The Machina thought experiments pose to major non-expected utility models challenges that are similar to those posed by the Ellsberg thought experiments to subjective expected utility theory (SEUT). We test human choices in the `Ellsberg three-color example', confirming typical ambiguity aversion patterns, and the `Machina 50/51 and reflection examples', partially confirming the preferences hypothesized by Machina. Then, we show that a quantum-theoretic framework for decision-making under uncertainty recently elaborated by some of us allows faithful modeling of all data on the Ellsberg and Machina paradox situations. In the quantum-theoretic framework subjective probabilities are represented by quantum probabilities, while quantum state transformations enable representations of ambiguity aversion and subjective attitudes toward it.
The Machina thought experiments pose to major non-expected utility models challenges that are similar to those posed by the Ellsberg thought experiments to subjective expected utility theory (SEUT). We test human choices in the Ellsberg three-color example', confirming typical ambiguity aversion patterns, and the Machina 50/51 and reflection examples', partially confirming the preferences hypothesized by Machina. Then, we show that a quantum-theoretic framework for decision-making under uncertainty recently elaborated by some of us allows faithful modeling of all data on the Ellsberg and Machina paradox situations. In the quantum-theoretic framework subjective probabilities are represented by quantum probabilities, while quantum state transformations enable representations of ambiguity aversion and subjective attitudes toward it.
The Ellsberg and Machina paradoxes reveal that expected utility theory is problematical when real subjects take decisions under uncertainty. Suitable generalizations of expected utility exist which attempt to solve the Ellsberg paradox, but none of them provides a satisfactory solution of the Machina paradox. In this paper we elaborate a quantum model in Hilbert space describing the Ellsberg situation and also the Machina situation, and show that we can model the specific aspect of the Machina situation that is unable to be modeled within the existing generalizations of expected utility.
Abstract We provide here a general mathematical framework to model attitudes towards ambiguity which uses the formalism of quantum theory as a “purely mathematical formalism, detached from any physical interpretation”. We show that the quantum-theoretic framework enables modelling of the Ellsberg paradox, but it also successfully applies to more concrete human decision-making tests involving financial, managerial and medical decisions. In particular, we elaborate a mathematical representation of various empirical studies which reveal that attitudes of managers towards uncertainty shift from ambiguity seeking to ambiguity aversion, and viceversa, thus exhibiting hope effects and fear effects. The present framework provides a promising direction towards the development of a unified theory of decisions in the presence of uncertainty.
The expected utility hypothesis and Savage's Sure-Thing Principle are violated in real life decisions, as shown by the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes. The popular explanation in terms of ambiguity aversion is not completely accepted. As a consequence, uncertainty is still problematical in economics. To overcome these difficulties a distinction between risk and ambiguity has been introduced which depends on the existence of a Kolmogorovian probabilistic structure modeling these uncertainties. On the other hand, evidence of everyday life suggests that context plays a fundamental role in human decisions under uncertainty. Moreover, it is well known from physics that any probabilistic structure modeling contextual interactions between entities structurally needs a non-Kolmogorovian framework admitting a quantum-like representation. For this reason, we have recently introduced a notion of contextual risk to mathematically capture situations in which ambiguity occurs. We prove in this paper that the contextual risk approach can be applied to the Ellsberg paradox, and elaborate a sphere model within our hidden measurement formalism which reveals that it is the overall conceptual landscape that is responsible of the disagreement between actual human decisions and the predictions of expected utility theory, which generates the paradox. This result points to the presence of a quantum conceptual layer in human thought which is superposed to the usually assumed classical logical layer, and conceptually supports the thesis of several authors suggesting the presence of quantum structure in economics and decision theory.
Empirical evidence has confirmed that quantum effects occur frequently also outside the microscopic domain, while quantum structures satisfactorily model various situations in several areas of science, including biological, cognitive and social processes. In this paper, we elaborate a quantum mechanical model which faithfully describes the Ellsberg paradox in economics, showing that the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is capable to represent the ambiguity present in this kind of situations, because of the presence of contextuality. Then, we analyze the data collected in a concrete experiment we performed on the Ellsberg paradox and work out a complete representation of them in complex Hilbert space. We prove that the presence of quantum structure is genuine, that is, interference and superposition in a complex Hilbert space are really necessary to describe the conceptual situation presented by Ellsberg. Moreover, our approach sheds light on 'ambiguity laden' decision processes in economics and decision theory, and allows to deal with different Ellsberg-type generalizations, e.g., the Machina paradox.
Classical models of decision-making under uncertainty, grounded in expected utility theory and Bayesian probability, often fail to account for systematic cognitive anomalies such as preference reversals, order effects, ambiguity aversion, and context-dependent choices. Quantum cognition models offer a novel theoretical framework that applies the mathematical principles of quantum probability—such as superposition, interference, and non-commutativity—to cognitive processes without assuming physical quantum mechanisms in the brain. By representing cognitive states as probabilistic superpositions that collapse through decision “measurements,” these models provide parsimonious explanations for violations of classical rationality. This paper examines how quantum cognition frameworks capture contextual influence, belief updating, and interference effects in uncertain decision environments. Drawing on findings from cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, the study highlights the relevance of quantum cognition for applications in economic choice modeling, legal decision analysis, and artificial intelligence. The analysis suggests that quantum probability offers a robust alternative to classical approaches when modeling human decision-making in complex, ambiguous, and context-sensitive situations.
The Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes show that the expected utility hypothesis and Savage's Sure-Thing Principle are violated in real life decisions.The popular explanation in terms of ambiguity aversion is not completely accepted.On the other hand, we have recently introduced a notion of contextual risk to mathematically capture what is known as ambiguity in the economics literature.Situations in which contextual risk occurs cannot be modeled by Kolmogorovian classical probabilistic structures, but a non-Kolmogorovian framework with a quantum-like structure is needed.We prove in this paper that the contextual risk approach can be applied to the Ellsberg paradox, and elaborate a sphere model within our hidden measurement formalism which reveals that it is the overall conceptual landscape that is responsible of the disagreement between actual human decisions and the predictions of expected utility theory, which generates the paradox.This result points to the presence of a quantum conceptual layer in human thought which is superposed to the usually assumed classical logical layer.