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arXiv:1711.09716 · Theoretical Computer Science

Composable security against collective attacks of a modified BB84 QKD protocol with information only in one basis

Michel Boyer, Rotem Liss, Tal Mor

Published Aug 16, 2019• 16 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1016/j.tcs.2019.08.014

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The Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol BB84 has been proven secure against several important types of attacks: the collective attacks and the joint attacks. Here we analyze the security of a modified BB84 protocol, for which information is sent only in the z basis while testing is done in both the z and the x bases, against collective attacks. The proof follows the framework of a previous paper (Boyer, Gelles, and Mor, 2009), but it avoids the classical information-theoretical analysis that caused problems with composability. We show that this modified BB84 protocol is as secure against collective attacks as the original BB84 protocol, and that it requires more bits for testing.
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We consider a subcarrier wave quantum key distribution (QKD) system, where quantum encoding is carried out at weak sidebands generated around a coherent optical beam as a result of electro-optical phase modulation. We study security of two protocols, B92 and BB84, against one of the most powerful attacks for this class of systems, the collective beam-splitting attack. Our analysis includes the case of high modulation index, where the sidebands are essentially multimode. We demonstrate numerically and experimentally that a subcarrier wave QKD system with realistic parameters is capable of distributing cryptographic keys over large distances in presence of collective attacks. We also show that BB84 protocol modification with discrimination of only one state in each basis performs not worse than the original BB84 protocol in this class of QKD systems, thus significantly simplifying the development of cryptographic networks using the considered QKD technique.