The status of the quantum wave function is one of the most debated issues in quantum foundations---whether it corresponds directly to the reality or just represents knowledge or information about some aspect of reality. We propose a $\ensuremath{\psi}$-ontology theorem that excludes a class of ontological explanations where the quantum wave function is treated as mere information. Our result, unlike the acclaimed Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph's theorem, does not presume the absence of holistic ontological properties for product quantum preparations. At the core of our derivation, we utilize the seminal no-go result by Bell that rules out any local realistic world view for quantum theory. We show that the observed phenomenon of quantum nonlocality cannot be incorporated in a class of $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic models. Using the well-known Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality, we obtain a threshold bound on the degree of epistemicity above which the ontological models are not compatible with quantum statistics.
The status of the quantum wave function is one of the most debated issues in quantum foundations---whether it corresponds directly to the reality or just represents knowledge or information about some aspect of reality. We propose a \ensuremathψ-ontology theorem that excludes a class of ontological explanations where the quantum wave function is treated as mere information. Our result, unlike the acclaimed Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph's theorem, does not presume the absence of holistic ontological properties for product quantum preparations. At the core of our derivation, we utilize the seminal no-go result by Bell that rules out any local realistic world view for quantum theory. We show that the observed phenomenon of quantum nonlocality cannot be incorporated in a class of \ensuremathψ-epistemic models. Using the well-known Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality, we obtain a threshold bound on the degree of epistemicity above which the ontological models are not compatible with quantum statistics.
The Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) no-go theorem provides an argument for the reality of the quantum state by ruling out $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic ontological theories, in which the quantum state is of a statistical nature. It applies under an assumption of preparation independence, the validity of which has been subject to debate. We propose two plausible and less restrictive alternatives: a weaker notion allowing for classical correlations, and an even weaker, physically motivated notion of independence, which merely prohibits the possibility of superluminal causal influences in the preparation process. The latter is a minimal requirement for enabling a reasonable treatment of subsystems in any theory. It is demonstrated by means of an explicit $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic ontological model that the argument of PBR becomes invalid under the alternative notions of independence. As an intermediate step, we recover a result which is valid in the presence of classical correlations. Finally, we obtain a theorem which holds under the minimal requirement, approximating the result of PBR. For this, we consider experiments involving randomly sampled preparations and derive bounds on the degree of $\ensuremath{\psi}$ epistemicity that is consistent with the quantum-mechanical predictions. The approximation is exact in the limit as the sample space of preparations becomes infinite.
Ψ-epistemic models of quantum mechanics imply that the quantum state does not correspond to physical reality, but instead reflects the observer's knowledge of the underlying quantum system. The epistemic view of the quantum state has the potential to shed light on several foundational problems of quantum theory and has attracted considerable attention in the literature. On the other hand, the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem demonstrated that broad classes of ψ-epistemic models must lead to predictions that deviate from those of quantum mechanics. Although the original theorem involved entangled joint measurements on composite systems, alternative no-go theorems involving measurements on single quantum systems were developed shortly thereafter. Experimental investigations of the deviations predicted by ψ-epistemic models from quantum mechanics are still ongoing. So far, such tests have been performed within the framework of non-relativistic quantum mechanics and predominantly rely on quantum information based measurement procedures. In this work, we show that ψ-epistemic models can give rise to deviations from standard quantum field-theoretic predictions through modifications of polarized scattering cross sections and decay widths. Our results do not require a relativistic formulation of ontological models or of the Harrigan-Spekkens criterion; the essential assumption is merely that measurements implemented through relativistic processes can still be represented within the ontological framework by well-defined response functions and probabilities. The present work constitutes a proof-of-principle study demonstrating that particle physics tests of the ontological status of the quantum state are possible and that ψ-epistemic models may exhibit experimentally distinguishable signatures in particle phenomenology.
We present a new psi-ontology theorem demonstrating that the quantum wave function is ontic (real) rather than epistemic (representing knowledge) in single-world unitary quantum theories (SUQTs). By leveraging a protocol of repeated reversible measurements on a single quantum system, we show that any two distinct quantum states produce different statistical distributions of (erased) measurement outcomes. This theoretical distinguishability implies that different quantum states correspond to different physical realities, supporting the ontic nature of the quantum state. Unlike previous psi-ontology theorems, such as the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem, our proof relies solely on the unitary evolution and Born rule of SUQTs, without additional assumptions like preparation independence. This strengthens its implications for quantum foundations, particularly in restricting non-psi-ontic interpretations like QBism without assuming an underlying ontic state and its dynamics. The theorem applies to any pair of distinct states in a finite-dimensional Hilbert space, with extensions to infinite-dimensional systems, offering a robust and general argument for the reality of the quantum state.
