Where does quantum mechanics part ways with classical mechanics? How does quantum randomness differ fundamentally from classical randomness? We cannot fully explain how the theories differ until we can derive them within a single axiomatic framework, allowing an unambiguous account of how one theory is the limit of the other. Here we derive non-relativistic quantum mechanics and classical statistical mechanics within a common framework. The common axioms include conservation of average energy and conservation of probability current. But two axioms distinguish quantum mechanics from classical statistical mechanics: an "ontic extension" defines a nonseparable (global) random variable that generates physical correlations, and an "epistemic restriction" constrains allowed phase space distributions. The ontic extension and epistemic restriction, with strength on the order of Planck's constant, imply quantum entanglement and uncertainty relations. This framework suggests that the wave function is epistemic, yet it does not provide an ontic dynamics for individual systems.
Where does quantum mechanics part ways with classical mechanics? How does quantum randomness differ fundamentally from classical randomness? We cannot fully explain how the theories differ until we can derive them within a single axiomatic framework, allowing an unambiguous account of how one theory is the limit of the other. Here we derive non-relativistic quantum mechanics and classical statistical mechanics within a common framework. The common axioms include conservation of average energy and conservation of probability current. But two axioms distinguish quantum mechanics from classical statistical mechanics: an "ontic extension" defines a nonseparable (global) random variable that generates physical correlations, and an "epistemic restriction" constrains allowed phase space distributions. The ontic extension and epistemic restriction, with strength on the order of Planck's constant, imply quantum entanglement and uncertainty relations. This framework suggests that the wave function is epistemic, yet it does not provide an ontic dynamics for individual systems.
Abstract Where does quantum mechanics part ways with classical mechanics? How does quantum randomness differ fundamentally from classical randomness? We cannot fully explain how the theories differ until we can derive them within a single axiomatic framework, allowing an unambiguous account of how one theory is the limit of the other. Here we derive non-relativistic quantum mechanics and classical statistical mechanics within a common framework. The common axioms include conservation of average energy and conservation of probability current. But two axioms distinguish quantum mechanics from classical statistical mechanics: an “ontic extension” defines a nonseparable (global) random variable that generates physical correlations, and an “epistemic restriction” constrains allowed phase space distributions. The ontic extension and epistemic restriction, with strength on the order of Planck’s constant, imply quantum entanglement and uncertainty relations. This framework suggests that the wave function is epistemic, yet it does not provide an ontic dynamics for individual systems.
Quantum physics consists of a formal core that is universally agreed upon (basically being a piece of mathematics with suggestive names for concepts matching related concepts of experimental culture) and an interpretational halo (trying to make this relation more precise) that remains highly disputed even after more than 90 years of modern quantum physics. The latter is the subject of the interpretation of quantum mechanics (see Part II), where many interpretations coexist and compete for the attention of those interested in what quantum physics really means. In this chapter, an axiomatic introduction to the undisputed formal core of quantum physics is given. The axioms described present nonrelativistic quantum statistical mechanics in the Schrödinger picture. The relativistic case is outside the scope of these axioms, as it must be treated by quantum field theory; see Chapter 7. As in any axiomatic setting (necessary for a formal discipline), there are a number of different but equivalent sets of axioms or postulates that can be used to define formal quantum physics. Since they are equivalent, their choice is a matter of convenience. The choice presented here is a formulation featuring three aspects: It emphasises the similarity of quantum mechanics and classical mechanics, gives most direct access to statistical mechanics, and is free from allusions to measurement. The reason for the first is that this similarity serves as a guide to meaning. From the axiomatic setting for quantum mechanics presented below, classical mechanics (in the Koopman setting discussed in Section 7.10) is obtained by simply restricting the operators to be diagonal, so that all operations happen pointwise on the diagonal elements. Thus, multiplication is commutative, and one can identify operators and functions. In particular, the density operator degenerates into a probability density. Therefore, the quantum case appears as a generalization of the classical case allowing for noncommutativity, so that both q-observables and the density operator are (usually infinite-dimensional) operators. The reason for the second is that statistical mechanics is the main tool for applications of quantum physics to the macroscopic systems we are familiar with. The reason for the third is that realistic measurements constitute a complex process involving macroscopic detectors, hence should be explained by quantum statistical mechanics rather than be part of the axiomatic foundations themselves. (This is in marked contrast to other foundations, and distinguishes the present system of axioms.)
