arXiv:1905.13248

The hidden assumptions of Frauchiger and Renner

Anthony Sudbery

Published May 30, 2019• 22 citations

Abstract

This note is a critical examination of the argument of Frauchiger and Renner (Nature Communications 9:3711 (2018)), in which they claim to show that three reasonable assumptions about the use of quantum mechanics jointly lead to a contradiction. It is shown that further assumptions are needed to establish the contradiction, and that each of these assumptions is invalid in some version of quantum mechanics.

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.1905.13248

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