The 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) challenged the completeness of the quantum-mechanical description of physical reality. In contemporary discussions, this challenge is often taken to have been decisively answered by Bell’s theorem and by the experimental violation of Bell inequalities. This article argues that such a conclusion involves an additional interpretive step not warranted by the logical structure of Bell-type results themselves. By formulating Bell-inequality violations as conditional exclusion results on classes of ontological models, and by distinguishing theoretical constraint from unique ontological confirmation, the analysis shows that Bell-type no-go theorems do not by themselves establish the ontological completeness of the quantum state. The same point is extended to the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem: although it further restricts admissible ψ-epistemic models under preparation independence, it does not uniquely fix quantum ontology. The combined lesson of these no-go results is therefore one of constrained but non-unique admissibility, rather than direct confirmation of wave-function completeness. From this perspective, the methodological core of Einstein’s incompleteness concern remains open—not as a defense of local hidden variables, but as a continuing question about the relation between empirical success, theoretical constraint, and ontological commitment in quantum foundations.
The main question under investigation in this thesis was the reality of the quantum state. We approached this problem by studying a recent no-go result by Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph, namely the PBR theorem. In Section 1 we provided a short introduction to quantum theory. A few relevant examples were covered, namely decompositions of quantum states, impossibility of the ignorance interpretation and the distinguishability of pure quantum states. Section 2 developed measure theoretic tools needed in the framework of ontological models. The Radon-Nikodym theorem was proven in order to justify the use of an alternative expression of the variational distance of probability measures. In Section 3 we developed a general framework for ontological models. In short, the ontological models framework can be considered the most general framework currently available for hidden variable theories and no-go results. We used the measure theoretic tools of Section 2 to make the formalism rigorous. Original research included in Section 3 was the characterization of a property called antidistinguishability for qubit states. A necessary and sufficient condition for antidistinguishability was given. It was then proven that any set of pure qubit states that is not antidistinguishable can be made antidistinguishable by adding a single carefully chosen state into the set. In the end of Section 3, some original observations were presented. Namely, a specific connection with contextuality was proven for sometimes ψ-ontic and never ψ-ontic ontological models. However, it was then noted that these observations were not enough to exclude never ψ-ontic ontological models, a feat that would have provided a new no-go theorem on its own. Contextuality in the ontological models framework was studied in Section 4. The main results were establishing preparation contextuality from the failure of maximal ψ-epistemicity and a proof of Bell's theorem based on preparation contextuality established this way. We concluded that ψ-ontic models cannot be Bell local based on these results. Finally in Section 5 the implications of ψ-ontology were discussed. By careful analysis of the results, it was noted that accepting the reality of the quantum state exposes explanatory gaps in the formalism. Possible solutions to the challenges introduced by these explanatory gaps were discussed through interpretations of quantum mechanics and the so-called measurement problem.
Bell's theorem is popularly stated as the inconsistency of quantum theory with local realism. Realism is here formalized by the ontological models framework, where elements of reality are points of a measurable space and probabilities obey the Kolmogorov axioms. In the Bell scenario, locally causal ontological models posit a common cause supporting a global valuation, a joint assignment of outcomes to all measurements at once, across incompatible contexts. Within this notion of realism, Bell's theorem makes any realist explanation of the quantum predictions conspiratorial: any mechanism, whether superluminal, superdeterministic, or retrocausal, must be finely tuned so as never to manifest operationally. We redefine realism through a new ontological framework that generalizes the standard one. The elements of reality, which we call records, are no longer points but relational parts of a point-free generalization of a topological space (sublocales of a locale). A record shared by two incompatible contexts establishes the sameness of a measurement across them, without such pairwise identities composing into a global valuation, and the common cause is then a web of such records. Within this framework, Bell's no-go theorem becomes a go theorem: local causality, restated for records, is no longer at odds with the quantum statistics. This is possible because modularity, the inclusion-exclusion law of classical probability, fails across incompatible contexts, so that the probability theory generalizes Kolmogorov's. We exhibit explicit models reproducing several quantum strategies, including the optimal CHSH violation. More broadly, locally causal models of this kind attain every Bell-CHSH value up to the algebraic maximum. A realist explanation of the quantum predictions need not be conspiratorial; every causal influence posited by these models is reflected in the operational predictions.