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arXiv:1907.06314 · Foundations of Science

Representing Attitudes Towards Ambiguity in Hilbert Space: Foundations and Applications

Sandro Sozzo

Published Nov 8, 2020• 5 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Abstract We provide here a general mathematical framework to model attitudes towards ambiguity which uses the formalism of quantum theory as a “purely mathematical formalism, detached from any physical interpretation”. We show that the quantum-theoretic framework enables modelling of the Ellsberg paradox, but it also successfully applies to more concrete human decision-making tests involving financial, managerial and medical decisions. In particular, we elaborate a mathematical representation of various empirical studies which reveal that attitudes of managers towards uncertainty shift from ambiguity seeking to ambiguity aversion, and viceversa, thus exhibiting hope effects and fear effects. The present framework provides a promising direction towards the development of a unified theory of decisions in the presence of uncertainty.

DOI
10.1007/s10699-020-09718-5

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Abstract We provide here a general mathematical framework to model attitudes towards ambiguity which uses the formalism of quantum theory as a “purely mathematical formalism, detached from any physical interpretation”. We show that the quantum-theoretic framework enables modelling of the Ellsberg paradox, but it also successfully applies to more concrete human decision-making tests involving financial, managerial and medical decisions. In particular, we elaborate a mathematical representation of various empirical studies which reveal that attitudes of managers towards uncertainty shift from ambiguity seeking to ambiguity aversion, and viceversa, thus exhibiting hope effects and fear effects. The present framework provides a promising direction towards the development of a unified theory of decisions in the presence of uncertainty.
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The expected utility hypothesis and Savage's Sure-Thing Principle are violated in real life decisions, as shown by the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes. The popular explanation in terms of ambiguity aversion is not completely accepted. As a consequence, uncertainty is still problematical in economics. To overcome these difficulties a distinction between risk and ambiguity has been introduced which depends on the existence of a Kolmogorovian probabilistic structure modeling these uncertainties. On the other hand, evidence of everyday life suggests that context plays a fundamental role in human decisions under uncertainty. Moreover, it is well known from physics that any probabilistic structure modeling contextual interactions between entities structurally needs a non-Kolmogorovian framework admitting a quantum-like representation. For this reason, we have recently introduced a notion of contextual risk to mathematically capture situations in which ambiguity occurs. We prove in this paper that the contextual risk approach can be applied to the Ellsberg paradox, and elaborate a sphere model within our hidden measurement formalism which reveals that it is the overall conceptual landscape that is responsible of the disagreement between actual human decisions and the predictions of expected utility theory, which generates the paradox. This result points to the presence of a quantum conceptual layer in human thought which is superposed to the usually assumed classical logical layer, and conceptually supports the thesis of several authors suggesting the presence of quantum structure in economics and decision theory.
The Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes show that the expected utility hypothesis and Savage's Sure-Thing Principle are violated in real life decisions.The popular explanation in terms of ambiguity aversion is not completely accepted.On the other hand, we have recently introduced a notion of contextual risk to mathematically capture what is known as ambiguity in the economics literature.Situations in which contextual risk occurs cannot be modeled by Kolmogorovian classical probabilistic structures, but a non-Kolmogorovian framework with a quantum-like structure is needed.We prove in this paper that the contextual risk approach can be applied to the Ellsberg paradox, and elaborate a sphere model within our hidden measurement formalism which reveals that it is the overall conceptual landscape that is responsible of the disagreement between actual human decisions and the predictions of expected utility theory, which generates the paradox.This result points to the presence of a quantum conceptual layer in human thought which is superposed to the usually assumed classical logical layer.
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The Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes show that the expected utility hypothesis and Savage's Sure-Thing Principle are violated in real life decisions. The popular explanation in terms of 'ambiguity aversion' is not completely accepted. On the other hand, we have recently introduced a notion of 'contextual risk' to mathematically capture what is known as 'ambiguity' in the economics literature. Situations in which contextual risk occurs cannot be modeled by Kolmogorovian classical probabilistic structures, but a non-Kolmogorovian framework with a quantum-like structure is needed. We prove in this paper that the contextual risk approach can be applied to the Ellsberg paradox, and elaborate a 'sphere model' within our 'hidden measurement formalism' which reveals that it is the overall conceptual landscape that is responsible of the disagreement between actual human decisions and the predictions of expected utility theory, which generates the paradox. This result points to the presence of a 'quantum conceptual layer' in human thought which is superposed to the usually assumed 'classical logical layer'.