Here we clarify the assumptions made and conclusions reached in our paper "The thermodynamical cost of some interpretations of quantum theory" [Phys. Rev. A 94, 052127 (2016)], at the light of the criticisms of Prunkl and Timpson [Stud. Hist. Philos. Sci. Part B 63, 114 (2018)], and Davidsson (Master thesis, Stockholm University, 2018). We point out some misunderstandings and some weaknesses of the counterexample Prunkl and Timpson present to challenge our conclusion. We thus conclude, once more, that interpretations of quantum theory which consider the probabilities of measurement outcomes to be determined by objective properties of the measured system and satisfy the assumption that the measured system only has finite memory have a thermodynamical cost.
Here we clarify the assumptions made and conclusions reached in our paper "The thermodynamical cost of some interpretations of quantum theory" [Phys. Rev. A 94, 052127 (2016)], at the light of the criticisms of Prunkl and Timpson [Stud. Hist. Philos. Sci. Part B 63, 114 (2018)], and Davidsson (Master thesis, Stockholm University, 2018). We point out some misunderstandings and some weaknesses of the counterexample Prunkl and Timpson present to challenge our conclusion. We thus conclude, once more, that interpretations of quantum theory which consider the probabilities of measurement outcomes to be determined by objective properties of the measured system and satisfy the assumption that the measured system only has finite memory have a thermodynamical cost.
The interpretation of quantum theory is one of the longest-standing debates in physics. Type I interpretations see quantum probabilities as determined by intrinsic properties of the observed system. Type II see them as relational experiences between an observer and the system. It is usually believed that a decision between these two options cannot be made simply on purely physical grounds but requires an act of metaphysical judgment. Here we show that, under some assumptions, the problem is decidable using thermodynamics. We prove that type I interpretations are incompatible with the following assumptions: (i) The choice of which measurement is performed can be made randomly and independently of the system under observation, (ii) the system has limited memory, and (iii) Landauer's erasure principle holds.
Quantum theory has traditionally – and not altogether unreasonably – been taken as a challenge to “realism” about physical theories. At the very least, the ways in which it is often formulated, presented and used suggest a non-realist understanding of the theory because the significance of the “state” of a system is described in terms of a catalogue of predictions. While protective measurement does not force one to give up on this standard view, it does support an alternative contention, namely, that the state of a physical system (a wave function, for example) has a somewhat more direct physical significance. I conclude with what I take to be the upshot of these observations for approaches to interpreting quantum theory and evaluating those interpretations. Introduction In 1993 I wrote an article (Dickson, 1995) about the scheme for protective measurement first described (to my knowledge) by Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman (1993). There I claimed that protective measurement makes “realism” about quantum theory more attractive than it might otherwise have been. I still believe some form of that claim to be true, and I am grateful to the editor and to Cambridge University Press for the opportunity to say so in the manner that I'm inclined to now, 20 years later. Of course, the debates about the interpretation of quantum theory have moved on quite a bit in the intervening time. We've seen a rise to prominence of “subjectivist” interpretations, largely based on developments in quantum information theory (but with its own historical precedents, as Timpson (2010) has pointed out – see Fuchs (2002) for a landmark paper in the modern development, and Timpson (2013) for a thorough overview and evaluation). The various “many-somethings” (worlds, minds, perspectives, whatever) interpretations have, arguably, seen a rise in fortune as well.
Considering a general microscopic model for a quantum measuring apparatus comprising a quantum probe coupled to a thermal bath, we analyze the energetic resources necessary for the realization of a quantum measurement, which includes the creation of system-apparatus correlations, the irreversible transition to a statistical mixture of definite outcomes, and the apparatus resetting. Crucially, we do not resort to another quantum measurement to capture the emergence of objective measurement results, but rather exploit the properties of the thermal bath which redundantly records the measurement result in its degrees of freedom, naturally implementing the paradigm of quantum Darwinism. In practice, this model allows us to perform a quantitative thermodynamic analysis of the measurement process. From the expression of the second law, we show how the minimal required work depends on the energy variation of the system being measured plus information-theoretic quantities characterizing the performance of the measurement – efficiency and completeness. Additionally, we show that it is possible to perform a thermodynamically reversible measurement, thus reaching the minimal work expenditure, and provide the corresponding protocol. Finally, for finite-time measurement protocols, we illustrate the increasing work cost induced by rising entropy production inherent in finite-time thermodynamic processes. This highlights an emerging trade-off between velocity of the measurement and work cost, on top of a trade-off between efficiency of the measurement and work cost. We apply those findings to bring new insights in the thermodynamic balance of the measurement-powered quantum engines.
