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arXiv:1901.10331 · Foundations of Physics

Comment on Healey’s “Quantum Theory and the Limits of Objectivity”

Veronika Baumann, Flavio Del Santo, Časlav Brukner

Published Jun 12, 2019• 13 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In this comment we critically review an argument against the existence of objective physical outcomes, recently proposed by Healey [ 1 ]. We show that his gedankenexperiment, based on a combination of “Wigner’s friend” scenarios and Bell’s inequalities, suffers from the main criticism, that the computed correlation functions entering the Bell’s inequality are in principle experimentally inaccessible, and hence the author’s claim is in principle not testable. We discuss perspectives for fixing that by adapting the proposed protocol and show that this, however, makes Healey’s argument virtually equivalent to other previous, similar proposals that he explicitly criticises.

DOI
10.1007/s10701-019-00276-w

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In this comment we critically review an argument against the existence of objective physical outcomes, recently proposed by Healey [ 1 ]. We show that his gedankenexperiment, based on a combination of “Wigner’s friend” scenarios and Bell’s inequalities, suffers from the main criticism, that the computed correlation functions entering the Bell’s inequality are in principle experimentally inaccessible, and hence the author’s claim is in principle not testable. We discuss perspectives for fixing that by adapting the proposed protocol and show that this, however, makes Healey’s argument virtually equivalent to other previous, similar proposals that he explicitly criticises.
The Wigner's friend thought experiment was intended to illustrate the difficulty one has in describing an agent as a quantum system when that agent performs a measurement. While it does pose a challenge to the orthodox interpretation of quantum theory, most modern interpretations have no trouble in resolving the difficulty. Recently, a number of extensions of Wigner's ideas have been proposed. We provide a gentle introduction to six such arguments, modifying the specifics of many of them so that they are as simple and unified as possible. In particular, we show that all of the arguments hinge on assumptions about correlations between measurement outcomes that are not accessible to any observer, even in principle. We then provide a critical analysis of each argument, focusing especially on how well one can motivate the required assumptions regarding these inaccessible correlations. Although we argue that some of these assumptions are not entirely well-motivated, all of the arguments do shed light on the nature of quantum theory, especially when concerning the description of agents and their measurements.
Recent arguments, involving entangled systems shared by sets of Wigner's friend arrangements, allegedly show that the assumption that the experiments performed by the friends yield definite outcomes, is incompatible with quantum predictions. From this, it is concluded that the results of measurements cannot be thought of as being actual or objective. Here, I show that these arguments depend upon a mistaken assumption, regarding the ("mixed") correlations between the results of the friends and those of "the Wigners", which leads to invalid predictions. It is not, then, that the assumption of definite outcomes leads to trouble, but that the results derived with such an assumption are contrasted with faulty predictions. Next, I explore the more famous no-go theorems by Frauchiger and Renner and by Brukner, on which these recent arguments are motivated. Regarding the first, I show that, although it is cast in a different form, it also rests on the mistaken assumption regarding "mixed" correlations--rendering it invalid. Regarding Brukner's theorem, I point out that it depends on the quite unattractive assumption of locality, a fact that fully diminishes its force. Throughout, I illustrate my claims with explicit calculations within pilot-wave theory.
The original Wigner’s friend paradox is a gedankenexperiment involving an observer described by an external agent. The paradox highlights the tension between unitary evolution and collapse in quantum theory, and is sometimes taken as requiring a reassessment of the notion of objective reality. In this note, however, we present a classical toy model in which (i) the contradicting predictions at the heart of the thought experiment are reproduced (ii) every system is in a well-defined state at all times. The toy model shows how puzzles such as Wigner’s friend’s experience of being in a superposition, conflicts between different agents’ descriptions of the experiment, the positioning of the Heisenberg’s cut and the apparent lack of objectivity of measurement outcomes can be explained within a classical model where there exists an objective state of affairs about every physical system at all times. Within the model, the debate surrounding the original Wigner’s friend thought experiment and its resolution have striking similarities with arguments concerning the nature of the second law of thermodynamics. The same conclusion however does not apply to more recent extensions of the gedankenexperiment featuring multiple encapsulated observers, and shows that such extensions are indeed necessary avoid simple classical explanations.