The structure of a complete lattice formed by closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space (i.e., a Hilbert lattice) entails some unreasonable consequences from the physical point of view. Specifically, this structure seems to contradict to the localized variant of the Kochen-Specker theorem according to which the bivaluation of a proposition represented by a closed linear subspace that does not belong to a Boolean algebra shared by the state, in which a quantum-mechanical system is prepared, must be value indefinite. For this reason, the Hilbert lattice structure seems to be too strong and needs to be weakened. The question is, how should it be weakened so that to support the quantum uncertainty principle and the Kochen-Specker theorem? Which logic will a weakened structure identify? The present paper tries to answer these questions.
The structure of a complete lattice formed by closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space (i.e., a Hilbert lattice) entails some unreasonable consequences from the physical point of view. Specifically, this structure seems to contradict to the localized variant of the Kochen-Specker theorem according to which the bivaluation of a proposition represented by a closed linear subspace that does not belong to a Boolean algebra shared by the state, in which a quantum-mechanical system is prepared, must be value indefinite. For this reason, the Hilbert lattice structure seems to be too strong and needs to be weakened. The question is, how should it be weakened so that to support the quantum uncertainty principle and the Kochen-Specker theorem? Which logic will a weakened structure identify? The present paper tries to answer these questions.
In quantum logic, i.e., within the structure of the Hilbert lattice imposed on all closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space, the assignment of truth values to quantum propositions (i.e., experimentally verifiable propositions relating to a quantum system) is unambiguously determined by the state of the system. So, if only pure states of the system are considered, can a probability measure mapping the probability space for truth values to the unit interval be assigned to quantum propositions? In other words, is a probability concept contingent or emergent in the logic of quantum propositions? Until this question is answered, the cause of probabilities in quantum theory cannot be completely understood. In the present paper it is shown that the interaction of the quantum system with its environment causes the irreducible randomness in the relation between quantum propositions and truth values.
The thesis investigates the possibility of a classical semantics for quantum propositional structures. A classical semantics is defined as a set of mappings each of which is (i) bivalent, i.e., the value 1 (true) or 0 (false) is assigned to each proposition, and (ii) truth-functional, i.e., the logical operations are preserved. In addition, this set must be "full", i.e., any pair of distinct propositions is assigned different values by some mapping in the set. When the propositions make assertions about the properties of classical or of quantum systems, the mappings should also be (iii) "state-induced", i.e., values assigned by the semantics should accord with values assigned by classical or by quantum mechanics. In classical propositional logic, (equivalence classes of) propositions form a Boolean algebra, and each semantic mapping assigns the value 1 to the members of a certain subset of the algebra, namely, an ultrafilter, and assigns 0 to the members of the dual ultraideal, where the union of these two subsets is the entire algebra. The propositional structures of classical mechanics are likewise Boolean algebras, so one can straightforwardly provide a classical semantics, which also satisfies (iii). However, quantum propositional structures are non-Boolean, so it is an open question whether a semantics satisfying (i), (ii) and (iii) can be provided. Von Neumann first proposed (1932) that the algebraic structures of the subspaces (or projectors) of Hilbert space be regarded as the pro-positional structures PQM of quantum mechanics. These structures have been formalized in two ways: as orthomodular lattices which have the binary operations "and", "or", defined among all elements, compatible [symbol omitted] and incompatible [symbol omitted]; and as partial-Boolean algebras which have the binary operations defined among only compatible elements. In the thesis, two basic senses in which these structures are non-Boolean are discriminated. And two notions of truth-functionality are distinguished: truth-functionality [symbols omitted] applicable to the PQM lattices; and truth-functionality [symbol omitted] applicable to both the lattices and partial-Boolean algebras. Then it is shown how the lattice definitions of "and", "or", among incompatibles rule out a bivalent, truth-functional [symbols omitted] semantics for any lattice containing incompatible, elements. In contrast, the Gleason and Kochen-Specker proofs of the impossibility of hidden-variables for quantum mechanics show the impossibility of a bivalent, truth-functional [symbol omitted] semantics for three-or-higher dimensional Hilbert space structures; and the presence of incompatible elements is necessary but is not sufficient to rule out such a semantics. As for (iii), each quantum state-induced expectation-function on a PQM truth-functionally assigns 1 and 0 values to the elements in a ultrafilter and dual ultraideal of PQM³ where, in general the union of an ultrafilter and its dual ultraideal is smaller than the entire structure. Thus it is argued that each expectation-function is the quantum analog of a classical semantic mapping, even though the domain where each expectation-function is bivalent and truth-functional is usually a non-Boolean substructure of PQM. The final portion of the thesis surveys proposals for the introduction of hidden variables into quantum mechanics, proofs of the impossibility of such hidden-variable proposals, and criticisms of these impossibility proofs. And arguments in favour of the partial-Boolean algebra, rather than the orthomodular lattice, formalization of the quantum propositional structures are reviewed.
