arXiv:1806.05323

Quantum theory is not only about information

Laura Felline

Published Jun 13, 2018• 2 citations

Abstract

In his recent book Bananaworld. Quantum mechanics for primates, Jeff Bub revives and provides a mature version of his influential information theoretic interpretation of Quantum Theory (QT). In this paper, I test Bub s conjecture that QT should be interpreted as a theory about information, by examining whether his information theoretic interpretation has the resources to explain (or explain away) quantum conundrums. The discussion of Bub s theses will also serve to investigate, more in general, whether other approaches succeed in defending the claim that QT is about quantum information. First of all, I argue that Bub s interpretation of QT as a principle theory fails to fully explain quantum nonlocality. Secondly, I argue that a constructive interpretation, where the quantum state is interpreted ontically as information, also fails at providing a full explanation of quantum correlations. Finally, while epistemic interpretations might succeed in this respect, I argue that such a success comes at the price of rejecting some in between the most basic scientific standards of physical theories.

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.1806.05323

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