The quantum wave-function is at the heart of quantum mechanics. It is the physical state of a quantum system before a measurement is taken. This wave-function is described mathematically by the formulation of matrix mechanics and represents the evolution of the quantum wave-function. In contemporary philosophy of physics, the wave-function’s nature of space is hotly debated. Contemporaries such as David Albert, who posits an ontology which is based off the mathematical features of the wave-function, claim that the dimensionality of our physical space is proportional to 3N, where N is equal to the number of particles in the universe. Others such as Bradley Monton claim quantum mechanics to be a false theory from the outset due to its incompatibility with general relativity and posit a much more realist property-based-physics ontology. However, these ontologies have their problems. Albert’s ontology takes the mathematics of the quantum wave-function at face value and disregards the distance properties of metric space to misconstrue the phase space nature of the 3N-configuration space as a metric space. Monton, on the other hand, questionably grounds his thesis on the incompatibility of quantum mechanics with general relativity and on common sense rather than on observation and experimentation, as required by the scientific method. In this thesis, I discuss the viewpoints of Albert and Monton in detail and explore the nature of space in the quantum wave-function in an attempt to reach a better understanding of the fundamental nature of space in the quantum wave-function.
The quantum wave-function is at the heart of quantum mechanics. It is the physical state of a quantum system before a measurement is taken. This wave-function is described mathematically by the formulation of matrix mechanics and represents the evolution of the quantum wave-function. In contemporary philosophy of physics, the wave-function’s nature of space is hotly debated. Contemporaries such as David Albert, who posits an ontology which is based off the mathematical features of the wave-function, claim that the dimensionality of our physical space is proportional to 3N, where N is equal to the number of particles in the universe. Others such as Bradley Monton claim quantum mechanics to be a false theory from the outset due to its incompatibility with general relativity and posit a much more realist property-based-physics ontology. However, these ontologies have their problems. Albert’s ontology takes the mathematics of the quantum wave-function at face value and disregards the distance properties of metric space to misconstrue the phase space nature of the 3N-configuration space as a metric space. Monton, on the other hand, questionably grounds his thesis on the incompatibility of quantum mechanics with general relativity and on common sense rather than on observation and experimentation, as required by the scientific method. In this thesis, I discuss the viewpoints of Albert and Monton in detail and explore the nature of space in the quantum wave-function in an attempt to reach a better understanding of the fundamental nature of space in the quantum wave-function.
In quantum mechanics, the wave function of a N-body system is a mathematical function defined in a 3N-dimensional configuration space. We argue that wave function realism implies particle ontology when assuming: (1) the wave function of a N-body system describes N physical entities; (2) each triple of the 3N coordinates of a point in configuration space that relates to one physical entity represents a point in ordinary three-dimensional space. Moreover, the motion of particles is random and discontinuous.
What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.
The wave function gives not the density of stuff, but gives rather (on squaring its modulus) the density of probability. Probability of what, exactly? Not of the electron being there, but of the electron being found there, if its position is ‘measured’. Why this aversion to ‘being’ and insistence on ‘finding’? The founding fathers were unable to form a clear picture of things on the remote atomic scale . John S. Bell (1990) Introduction The physical meaning of the wave function is an important interpretative problem of quantum mechanics. Notwithstanding nearly ninety years of development of the theory, it is still an unsolved issue. During recent years, more and more research has been done on the ontological status and meaning of the wave function (see, e.g. Monton, 2002; Lewis, 2004; Gao, 2011a, 2011b; Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph, 2012; Ney and Albert, 2013). In particular, Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (2012) demonstrated that under certain non-trivial assumptions such as the preparation independence assumption, the wave function of a quantum system is a representation of the physical state of the system. This poses a further question, namely whether the reality of the wave function can be argued without resorting to non-trivial assumptions. Moreover, a harder problem is to determine the ontological meaning of the wave function, which is still a hot topic of debate in the realistic alternatives to quantum mechanics such as the de Broglie–Bohm theory or Bohmian mechanics (Belot, 2012). In this chapter, we will first give a clearer argument for the reality of the wave function in terms of protective measurements, which does not depend on non-trivial assumptions and can also overcome existing objections. Next, based on an analysis of the mass and charge properties of a quantum system, we will propose a new ontological interpretation of the wave function. According to this interpretation, the wave function of an N -body system represents the state of ergodic motion of N particles.
The mathematical structure of realist quantum theories has given rise to a debate about how our ordinary 3-dimensional space is related to the 3N-dimensional configuration space on which the wave function is defined. Which of the two spaces is our (more) fundamental physical space? I review the debate between 3N-Fundamentalists and 3D-Fundamentalists and evaluate it based on three criteria. I argue that when we consider which view leads to a deeper understanding of the physical world, especially given the deeper topological explanation from the unordered configurations to the Symmetrization Postulate, we have strong reasons in favor of 3D-Fundamentalism. I conclude that our evidence favors the view that our fundamental physical space in a quantum world is 3-dimensional rather than 3N-dimensional. I outline lines of future research where the evidential balance can be restored or reversed. Finally, I draw lessons from this case study to the debate about theoretical equivalence.
At the heart of quantum mechanics lies the wave function, a powerful but mysterious mathematical object which has been a hot topic of debate from its earliest stages. Covering much of the recent debate and providing a comprehensive and critical review of competing approaches, this ambitious text provides new, decisive proof of the reality of the wave function. Aiming to make sense of the wave function in quantum mechanics and to find the ontological content of the theory, this book explores new ontological interpretations of the wave function in terms of random discontinuous motion of particles. Finally, the book investigates whether the suggested quantum ontology is complete in solving the measurement problem and if it should be revised in the relativistic domain. A timely addition to the literature on the foundations of quantum mechanics, this book is of value to students and researchers with an interest in the philosophy of physics.
Introduction It is not exaggeration to claim that one of the major divides in the foundations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics derives from the way physicists and philosophers understand the status of the wave function. On the instrumentalist side of the camp, the wave function is regarded as a mere instrument to calculate probabilities that have been established by previous measurement outcomes. On the other “realistic” camp, the wave function is regarded as a new physical entity or a physical field of some sort. While both sides agree about the existence of quantum “particles” (the so-called theoretical entities), and therefore reject the radical agnosticism about them preached by van Fraassen (1980), the various “realistic” (and consequently, instrumentalist) philosophies of quantum mechanics are typically formulated in different, logically independent ways, so their implications need to be further investigated. For instance, on the one hand it seems plausible to claim that a realistic stance about the wave function is not the only way to defend “realism” about quantum theory. One can support a “flash” or a “density-of-stuff ” ontology (two variants of GRW), or an ontology of particles with well-defined positions (as in Bohmian mechanics), as primitive ontologies for observer-independent formulations of quantum mechanics (Allori, Goldstein, Tumulka and Zanghí, 2008). “Primitive ontologies”, as here are understood, are not only a fundamental ground for other ontological posits, but also entail a commitment to something concretely existing in spacetime (see also Allori, 2013). On the other hand, however, it is still debated whether such primitive ontologies can be autonomous from some form of realism about the wave function (Albert, 1996). In order to discuss this problem, we begin with a preliminary clarification of the meaning of “realism” and “instrumentalism” in physics, which are often subject to ideological and abstract discussions that often have little to do with the practice of physics (Section 9.2).