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arXiv:1901.09741

Quantum strategies and evolutionary stability (in Urdu)

Azhar Iqbal, Derek Abbott

Published Jan 28, 2019• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

This expanded Urdu-language review introduces classical and quantum game theory with particular attention to Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stability. It adds worked examples of the Prisoner's Dilemma and Hawk--Dove games, a concise introduction to qubits and measurement, quantum protocol construction, noise robustness, multiplayer games, a bilingual glossary, and guided questions for learners. It explains the role of quantum protocols, entanglement, admissible strategy spaces, and payoff equivalence, while distinguishing mathematical game-theoretic conclusions from claims of physical implementation. Detailed new sections distinguish equilibrium from ESS and from stability of payoff-equivalence classes, derive the instability of a classical mixed coordination equilibrium, discuss the Bloch-sphere quotient for a special quantum game, analyze noise and perturbations, and propose a reproducible research framework. The article ends with limitations and open research questions. .

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1901.09741

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This expanded Urdu-language review introduces classical and quantum game theory with particular attention to Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stability. It adds worked examples of the Prisoner's Dilemma and Hawk--Dove games, a concise introduction to qubits and measurement, quantum protocol construction, noise robustness, multiplayer games, a bilingual glossary, and guided questions for learners. It explains the role of quantum protocols, entanglement, admissible strategy spaces, and payoff equivalence, while distinguishing mathematical game-theoretic conclusions from claims of physical implementation. Detailed new sections distinguish equilibrium from ESS and from stability of payoff-equivalence classes, derive the instability of a classical mixed coordination equilibrium, discuss the Bloch-sphere quotient for a special quantum game, analyze noise and perturbations, and propose a reproducible research framework. The article ends with limitations and open research questions. .
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Since the establishment of von Neumann and Nash's concept of equilibrium, game theory has become a universal language in economics and social sciences. However, classical game theory is deeply rooted in the mechanistic worldview, and its deterministic assumptions, static equilibrium, and individualistic methodology are becoming increasingly inadequate in explaining the emergence of cooperation, uncertainty, and complex social interactions. This book directly faces this dilemma and introduces the core concepts of quantum mechanics into game analysis, constructing a complete system of quantum game theory. Starting from the century long evolution of game theory, the entire book deeply criticizes the mechanistic nature of classical game theory, and re establishes the philosophical foundation of game theory through practical ontology. On this basis, this book proposes the hypothesis of a "quantum gamer" and constructs a complete analytical framework from superposition strategy space, quantum entanglement to measurement collapse. The system reconstructs core areas such as quantum zero sum games, quantum non-zero sum games, quantum prisoner's dilemma, quantum coordination games, quantum evolutionary games, quantum cooperative games, and quantum incomplete information games, and extends them to cutting-edge directions such as quantum repetitive games, quantum game learning, and quantum mechanism design. At the application level, this book comprehensively demonstrates the broad prospects of quantum game theory in fields such as economics, political science, sociology, biology, computer science, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and ethics. This book emphasizes that quantum entanglement enables cooperation to emerge, and quantum measurement leads equilibrium from static to dynamic collapse, thus surpassing the explanatory boundaries of classical game theory. The book has a rigorous structure and in-depth arguments, combining theoretical originality with interdisciplinary perspectives, providing a groundbreaking work for researchers, graduate students, and cutting-edge explorers to understand the quantum game revolution.
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy that, once adopted by a population, cannot be invaded by any sufficiently rare alternative (mutant) strategy. We analyse evolutionary stability in an Eisert--Wilkens--Lewenstein (EWL) quantization of a symmetric 2×22\times22×2 coordination game, whose classical mixed equilibrium p∗=1/2p^*=1/2p∗=1/2 is not an ESS. In the restricted two-parameter EWL strategy space, the corresponding quantum strategy is a strict symmetric Nash equilibrium and an ESS for every entanglement strength γ>0γ>0γ>0. In the full SU(2)SU(2)SU(2) strategy space it remains a Nash equilibrium, but in the unreduced game, in which every unitary is a distinct strategy, exact payoff duplicates preclude strictness and ESS for every pure strategy. For the agreement-payoff class, the payoff factors through a Bloch map; identifying payoff-equivalent unitaries gives the reduced space U(1)\SU(2)≅S2U(1)\backslash SU(2)\cong S^2U(1)\SU(2)≅S2, where strictness and ESS are restored for γ>0γ>0γ>0. An arbitrarily small perturbation outside this class that preserves p∗=1/2p^*=1/2p∗=1/2 yields a profitable deviation, so the reduced-space result is not generic.
The concept of Nash equilibria in pure strategies for quantum extensions of the general form of the Prisoner's Dilemma game is investigated. The process of quantization involves incorporating two additional unitary strategies, which effectively expand the classical game. We consider five classes of such quantum games, which remain invariant under isomorphic transformations of the classical game. The resulting Nash equilibria are found to be more closely aligned with Pareto-optimal solutions than those of the conventional Nash equilibrium outcome of the classical game. Our results demonstrate the complexity and diversity of strategic behavior in the quantum setting, providing new insights into the dynamics of classical decision-making dilemmas. In particular, we provide a detailed characterization of strategy profiles and their corresponding Nash equilibria, thereby extending the understanding of quantum strategies' impact on traditional game-theoretical problems.
The authors proposed a quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game as a natural extension of the classic PD game to resolve the dilemma. Here, we establish a new Nash equilibrium principle of the game, propose the notion of convergence and discover the convergence and phase-transition phenomena of the evolutionary games on networks. We investigate the many-body extension of the game or evolutionary games in networks. For homogeneous networks, we show that entanglement guarantees a quick convergence of super cooperation, that there is a phase transition from the convergence of defection to the convergence of super cooperation, and that the threshold for the phase transitions is principally determined by the Nash equilibrium principle of the game, with an accompanying perturbation by the variations of structures of networks. For heterogeneous networks, we show that the equilibrium frequencies of super-cooperators are divergent, that entanglement guarantees emergence of super-cooperation and that there is a phase transition of the emergence with the threshold determined by the Nash equilibrium principle, accompanied by a perturbation by the variations of structures of networks. Our results explore systematically, for the first time, the dynamics, morphogenesis and convergence of evolutionary games in interacting and competing systems.