Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1910.08339 · P-Adic Numbers Ultrametric Analysis and Applications

Active Beam Splitting Attack Applied to Differential Phase Shift Quantum Key Distribution Protocol

Ashot S. Avanesov, D. A. Kronberg, Alexander Nikolaevich Pechen

Published Jul 1, 2018• 15 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The differential phase shift quantum key distribution protocol is of high interest due to its relatively simple practical implementation. This protocol uses trains of coherent pulses and allows the legitimate users to resist individual attacks. In this paper, a new attack on this protocol is proposed which is based on the idea of information extraction from the part of each coherent state and then making decision about blocking the rest part depending on the amount of extracted information.

DOI
10.1134/s2070046618030068

Related papers

A simple coherent attack and practical security of differential phase shift quantum cryptography

Dmitry Anatolevich Kronberg

The differential phase shift quantum key distribution protocol reveals good security against such powerful attacks as unambiguous state discrimination and beam splitting attacks. Its complete security analysis is complex due to high dimensions of the supposed spaces and density operators. In this paper, we consider a particular and conceptually simple coherent attack, available in practical implementations. The main condition for this attack is the length of used coherent state tuples of order 8–12. We show that under this condition, no high level of practical distance between legitimate users can be achieved.

Laser Physics•Jan 17, 2014•10 citations

Robustness of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution against photon-number-splitting attack

Kyo Inoue, Toshimori Honjo

A photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack against differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) is described. In the conventional 1984 Bennett-Brassard protocol, using weak laser light, the PNS attacks, which involve installing a lossless transmission line and blocking pulses from which extra photons cannot be picked up, impose a limit on the transmission distance. In contrast, use of a coherent pulse train in DPS QKD prevents the PNS attack and removes the distance limitation imposed by it. We carried out a DPS QKD experiment that simulated the situation where some pulses are blocked. The result showed that extra bit errors are induced in an eavesdropped condition, indicating the robustness of DPS QKD against PNS attacks.

Physical Review A•Apr 4, 2005•67 citations

Differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution

Kyo Inoue, Hiroki Takesue, Toshimori Honjo

A novel type of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, called DPS (differential-phase-shift) QKD, was proposed several years ago. A sender transmits a highly-attenuated coherent pulse train with {0, π} phase, and a receiver receives it with a one-bit delay Mach-Zehnder interferometer followed by photon detectors. A secret key is created from photon detection events, whose security is based on the fact that an eavesdropper cannot perfectly measure the phase information of a highly-attenuated coherent pulse train. This protocol has some features of simple setup, potential for a high key creation rate, and robustness against photon-number-splitting attack. This paper overviews DPS-QKD. The operation mechanism is described, and then some experimental efforts are introduced, featuring use of a glass waveguide Mach-Zehnder interferometer and advanced single-photon detectors. The highest key rate and the longest distance have been achieved with the DPS-QKD protocol. Some modified schemes are also presented, including that utilizing quantum entanglement, that using decoy pulses, and that using macroscopic coherent light.

Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE•Sep 9, 2007•3 citations

Analysis of differential-phase-shift keying protocol for a two-way quantum-key-distribution system

Rongzhen Jiao, Feng Chen-Xu, 北京邮电大学理学院，北京 100876

The performance of a two-way quantum-key-distribution (QKD) system are analyzed using the differential-phase-shift keying (DPSK) protocol. The comparison is based on the secure communication rate as a function of distance for three QKD protocols: the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the Bennett-Brassard-Mermin 1992, and the coherent differential-phase-shift keying protocols. We discussed the security of DPSK protocol against any type of individual photon splitting attack and concluded that the simple and efficient DPSK protocol allows for more than 200km of secure communication distance with high communication rates.

Acta Physica Sinica•Jan 1, 2008•3 citations

DPS quantum key distribution and related technologies

Kyo Inoue, Hiroki Takesue, Toshimori Honjo

A unique quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, called DPS (differential-phase-shift) QKD, has been proposed and developed at NTT and Osaka University, which utilizes a coherent pulse train instead of individual photons as in traditional QKD protocols such as BB84. Its security is based on the fact that every phase difference of a highlyattenuated coherent pulse train cannot be fully measured. This protocol has features of simple setup, potential for a high key creation rate, and robustness against photon-number-splitting attack. This paper presents recent research activities on DPS-QKD.

Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE•Dec 2, 2008•3 citations

Modified general individual attack against differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution

Kyo Inoue, Toshimori Honjo

Differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) is a type of QKD protocol. It is a unique QKD scheme wherein a lasting coherent pulse sequence containing numerous photons is transmitted as an information carrier instead of qubits in traditional QKD protocols. Regarding the security of DPS-QKD, a general individual attack (GIA), which first conducts a beam-splitting attack and then entangles probe states with each photon in a pulse sequence after beam splitting, has been presented and is usually assumed to evaluate the DPS-QKD system performance. Thus, this study reconsidered the GIA scheme, examined its feasibility, and consequently modified it to render it feasible. A formula for the secret key creation rate, assuming a modified GIA, was formulated. Calculations using the presented and conventional formulas indicated that while the key creation rates in systems assuming conventional and modified GIAs were approximately the same, the modified GIA resulted in a higher key creation rate in short- and medium-distance systems to a certain extent.

Physical Review A•Oct 29, 2024•4 citations
The differential phase shift quantum key distribution protocol is of high interest due to its relatively simple practical implementation. This protocol uses trains of coherent pulses and allows the legitimate users to resist individual attacks. In this paper, a new attack on this protocol is proposed which is based on the idea of information extraction from the part of each coherent state and then making decision about blocking the rest part depending on the amount of extracted information.
The differential phase shift quantum key distribution protocol reveals good security against such powerful attacks as unambiguous state discrimination and beam splitting attacks. Its complete security analysis is complex due to high dimensions of the supposed spaces and density operators. In this paper, we consider a particular and conceptually simple coherent attack, available in practical implementations. The main condition for this attack is the length of used coherent state tuples of order 8–12. We show that under this condition, no high level of practical distance between legitimate users can be achieved.
A photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack against differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) is described. In the conventional 1984 Bennett-Brassard protocol, using weak laser light, the PNS attacks, which involve installing a lossless transmission line and blocking pulses from which extra photons cannot be picked up, impose a limit on the transmission distance. In contrast, use of a coherent pulse train in DPS QKD prevents the PNS attack and removes the distance limitation imposed by it. We carried out a DPS QKD experiment that simulated the situation where some pulses are blocked. The result showed that extra bit errors are induced in an eavesdropped condition, indicating the robustness of DPS QKD against PNS attacks.
A novel type of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, called DPS (differential-phase-shift) QKD, was proposed several years ago. A sender transmits a highly-attenuated coherent pulse train with {0, π} phase, and a receiver receives it with a one-bit delay Mach-Zehnder interferometer followed by photon detectors. A secret key is created from photon detection events, whose security is based on the fact that an eavesdropper cannot perfectly measure the phase information of a highly-attenuated coherent pulse train. This protocol has some features of simple setup, potential for a high key creation rate, and robustness against photon-number-splitting attack. This paper overviews DPS-QKD. The operation mechanism is described, and then some experimental efforts are introduced, featuring use of a glass waveguide Mach-Zehnder interferometer and advanced single-photon detectors. The highest key rate and the longest distance have been achieved with the DPS-QKD protocol. Some modified schemes are also presented, including that utilizing quantum entanglement, that using decoy pulses, and that using macroscopic coherent light.
The performance of a two-way quantum-key-distribution (QKD) system are analyzed using the differential-phase-shift keying (DPSK) protocol. The comparison is based on the secure communication rate as a function of distance for three QKD protocols: the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the Bennett-Brassard-Mermin 1992, and the coherent differential-phase-shift keying protocols. We discussed the security of DPSK protocol against any type of individual photon splitting attack and concluded that the simple and efficient DPSK protocol allows for more than 200km of secure communication distance with high communication rates.
A unique quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, called DPS (differential-phase-shift) QKD, has been proposed and developed at NTT and Osaka University, which utilizes a coherent pulse train instead of individual photons as in traditional QKD protocols such as BB84. Its security is based on the fact that every phase difference of a highlyattenuated coherent pulse train cannot be fully measured. This protocol has features of simple setup, potential for a high key creation rate, and robustness against photon-number-splitting attack. This paper presents recent research activities on DPS-QKD.
Differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) is a type of QKD protocol. It is a unique QKD scheme wherein a lasting coherent pulse sequence containing numerous photons is transmitted as an information carrier instead of qubits in traditional QKD protocols. Regarding the security of DPS-QKD, a general individual attack (GIA), which first conducts a beam-splitting attack and then entangles probe states with each photon in a pulse sequence after beam splitting, has been presented and is usually assumed to evaluate the DPS-QKD system performance. Thus, this study reconsidered the GIA scheme, examined its feasibility, and consequently modified it to render it feasible. A formula for the secret key creation rate, assuming a modified GIA, was formulated. Calculations using the presented and conventional formulas indicated that while the key creation rates in systems assuming conventional and modified GIAs were approximately the same, the modified GIA resulted in a higher key creation rate in short- and medium-distance systems to a certain extent.