It was argued [1] that there can be no extension of quantum mechanics with improved predictive power on a measurement freely chosen, independently of any event that is not in its future light cone. The assumption of measurement choice was criticized [2] to be too strong to be physically necessary and extensions of quantum mechanics were shown [3] to be possible under a more relaxed measurement assumption. Here I point out an error in the criticism and observe that the actual mistake of the no-go theorem lies in an unwarranted assumption implicitly made in the proof of [1]. Hence, quantum mechanics is guaranteed to have the maximal predictive power only in situations of complete certainty and complete uncertainty about measurement outcomes. I then show that the measurement assumption can be further relaxed without affecting the conclusion on the predictive power of quantum mechanics versus alternative theories. I further study the optimal predicative improvement over quantum mechanics of local spin measurements on a pair of entangled qubits by any alternative theory and conjecture a strict upper bound.
The central part of Everett's formulation of quantum mechanics is a quantum mechanical model of memory and of observation as the recording of information in a memory. To use this model as an answer to the measurement problem, Everett has to assume that a conscious observer can be in a superposition of such memory states and be unaware of it. This assumption has puzzled generations of readers. The fundamental aim of this dissertation is to find a set of simpler assumptions which are sufficient to show that Everett's model is empirically adequate. I argue that Everett's model needs three assumptions to account for the process of observation: an assumption of decoherence of observers as quantum mechanical systems; an assumption of supervenience of mental states (qualities) over quantum mechanical properties; and an assumption about the interpretation of quantum mechanical states in general: quantum mechanical states describe ensembles of states of affairs coexisting in the same system. I argue that the only plausible understanding of such ensembles is as ensembles of possibilities, and that all standard no-collapse interpretations agree in this reading of quantum mechanical states. Their differences can be understood as different theories about what marks the real state within this ensemble, and Everett's theory as the claim that no additional 'mark of reality' is necessary. Using the three assumptions, I argue that introspection cannot determine the objective quantum mechanical state of an observer. Rather, the introspective qualities of a quantum mechanical state can be represented by a (classical) statistical ensemble of subjective states. An analysis of these subjective states and their dynamics leads to the conclusion that they suffice to give empirically correct predictions. The argument for the empirical adequacy of the subjective state entails that knowledge of the objective quantum mechanical state is impossible in principle. Empirical reality for a conscious observer is not described by the objective state, but by a Everettian relative state conditional on the subjective state, and no theoretical 'mark of reality' is necessary for this concept of reality. I compare the resulting concept of reality to Kant's distinction between empirical and transcendental reality.
This chapter presents the measurement problem from the point of view of the thermal interpretation of quantum physics. Everything physicists measure is measured in a thermal environment, for which statistical thermodynamics is relevant. The thermal interpretation agrees with how one interprets measurements in thermodynamics, the macroscopic part of quantum physics, derived via statistical mechanics. By its very construction, the thermal interpretation naturally matches the classical properties of our quantum world: The thermal interpretation assigns states-and a realistic interpretation for them-to individual quantum systems, in a way that large quantum systems are naturally described by classical observables. Since measurement devices are large quantum systems, this is the key to solving the measurement problem. We discuss the role played by macroscopic systems and the weak law of large numbers in getting readings with small uncertainty. Since quantum physics makes many deterministic predictions, for example regarding observed spectra, but also assertions about probabilities, we distinguish deterministic and statistical measurements. To clarify the meaning of the concept of measurement, we postulate (in Section 11.1) a measurement principle that defines what it means in the thermal interpretation to measure a quantity with a specified uncertainty. This turns the measurement problem from a philosophical riddle into a scientific problem in the domain of quantum statistical mechanics, namely how the quantum dynamics correlates macroscopic readings from an instrument with properties of the state of a measured microscopic system. The essence of scientific practice is the reproducibility of measurements, discussed in Section 11.2. Unlike in traditional interpretations, single, nonreproducible observations do not count as measurements, since this would violate the reproducibility of measurements-the essence of scientific practice. As a consequence, the measurement of a Hermitian quantity A is regarded as giving an uncertain value approximating the q-expectation {A} rather than (as tradition wanted to have it) as an exact revelation of an eigenvalue of A. This difference is most conspicuous in the interpretation of single discrete microscopic events. Except in very special circumstances, these are not reproducible. Thus, they have no scientific value in themselves and do not constitute measurement results. Scientific value is, however, in ensembles of such observations, which result in approximate measurements of q-probabilities and q-expectations. Sections 11.3 and 11.4 distinguish deterministic and statistical measurements, depending on whether a single observation is reproducible, and discuss the role played by macroscopic systems and the weak law of large numbers in getting readings with small uncertainty. How to measure the q-probabilities of events, described in terms of POVMs, is discussed in Section 11.5. Section 11.6 poses the measurement problem as a problem of the statistical mechanics of measurement devices, and discuss recent work by Allahverdyan, Balian, and Nieuwenhuizen on its resolution. Section 11.7 discusses the problem how, in the thermal interpretation, discrete events can arise, although qexpectations are by their very nature continuous. This is resolved by pointing to work by Breuer and Petruccione on piecewise deterministic processes (PDP). Section 11.8 sheds additional light on the origin of discrete events by an analysis of the role dissipative bistability plays in obtaining discreteness in classical physics.