This paper presents the measurement problem from the point of view of the thermal interpretation of quantum physics introduced in Part II. The measurement of a Hermitian quantity $A$ is regarded as giving an uncertain value approximating the q-expectation $\langle A\rangle$ rather than (as tradition wanted to have it) as an exact revelation of an eigenvalue of $A$. Single observations of microscopic systems are (except under special circumstances) very uncertain measurements only. The thermal interpretation * treats detection events as a statistical measurement of particle beam intensity. * claims that the particle concept is only asymptotically valid, under conditions where particles are essentially free. * claims that the unmodeled environment influences the results enough to cause all randomness in quantum physics. * allows one to derive Born's rule for scattering and in the limit of ideal measurements; but in general, only part of Born's rule holds exactly: Whenever a quantity A with zero uncertainty is measured exactly, its value is an eigenvalue of A. * has no explicit collapse -- the latter emerges approximately in non-isolated subsystems. * gives a valid interpretation of systems modeled by a quantum-classical dynamics. * explains the peculiar features of the Copenhagen interpretation (lacking realism between measurements) and the minimal statistical interpretation (lacking realism for the single case) where these interpretations apply -- in the microscopic domain. The thermal interpretation is an interpretation of quantum physics that is in principle refutable by theoretical arguments leading to a negative answer to a number of open issues collected at the end of the paper, since there is plenty of experimental evidence for each of the points mentioned there.
This paper presents the measurement problem from the point of view of the thermal interpretation of quantum physics introduced in Part II. The measurement of a Hermitian quantity A is regarded as giving an uncertain value approximating the q-expectation ⟨A⟩ rather than (as tradition wanted to have it) as an exact revelation of an eigenvalue of A. Single observations of microscopic systems are (except under special circumstances) very uncertain measurements only. The thermal interpretation * treats detection events as a statistical measurement of particle beam intensity. * claims that the particle concept is only asymptotically valid, under conditions where particles are essentially free. * claims that the unmodeled environment influences the results enough to cause all randomness in quantum physics. * allows one to derive Born's rule for scattering and in the limit of ideal measurements; but in general, only part of Born's rule holds exactly: Whenever a quantity A with zero uncertainty is measured exactly, its value is an eigenvalue of A. * has no explicit collapse -- the latter emerges approximately in non-isolated subsystems. * gives a valid interpretation of systems modeled by a quantum-classical dynamics. * explains the peculiar features of the Copenhagen interpretation (lacking realism between measurements) and the minimal statistical interpretation (lacking realism for the single case) where these interpretations apply -- in the microscopic domain. The thermal interpretation is an interpretation of quantum physics that is in principle refutable by theoretical arguments leading to a negative answer to a number of open issues collected at the end of the paper, since there is plenty of experimental evidence for each of the points mentioned there.
This chapter presents the measurement problem from the point of view of the thermal interpretation of quantum physics. Everything physicists measure is measured in a thermal environment, for which statistical thermodynamics is relevant. The thermal interpretation agrees with how one interprets measurements in thermodynamics, the macroscopic part of quantum physics, derived via statistical mechanics. By its very construction, the thermal interpretation naturally matches the classical properties of our quantum world: The thermal interpretation assigns states-and a realistic interpretation for them-to individual quantum systems, in a way that large quantum systems are naturally described by classical observables. Since measurement devices are large quantum systems, this is the key to solving the measurement problem. We discuss the role played by macroscopic systems and the weak law of large numbers in getting readings with small uncertainty. Since quantum physics makes many deterministic predictions, for example regarding observed spectra, but also assertions about probabilities, we distinguish deterministic and statistical measurements. To clarify the meaning of the concept of measurement, we postulate (in Section 11.1) a measurement principle that defines what it means in the thermal interpretation to measure a quantity with a specified uncertainty. This turns the measurement problem from a philosophical riddle into a scientific problem in the domain of quantum statistical mechanics, namely how the quantum dynamics correlates macroscopic readings from an instrument with properties of the state of a measured microscopic system. The essence of scientific practice is the reproducibility of measurements, discussed in Section 11.2. Unlike in traditional interpretations, single, nonreproducible observations do not count as measurements, since this would violate the reproducibility of measurements-the essence of scientific practice. As a consequence, the measurement of a Hermitian quantity A is regarded as giving an uncertain value approximating the q-expectation {A} rather than (as tradition wanted to have it) as an exact revelation of an eigenvalue of A. This difference is most conspicuous in the interpretation of single discrete microscopic events. Except in very special circumstances, these are not reproducible. Thus, they have no scientific value in themselves and do not constitute measurement results. Scientific value is, however, in ensembles of such observations, which result in approximate measurements of q-probabilities and q-expectations. Sections 11.3 and 11.4 distinguish deterministic and statistical measurements, depending on whether a single observation is reproducible, and discuss the role played by macroscopic systems and the weak law of large numbers in getting readings with small uncertainty. How to measure the q-probabilities of events, described in terms of POVMs, is discussed in Section 11.5. Section 11.6 poses the measurement problem as a problem of the statistical mechanics of measurement devices, and discuss recent work by Allahverdyan, Balian, and Nieuwenhuizen on its resolution. Section 11.7 discusses the problem how, in the thermal interpretation, discrete events can arise, although qexpectations are by their very nature continuous. This is resolved by pointing to work by Breuer and Petruccione on piecewise deterministic processes (PDP). Section 11.8 sheds additional light on the origin of discrete events by an analysis of the role dissipative bistability plays in obtaining discreteness in classical physics.
