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arXiv:1810.06551

The Intrinsic Structure of Quantum Mechanics

Eddy Keming Chen

Published Oct 13, 2018• 18 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The wave function in quantum mechanics presents an interesting challenge to our understanding of the physical world. In this paper, I show that the wave function can be understood as four intrinsic relations on physical space. My account has three desirable features that the standard account lacks: (1) it does not refer to any abstract mathematical objects, (2) it is free from the usual arbitrary conventions, and (3) it explains why the wave function has its gauge degrees of freedom, something that are usually put into the theory by hand. Hence, this account has implications for debates in philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science. First, by removing references to mathematical objects, it provides a framework for nominalizing quantum mechanics. Second, by excising superfluous structure such as overall phase, it reveals the intrinsic structure postulated by quantum mechanics. Moreover, it also removes a major obstacle to "wave function realism."

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1810.06551

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A century after the discovery of quantum mechanics, the meaning of quantum mechanics still remains elusive. This is largely due to the puzzling nature of the wave function, the central object in quantum mechanics. If we are realists about quantum mechanics, how should we understand the wave function? What does it represent? What is its physical meaning? Answering these questions would improve our understanding of what it means to be a realist about quantum mechanics. In this survey article, I review and compare several realist interpretations of the wave function. They fall into three categories: ontological interpretations, nomological interpretations, and the sui generis interpretation. For simplicity, I will focus on non-relativistic quantum mechanics.

•Oct 13, 2018•67 citations
The wave function in quantum mechanics presents an interesting challenge to our understanding of the physical world. In this paper, I show that the wave function can be understood as four intrinsic relations on physical space. My account has three desirable features that the standard account lacks: (1) it does not refer to any abstract mathematical objects, (2) it is free from the usual arbitrary conventions, and (3) it explains why the wave function has its gauge degrees of freedom, something that are usually put into the theory by hand. Hence, this account has implications for debates in philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science. First, by removing references to mathematical objects, it provides a framework for nominalizing quantum mechanics. Second, by excising superfluous structure such as overall phase, it reveals the intrinsic structure postulated by quantum mechanics. Moreover, it also removes a major obstacle to "wave function realism."
What is the proper metaphysics of quantum mechanics? In this dissertation, I approach the question from three different but related angles. First, I suggest that the quantum state can be understood intrinsically as relations holding among regions in ordinary space-time, from which we can recover the wave function uniquely up to an equivalence class (by representation and uniqueness theorems). The intrinsic account eliminates certain conventional elements (e.g. overall phase) in the representation of the quantum state. It also dispenses with first-order quantification over mathematical objects, which goes some way towards making the quantum world safe for a nominalistic metaphysics suggested in Field (1980, 2016). Second, I argue that the fundamental space of the quantum world is the low-dimensional physical space and not the high-dimensional space isomorphic to the ``configuration space.'' My arguments are based on considerations about dynamics, empirical adequacy, and symmetries of the quantum mechanics. Third, I show that, when we consider quantum mechanics in a time-asymmetric universe (with a large entropy gradient), we obtain new theoretical and conceptual possibilities. In such a model, we can use the low-entropy boundary condition known as the Past Hypothesis (Albert, 2000) to pin down a natural initial quantum state of the universe. However, the universal quantum state is not a pure state but a mixed state, represented by a density matrix that is the normalized projection onto the Past Hypothesis subspace. This particular choice has interesting consequences for Humean supervenience, statistical mechanical probabilities, and theoretical unity.
The quantum wave-function is at the heart of quantum mechanics. It is the physical state of a quantum system before a measurement is taken. This wave-function is described mathematically by the formulation of matrix mechanics and represents the evolution of the quantum wave-function. In contemporary philosophy of physics, the wave-function’s nature of space is hotly debated. Contemporaries such as David Albert, who posits an ontology which is based off the mathematical features of the wave-function, claim that the dimensionality of our physical space is proportional to 3N, where N is equal to the number of particles in the universe. Others such as Bradley Monton claim quantum mechanics to be a false theory from the outset due to its incompatibility with general relativity and posit a much more realist property-based-physics ontology. However, these ontologies have their problems. Albert’s ontology takes the mathematics of the quantum wave-function at face value and disregards the distance properties of metric space to misconstrue the phase space nature of the 3N-configuration space as a metric space. Monton, on the other hand, questionably grounds his thesis on the incompatibility of quantum mechanics with general relativity and on common sense rather than on observation and experimentation, as required by the scientific method. In this thesis, I discuss the viewpoints of Albert and Monton in detail and explore the nature of space in the quantum wave-function in an attempt to reach a better understanding of the fundamental nature of space in the quantum wave-function.
Introduction to the Maths and Physics of Quantum Mechanics details the mathematics and physics that are needed to learn the principles of quantum mechanics. It provides an accessible treatment of how to use quantum mechanics and why it is so successful in explaining natural phenomena. This book clarifies various aspects of quantum physics such as ‘why quantum mechanics equations contain “I”, the imaginary number?’, ‘Is it possible to make a transition from classical mechanics to quantum physics without using postulates?’ and ‘What is the origin of the uncertainty principle?’. A significant proportion of discussion is dedicated to the issue of why the wave function must be complex to properly describe our “real” world. The book also addresses the different formulations of quantum mechanics. A relatively simple introductory treatment is given for the “standard” Heisenberg matrix formulation and Schrodinger wave-function formulation and Feynman path integrals and second quantization are then discussed. This book will appeal to first- and second-year university students in physics, mathematics, engineering and other sciences studying quantum mechanics who will find material and clarifications not easily found in other textbooks. It will also appeal to self-taught readers with a genuine interest in modern physics who are willing to examine the mathematics and physics in a simple but rigorous way. Key Features: Written in an engaging and approachable manner, with fully explained mathematics and physics concepts Suitable as a companion to all introductory quantum mechanics textbooks Accessible to a general audience
What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.
In this paper, I introduce an intrinsic account of the quantum state. This account contains three desirable features that the standard platonistic account lacks: (1) it does not refer to any abstract mathematical objects such as complex numbers, (2) it is independent of the usual arbitrary conventions in the wave function representation, and (3) it explains why the quantum state has its amplitude and phase degrees of freedom. Consequently, this account extends Hartry Field’s program outlined in Science Without Numbers (1980), responds to David Malament’s long-standing impossibility conjecture (1982), and establishes an important first step towards a genuinely intrinsic and nominalistic account of quantum mechanics. I will also compare the present account to Mark Balaguer’s (1996) nominalization of quantum mechanics and discuss how it might bear on the debate about “wave function realism.” In closing, I will suggest some possible ways to extend this account to accommodate spinorial degrees of freedom and a variable number of particles (e.g. for particle creation and annihilation). Along the way, I axiomatize the quantum phase structure as what I shall call a “periodic difference structure” and prove a representation theorem as well as a uniqueness theorem. These formal results could prove fruitful for further investigation into the metaphysics of phase and theoretical structure. (For a more recent version of this paper, please see "The Intrinsic Structure of Quantum Mechanics" available on PhilPapers.)
A century after the discovery of quantum mechanics, the meaning of quantum mechanics still remains elusive. This is largely due to the puzzling nature of the wave function, the central object in quantum mechanics. If we are realists about quantum mechanics, how should we understand the wave function? What does it represent? What is its physical meaning? Answering these questions would improve our understanding of what it means to be a realist about quantum mechanics. In this survey article, I review and compare several realist interpretations of the wave function. They fall into three categories: ontological interpretations, nomological interpretations, and the sui generis interpretation. For simplicity, I will focus on non-relativistic quantum mechanics.