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arXiv:1812.01937

Probabilities in the logic of quantum propositions

Arkady Bolotin

Published Dec 5, 2018• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In quantum logic, i.e., within the structure of the Hilbert lattice imposed on all closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space, the assignment of truth values to quantum propositions (i.e., experimentally verifiable propositions relating to a quantum system) is unambiguously determined by the state of the system. So, if only pure states of the system are considered, can a probability measure mapping the probability space for truth values to the unit interval be assigned to quantum propositions? In other words, is a probability concept contingent or emergent in the logic of quantum propositions? Until this question is answered, the cause of probabilities in quantum theory cannot be completely understood. In the present paper it is shown that the interaction of the quantum system with its environment causes the irreducible randomness in the relation between quantum propositions and truth values.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1812.01937

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In quantum logic, i.e., within the structure of the Hilbert lattice imposed on all closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space, the assignment of truth values to quantum propositions (i.e., experimentally verifiable propositions relating to a quantum system) is unambiguously determined by the state of the system. So, if only pure states of the system are considered, can a probability measure mapping the probability space for truth values to the unit interval be assigned to quantum propositions? In other words, is a probability concept contingent or emergent in the logic of quantum propositions? Until this question is answered, the cause of probabilities in quantum theory cannot be completely understood. In the present paper it is shown that the interaction of the quantum system with its environment causes the irreducible randomness in the relation between quantum propositions and truth values.
Of what are experimental quantum propositions primary bearers? As it is widely accepted in the modern literature, rather than being bearers of truth and falsity, these entities are bearers of probability values. Consequently, their truth values can be regarded as no more than degenerate probabilities (i.e., ones that have only the values 0 and 1). The mathematical motivation for precedence of probabilistic semantics over propositional semantic for the logic of experimental quantum propositions is Gleason's theorem. It proves that the theory of probability measures on closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space (which represent experimental quantum propositions) does not admit any probability measure having only the values 0 and 1. -- By contrast, in the present paper, it is proclaimed that experimental propositions about quantum systems are primary bearers of truth values. As this paper demonstrates, algebraic properties of separable Hilbert spaces of finite dimension equal or greater than 2 do not allow in valuations (that is, truth assignments) which are dispersion-free, i.e., total functions from the set of atomic propositions to the set of two objects, true and false. Providing a probability function can be interpreted as a measure of the (un)certainty in the assignment of truth values, the fact that valuations cannot be dispersion-free gives rise to probabilistic semantics for the logic of experimental quantum propositions.
According to quantum mechanics, statements about the future made by sentient beings like us are, in general, neither true nor false; they must satisfy a many-valued logic. I propose that the truth value of such a statement should be identified with the probability that the event it describes will occur. After reviewing the history of related ideas in logic, I argue that it gives an understanding of probability which is particularly satisfactory for use in quantum mechanics. I construct a lattice of future-tense propositions, with truth values in the interval [0, 1], and derive logical properties of these truth values given by the usual quantum-mechanical formula for the probability of a history.
A set of statements about the properties of a quantum system is looked at as at a partially ordered set of subspaces of finite or infinite dimensional Hilbert space. The operation of ordering is performed on a set of propositions comparing the truth values of these propositions and on the set of subspaces as the opera- tion of inclusion. Based on the required properties these structures are translated into operations on the lattice. The correspondence with Heisenberg uncertainty principle is shown there. Furthermore, it is shown that the lattices correspond- ing to the subspaces of infinite dimensional Hilbert space are not modular. This property is replaced with weaker property of orthomodularity, when operation of the negation is added. Following the work of G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann, the structure of quantum logic is looked for in projective spaces, which are in- troduced either arithmetically or axiomatically. The examples of quantum logic, their physical implementation and eventual implementation in projective spaces are analysed. 1
According to quantum mechanics, the pure states of a microsystem are represented by vectors in a Hilbert Space. Sentences of the form, "x є L" (where x is the state vector for a system, L a subspace of the appropriate Hilbert space), may be called Q-propositions: such sentences serve to summarise our information about the results of possible experiments on the system. Quantum logic investigates the relations which hold among the Q-propositions about a given physical sys tem. These logical relations correspond to algebraic relations among the subspaces of Hilbert space. The algebra of this set of subspaces is non-Boolean, and may be regarded either as an orthomodular lattice or as a partial Boolean algebra. With each type of structure we can associate a logic. A general approach to the semantics for such a logic is provided in terms of interpretations of a formal language within an algebraic structure; an interpretation maps sentences of the language homomorphically onto elements of the structure. When the structure in question is a Boolean algera, the resulting logic is classical; here we develop a semantics for the logic associated with partial Boolean algebras. Two systems of proof, based on the natural deduction systems of Gentzen, are shown for this logic. With respect to the given sematics, these calculi are sound and weakly complete. Strong completeness is conjectured. Quantum logic deals with the logical relations between sentences, and so is properly called a logic. However, it is the logic appropriate to a limited class of sentences: proposals that it should replace classical logic wherever the latter is used should be viewed with suspicion.
I discuss the problems of probability and the future in the Everett-Wheeler understanding of quantum theory. To resolve these, I propose an understanding of probability arising from a form of temporal logic: the probability of a future-tense proposition is identified with its truth value in a many-valued and context-dependent logic. I construct a lattice of tensed propositions, with truth values in the interval [0,1][0,1][0,1], and derive logical properties of the truth values given by the usual quantum-mechanical formula for the probability of histories.
The structure of a complete lattice formed by closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space (i.e., a Hilbert lattice) entails some unreasonable consequences from the physical point of view. Specifically, this structure seems to contradict to the localized variant of the Kochen-Specker theorem according to which the bivaluation of a proposition represented by a closed linear subspace that does not belong to a Boolean algebra shared by the state, in which a quantum-mechanical system is prepared, must be value indefinite. For this reason, the Hilbert lattice structure seems to be too strong and needs to be weakened. The question is, how should it be weakened so that to support the quantum uncertainty principle and the Kochen-Specker theorem? Which logic will a weakened structure identify? The present paper tries to answer these questions.