This paper continues the discussion of the thermal interpretation of quantum physics. While Part II and Part III of this series of papers explained and justified the reasons for the departure from tradition, the present Part IV summarizes the main features and adds intuitive explanations and new technical developments. It is shown how the spectral features of quantum systems and an approximate classical dynamics arise under appropriate conditions. Evidence is given for how, in the thermal interpretation, the measurement of a qubit by a pointer q-expectation may result in a binary detection event with probabilities given by the diagonal entries of the reduced density matrix of the prepared qubit. Differences in the conventions about measurement errors in the thermal interpretation and in traditional interpretations are discussed in detail. Several standard experiments, the double slit, Stern--Gerlach, and particle decay are described from the perspective of the thermal interpretation.
This paper presents the thermal interpretation of quantum physics. The insight from Part I of this series that Born's rule has its limitations -- hence cannot be the foundation of quantum physics -- opens the way for an alternative interpretation -- the thermal interpretation of quantum physics. It gives new foundations that connect quantum physics (including quantum mechanics, statistical mechanics, quantum field theory and their applications) to experiment. The thermal interpretation resolves the problems of the foundations of quantum physics revealed in the critique from Part I of this series. It improves the traditional foundations in several respects: * The thermal interpretation reflects the actual practice of quantum physics, especially regarding its macroscopic implications. * The thermal interpretation gives a fair account of the interpretational differences between quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. * The thermal interpretation gives a natural, realistic meaning to the standard formalism of quantum mechanics and quantum field theory in a single world, without introducing additional hidden variables. * The thermal interpretation is independent of the measurement problem. The latter becomes a precise problem in statistical mechanics rather than a fuzzy and problematic notion in the foundations. Details will be discussed in Part III.
Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.
The Born rule, P(x)=∣ψ(x)∣2 is one of the most successful relations in modern physics. Yet its physical meaning remains conceptually distinctive. Schrödinger's equation describes the continuous evolution of a complex wave amplitude, whereas an actual detector records discrete and localized events. The Born rule connects these two descriptions with remarkable precision, but the physical mechanism responsible for the quadratic relation between wave amplitude and event frequency is not contained explicitly in the Schrödinger equation itself. This paper revisits the historical and physical relationship between Schrödinger's wave mechanics and Born's statistical interpretation of scattering. The purpose is not to deny the empirical validity of the Born rule, but to identify the physical gap between continuous wave evolution and discrete detection statistics. We distinguish three levels of description: the preparation of localized quantum excitations, their continuous propagation and scattering, and the final microscopic detector event. This leads to a central question: \boxedtext{Why should the rate of discrete detection events be proportional to ∣ψ∣2?} The paper argues that the answer cannot be obtained merely by defining ∣ψ∣2 to be a probability density. Instead, a physical theory must explain how a continuously distributed complex amplitude produces a localized event rate. We investigate the possibility that the quadratic dependence emerges from a local interaction functional, energy-transfer mechanism, or bilinear response of the detector to the incident quantum amplitude. A particularly important distinction is made between the wave amplitude itself and the experimentally recorded event frequency. A single detection event is localized, whereas the Born distribution emerges only through repeated preparations and statistical accumulation. The paper therefore proposes that the Born rule may be viewed as the macroscopic statistical image of a microscopic event-generation process. No completed derivation of Born's rule is claimed here. Rather, the paper formulates the precise dynamical problem that such a derivation must solve and identifies several mathematical and experimental constraints that any successful mechanism must satisfy.