According to quantum mechanics, the pure states of a microsystem are represented by vectors in a Hilbert Space. Sentences of the form, "x є L" (where x is the state vector for a system, L a subspace of the appropriate Hilbert space), may be called Q-propositions: such sentences serve to summarise our information about the results of possible experiments on the system. Quantum logic investigates the relations which hold among the Q-propositions about a given physical sys tem. These logical relations correspond to algebraic relations among the subspaces of Hilbert space. The algebra of this set of subspaces is non-Boolean, and may be regarded either as an orthomodular lattice or as a partial Boolean algebra. With each type of structure we can associate a logic. A general approach to the semantics for such a logic is provided in terms of interpretations of a formal language within an algebraic structure; an interpretation maps sentences of the language homomorphically onto elements of the structure. When the structure in question is a Boolean algera, the resulting logic is classical; here we develop a semantics for the logic associated with partial Boolean algebras. Two systems of proof, based on the natural deduction systems of Gentzen, are shown for this logic. With respect to the given sematics, these calculi are sound and weakly complete. Strong completeness is conjectured. Quantum logic deals with the logical relations between sentences, and so is properly called a logic. However, it is the logic appropriate to a limited class of sentences: proposals that it should replace classical logic wherever the latter is used should be viewed with suspicion.
As it is known, the set of all closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space together with a binary relation over the set represents the logic of the quantum propositions. It is also known that the lattices of the closed linear subspaces on a Hilbert space of dimension 3 or greater do not have a prime filter, hence those lattices do not allow a valuation map. In contrast to that, for qubits it is easy to find prime filters in the Hilbert lattice. This begs the question: What assumption(s) related to the lattices of the closed linear subspaces should be added or altered to preclude the bivaluation map in the two-dimensional case? The presented paper offers the answer to this question.
The semantics underlying the propositional structure of Hilbert space quantum mechanics involves an inherent ambiguity concerning the impossibility of assigning definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to a quantum system without generating a Kochen-Specker contradiction. Although the preceding Kochen-Specker result forbids a global, absolute assignment of truth values to quantum mechanical propositions, it does not exclude ones that are contextual. In this respect, the Bub-Clifton “uniqueness theorem” is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a suitable “preferred” observable. It is suggested that the most natural choice of the latter, especially for confronting the problem of truth valuation in quantum mechanics, results in the determinateness of the observable to be measured. An account of truth of contextual correspondence is thereby provided that is appropriate to the quantum domain of discourse. The resulting account of truth is compatible with a realist conception of truth. Such an account essentially denies that there can be a universal context of reference or an Archimedean standpoint from which to evaluate logically the totality of facts of nature.
The Kochen-Specker no-go theorem established that hidden-variable theories in quantum mechanics necessarily admit contextuality. This theorem is formally stated in terms of the partial Boolean algebra structure of projectors on a Hilbert space. Each partial Boolean algebra provides a semantics for interpreting propositional logic. In this paper, we examine the complexity of propositional satisfiablity for various classes of partial Boolean algebras. We first show that the satisfiability problem for the class of non-trivial partial Boolean algebras is NP-complete. Next, we consider the satisfiability problem for the class of partial Boolean algebras arising from projectors on finite dimensional Hilbert spaces. For real Hilbert spaces of dimension greater 2 and any complex Hilbert spaces of dimension greater than 3, we demonstrate that the satisfiablity problem is complete for the existential theory of the reals. Interestingly, the proofs of these results make use of Kochen-Specker sets as gadgets. As a corollary, we conclude that deciding quantum homomorphism in these fixed dimensions are also complete for the existential theory of the reals. Finally, we show that the satisfiability problems for the class of all Hilbert spaces and all finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces is undecidable.