction hypothesis and a Gleason-type theorem are neither necessary nor sufficient for intermediate determinism.
Generalized contextuality refers to our inability of explaining measurement statistics using a contextindependent probabilistic and ontological model.On the other hand, measurement statistics can also be modeled using the framework of general probabilistic theories (GPTs).Here, starting from a construction of GPTs based on a Gleason-type theorem, we fully characterize these structures with respect to their permission and rejection of generalized (non)contextual ontological models.It follows that in any GPT construction the three insistence of (i) the no-restriction hypothesis, (ii) the ontological noncontextuality, and (iii) multiple nonrefinable measurements for any fixed number of outcomes are incompatible.Hence, any GPT satisfying the no-restriction hypothesis is ontologically noncontextual if and only if it is simplicial.We give a detailed discussion of GPTs for which the no-restriction hypothesis is violated, and show that they can always be considered as subtheories (subGPTs) of GPTs satisfying the hypothesis.It is shown that subGPTs are ontologically noncontextual if and only if they are subtheories of simplicial GPTs of the same dimensionality.Finally, we establish as a corollary the necessary and sufficient condition for a single resourceful measurement or state to promote an ontologically noncontextual (i.e., classical) general probabilistic theory to an ontologically contextual (i.e., nonclassical) one under the no-restriction hypothesis.
Quantum processes cannot be reduced, in a nontrivial way, to classical processes without specifying the context in the description of a measurement procedure. This requirement is implied by the Kochen--Specker theorem in the outcome-deterministic case and, more generally, by the Gleason theorem. The latter establishes that there is only one noncontextual classical model compatible with quantum theory, the one that trivially identifies the quantum state with the classical state. However, this model requires a breaking of the unitary evolution to account for macroscopic realism. Thus, a causal classical model compatible with the unitary evolution of the quantum state is necessarily contextual to some extent. Inspired by well-known results in quantum communication complexity, we consider a particular class of hidden variable theories by assuming that the amount of information about the measurement context is finite. Aiming at establishing some general features of these theories, we first present a generalized version of the Gleason theorem and provide a simple proof of it. Assuming that Gleason's hypotheses hold only locally for small changes of the measurement procedure, we obtain almost the same conclusion of the original theorem about the functional form of the probability measure. An additional constant and a relaxed property of the density operator are the only two differences from the original result. By this generalization of the Gleason theorem and the assumption of finite information for the context, we prove that the probabilities over three or more outcomes of a projective measurement must be linear functions of the projectors associated with the outcomes, given the information on the context.
The framework of generalized probabilistic theories (GPT) is a widely-used approach for studying the physical foundations of quantum theory. The standard GPT framework assumes the no-restriction hypothesis, in which the state space of a physical theory determines the set of measurements. However, this assumption is not physically motivated. In Janotta and Lal [Phys. Rev. A 87, 052131 (2013)], it was shown how this assumption can be relaxed, and how such an approach can be used to describe new classes of probabilistic theories. This involves introducing a new, more general, definition of maximal joint state spaces, which we call the generalised maximal tensor product. Here we show that the generalised maximal tensor product recovers the standard maximal tensor product when at least one of the systems in a bipartite scenario obeys the no-restriction hypothesis. We also show that, under certain conditions, relaxing the no-restriction hypothesis for a given state space does not allow for stronger non-locality, although the generalized maximal tensor product may allow new joint states.