How would the world appear to us if its ontology was that of classical mechanics but every agent faced a restriction on how much they could come to know about the classical state? We show that in most respects it would appear to us as quantum. The statistical theory of classical mechanics, which specifies how probability distributions over phase space evolve under Hamiltonian evolution and under measurements, is typically called Liouville mechanics, so the theory we explore here is Liouville mechanics with an epistemic restriction. The particular epistemic restriction we posit as our foundational postulate specifies two constraints. The first constraint is a classical analog of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle; the second-order moments of position and momentum defined by the phase-space distribution that characterizes an agent's knowledge are required to satisfy the same constraints as are satisfied by the moments of position and momentum observables for a quantum state. The second constraint is that the distribution should have maximal entropy for the given moments. Starting from this postulate, we derive the allowed preparations, measurements, and transformations and demonstrate that they are isomorphic to those allowed in Gaussian quantum mechanics and generate the same experimental statistics. We argue that this reconstruction of Gaussian quantum mechanics constitutes additional evidence in favor of a research program wherein quantum states are interpreted as states of incomplete knowledge and that the phenomena that do not arise in Gaussian quantum mechanics provide the best clues for how one might reconstruct the full quantum theory.
Most scholars maintain that quantum mechanics (QM) is a contextual theory and that quantum probability does not allow for an epistemic (ignorance) interpretation. By inquiring possible connections between contextuality and non-classical probabilities we show that a class TμMP of theories can be selected in which probabilities are introduced as classical averages of Kolmogorovian probabilities over sets of (microscopic) contexts, which endows them with an epistemic interpretation. The conditions characterizing TμMP are compatible with classical mechanics (CM), statistical mechanics (SM), and QM, hence we assume that these theories belong to TμMP. In the case of CM and SM, this assumption is irrelevant, as all of the notions introduced in them as members of TμMP reduce to standard notions. In the case of QM, it leads to interpret quantum probability as a derived notion in a Kolmogorovian framework, explains why it is non-Kolmogorovian, and provides it with an epistemic interpretation. These results were anticipated in a previous paper, but they are obtained here in a general framework without referring to individual objects, which shows that they hold, even if only a minimal (statistical) interpretation of QM is adopted in order to avoid the problems following from the standard quantum theory of measurement.
One of the advantages of a reconstruction of quantum mechanics based on transparent physical axioms is that it may offer insight to naturally generalize quantum mechanics by relaxing the axioms. Here, we discuss possible extensions of quantum mechanics within a general epistemic framework based on an operational scheme of estimation of momentum given information on the conjugate positions under epistemic restriction. The epistemic restriction is parameterized by a global-nonseparable random variable on the order of Planck constant, an ontic extension to the separable classical phase-space variables. Within the estimation scheme, the canonical quantum laws are reconstructed for a specific estimator and estimation error. In the present work, keeping the Born's quadratic law intact, we construct a class of nonlinear variants of Schr\"odinger equation and generalized Heisenberg uncertainty principle within the estimation scheme by assuming a more general class of estimation errors. The nonlinearity of the Schr\"odinger equation and the deviation from the Heisenberg uncertainty principle thus have a common transparent operational origin in terms of generalizations of estimation errors. We then argue that a broad class of nonlinearities and deviations from the Heisenberg uncertainty principle arise from estimation errors violating a plausible inferential-causality principle of estimation independence which is respected by the standard quantum mechanics. This result therefore constrains possible extensions of quantum mechanics and suggests directions to generalize quantum mechanics which comply with the principle of estimation independence.
The conceptual setting of quantum mechanics is subject to an ongoing debate from its beginnings until now. The consequences of the apparent differences between quantum statistics and classical statistics range from the philosophical interpretations to practical issues as quantum computing. In this note we demonstrate how quantum mechanics can emerge from classical statistical systems. We discuss conditions and circumstances for this to happen. Quantum systems describe isolated subsystems of classical statistical systems with infinitely many states. While infinitely many classical observables "measure" properties of the subsystem and its environment, the state of the subsystem can be characterized by the expectation values of only a few probabilistic observables. They define a density matrix, and all the usual laws of quantum mechanics follow. No concepts beyond classical statistics are needed for quantum physics – the differences are only apparent and result from the particularities of those classical statistical systems which admit a quantum mechanical description. In particular, we show how the non-commuting properties of quantum operators are associated to the use of conditiona probabilities within the classical system, and how a unitary time evolution reflects the isolation of the subsystem.