The BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) combined with decoy-state method is currently the most practical protocol, which has been proved secure against general attacks in the finite-key regime. Thereinto, statistical fluctuation analysis methods are very important in dealing with finite-key effects, which directly affect secret key rate, secure transmission distance and most importantly, the security. There are two tasks of statistical fluctuation in decoy-state BB84 QKD. One is the deviation between expected value and observed value for a given expected value or observed value. The other is the deviation between phase error rate of computational basis and bit error rate of dual basis. Here, we provide the rigorous and optimal analytic formula to solve the above tasks, resulting to higher secret key rate and longer secure transmission distance. Our results can be widely applied to deal with statistical fluctuation in quantum cryptography protocols.
The BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) combined with decoy-state method is currently the most practical protocol, which has been proved secure against general attacks in the finite-key regime. Thereinto, statistical fluctuation analysis methods are very important in dealing with finite-key effects, which directly affect secret key rate, secure transmission distance and most importantly, the security. There are two tasks of statistical fluctuation in decoy-state BB84 QKD. One is the deviation between expected value and observed value for a given expected value or observed value. The other is the deviation between phase error rate of computational basis and bit error rate of dual basis. Here, we provide the rigorous and optimal analytic formula to solve the above tasks, resulting to higher secret key rate and longer secure transmission distance. Our results can be widely applied to deal with statistical fluctuation in quantum cryptography protocols.
The decoy-state scheme is the most widely implemented quantum-key-distribution protocol in practice. In order to account for the finite-size key effects on the achievable secret key generation rate, a rigorous statistical fluctuation analysis is required. Originally, a heuristic Gaussian-approximation technique was used for this purpose, which, despite its analytical convenience, was not sufficiently rigorous. The fluctuation analysis has recently been made rigorous by using the Chernoff bound. There is a considerable gap, however, between the key-rate bounds obtained from these techniques and that obtained from the Gaussian assumption. Here we develop a tighter bound for the decoy-state method, which yields a smaller failure probability. This improvement results in a higher key rate and increases the maximum distance over which secure key exchange is possible. By optimizing the system parameters, our simulation results show that our method almost closes the gap between the two previously proposed techniques and achieves a performance similar to that of conventional Gaussian approximations.
Abstract One-decoy-state quantum key distribution with infinite length pulses can even approach the asymptotic case, i.e., infinite decoy states and infinite length pulses. Due to the limitation of experimental time, we must consider the statistical fluctuation caused by the finite number of pulses. The central limit theorem analysis method is an effective method, which can easily give the upper and lower bounds of experimental observations. Combining the central limit theorem method with the theorem that the ratio of two independent normal random variables can be approximated as a normal random variable under certain conditions, we propose a more efficient method to estimate the secure key rate. Compared with using central limit theorem method directly, our method has fewer bounds, smaller estimation deviation and higher estimation accuracy. The simulation results show that our method can significantly improve the secure key rate and transmission distance when considering statistical fluctuation and keeping the pulse number and security parameters unchanged, especially in the case of small pulse number (e.g. 107).
The decoy-state Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is widely regarded as the de facto standard for practical implementations. On the receiver side, passive basis choice is attractive because it significantly reduces the need for random number generators and eliminates the need for optical modulators. Despite these advantages, a finite-key analytical security proof for the decoy-state BB84 protocol, where the basis is chosen passively with a biased probability, has been lacking. In this work, we present a simple analytical finite-key security proof for this setting, yielding a closed-form secret-key rate formula that can be directly evaluated using experimentally accessible parameters. Numerical simulations show that the key rates of passiveand active-measurement implementations are nearly identical, indicating that passive measurement does not compromise key-generation efficiency in practical QKD systems.
The statistical fluctuation problem is a critical factor in all quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols under finite-key conditions. The current statistical fluctuation analysis is mainly based on independent random samples, however, the precondition cannot always be satisfied because of different choices of samples and actual parameters. As a result, proper statistical fluctuation methods are required to solve this problem. Taking the after-pulse contributions into consideration, this paper gives the expression for the secure key rate and the mathematical model for statistical fluctuations, focusing on a decoy-state QKD protocol [Z.-C. Wei et al., Sci. Rep. 3, 2453 (2013)] with a biased basis choice. On this basis, a classified analysis of statistical fluctuation is represented according to the mutual relationship between random samples. First, for independent identical relations, a deviation comparison is made between the law of large numbers and standard error analysis. Second, a sufficient condition is given that the Chernoff bound achieves a better result than Hoeffding's inequality based on only independent relations. Third, by constructing the proper martingale, a stringent way is proposed to deal issues based on dependent random samples through making use of Azuma's inequality. In numerical optimization, the impact on the secure key rate, the comparison of secure key rates, and the respective deviations under various kinds of statistical fluctuation analyses are depicted.
In the original BB84 quantum key distribution protocol, the states are prepared and measured randomly, which lose the unmatched detection results. To improve the sifting efficiency, biased bases selection BB84 protocol is proposed. Meanwhile, a practical quantum key distribution protocol can only transmit a finite number of signals, resulting in keys of finite length. The previous techniques for finite-key analysis focus mainly on the statistical fluctuations of the error rates and yields of the qubits. However, the prior choice probabilities of the two bases also have fluctuations by taking into account the finite-size effect. In this paper, we discuss the security of biased decoy state BB84 protocol with finite resources by considering all of the statistical fluctuations. The results can be directly used in the experimental realizations.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises provably secure communications. In order to improve the secret key rate, combining a biased basis choice with the decoy-state method is proposed. Concomitantly, there is a basis-independent detection efficiency condition, which usually cannot be satisfied in a practical system, such as the time-phase encoding. Fortunately, this flaw has been recently removed theoretically and experimentally in the four-intensity decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol using the fact that the expected yields of single-photon states prepared in two bases stay the same for a given measurement basis. However, the security proofs do not fully consider the finite-key effects for general attacks. In this work, we provide the rigorous finite-key security bounds in the universally composable framework for the four-intensity decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol. We build a time-phase encoding system with 200 MHz clock to implement this protocol, in which the real-time secret key rate is more than 60 kbps over 50 km single-mode fiber.