How would the world appear to us if its ontology was that of classical mechanics but every agent faced a restriction on how much they could come to know about the classical state? We show that in most respects it would appear to us as quantum. The statistical theory of classical mechanics, which specifies how probability distributions over phase space evolve under Hamiltonian evolution and under measurements, is typically called Liouville mechanics, so the theory we explore here is Liouville mechanics with an epistemic restriction. The particular epistemic restriction we posit as our foundational postulate specifies two constraints. The first constraint is a classical analog of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle; the second-order moments of position and momentum defined by the phase-space distribution that characterizes an agent's knowledge are required to satisfy the same constraints as are satisfied by the moments of position and momentum observables for a quantum state. The second constraint is that the distribution should have maximal entropy for the given moments. Starting from this postulate, we derive the allowed preparations, measurements, and transformations and demonstrate that they are isomorphic to those allowed in Gaussian quantum mechanics and generate the same experimental statistics. We argue that this reconstruction of Gaussian quantum mechanics constitutes additional evidence in favor of a research program wherein quantum states are interpreted as states of incomplete knowledge and that the phenomena that do not arise in Gaussian quantum mechanics provide the best clues for how one might reconstruct the full quantum theory.
How would the world appear to us if its ontology was that of classical mechanics but every agent faced a restriction on how much they could come to know about the classical state? We show that in most respects it would appear to us as quantum. The statistical theory of classical mechanics, which specifies how probability distributions over phase space evolve under Hamiltonian evolution and under measurements, is typically called Liouville mechanics, so the theory we explore here is Liouville mechanics with an epistemic restriction. The particular epistemic restriction we posit as our foundational postulate specifies two constraints. The first constraint is a classical analog of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle; the second-order moments of position and momentum defined by the phase-space distribution that characterizes an agent's knowledge are required to satisfy the same constraints as are satisfied by the moments of position and momentum observables for a quantum state. The second constraint is that the distribution should have maximal entropy for the given moments. Starting from this postulate, we derive the allowed preparations, measurements, and transformations and demonstrate that they are isomorphic to those allowed in Gaussian quantum mechanics and generate the same experimental statistics. We argue that this reconstruction of Gaussian quantum mechanics constitutes additional evidence in favor of a research program wherein quantum states are interpreted as states of incomplete knowledge and that the phenomena that do not arise in Gaussian quantum mechanics provide the best clues for how one might reconstruct the full quantum theory.
Consider a statistical model with an epistemic restriction such that, unlike in classical mechanics, the allowed distribution of positions is fundamentally restricted by the form of an underlying momentum field. Assume an agent (observer) who wishes to estimate the momentum field given information on the conjugate positions. We discuss a classically consistent, weakly unbiased, best estimation scheme for the momentum field (by minimizing the mean-squared error) based on which the abstract mathematical rules of quantum mechanics can be derived. The results suggest that a quantum wave function is not an objective agent-independent attribute of reality but represents the agent's best estimations of the momentum, given the positions, under epistemic restriction. Quantum uncertainty and complementarity between momentum and position find their epistemic origin from the trade-off between the mean-squared errors of simultaneous estimations of momentum field and mean position, with the Gaussian wave function representing the simultaneous efficient estimations, achieving the Cram\'er-Rao bounds of the associated mean-squared errors. We then argue that unitary time evolution and wave-function collapse in measurement are normative rules for an agent to update her estimations given information on the experimental settings.
This doctoral dissertation on the foundations of quantum theory isolates and formalizes physical knowability constraints, understood here as constraints on what any conceivable observer can know about the physical world; I henceforth call these “epistemic constraints” for terseness. Here, epistemic constraints concern the definite, intersubjectively agreeable, ordinary-language conditions under which experiments are described. The usual formulation of the quantum measurement problem, which I call the Schrodingerian measurement problem, has the structure of an anomaly: if we take quantum theory at face value, we expect no definite values, and yet we see definite values in experiments. The responses to this problem have been either to solve it or to dissolve it. These responses, which have taken the form of interpretation, modification, or reconstruction of quantum mechanics, seek either to derive (conceptually or mathematically) epistemic constraints from within quantum mechanics or suitable modifications of it, as is the case with certain interpretations and modifications, or to posit the epistemic constraint, or parts of it, as a primitive assumption with the goal of deriving quantum mechanics, as is the case in some reconstruction programs. In contrast to the Schrodingerian measurement problem, which had the structure of an anomaly, this dissertation develops the Bohrian Program, which (for lack of a better comparison) has a structure similar to the problem historically associated with Euclid’s fifth postulate. It seeks to keep epistemic constraints as primitive in an onto-epistemic sense. It then seeks new physical conclusions from the joint consideration of quantum mechanics and epistemic constraints, without seeking to derive one from the other. Among other results, this leads to a notion of the probability of instantiability of the Born Rule that specifies when to apply the Born Rule and when to apply a unitary transformation to a quantum state.
This doctoral dissertation on the foundations of quantum theory isolates and formalizes physical knowability constraints, understood here as constraints on what any conceivable observer can know about the physical world; I henceforth call these “epistemic constraints” for terseness. Here, epistemic constraints concern the definite, intersubjectively agreeable, ordinary-language conditions under which experiments are described. The usual formulation of the quantum measurement problem, which I call the Schrodingerian measurement problem, has the structure of an anomaly: if we take quantum theory at face value, we expect no definite values, and yet we see definite values in experiments. The responses to this problem have been either to solve it or to dissolve it. These responses, which have taken the form of interpretation, modification, or reconstruction of quantum mechanics, seek either to derive (conceptually or mathematically) epistemic constraints from within quantum mechanics or suitable modifications of it, as is the case with certain interpretations and modifications, or to posit the epistemic constraint, or parts of it, as a primitive assumption with the goal of deriving quantum mechanics, as is the case in some reconstruction programs. In contrast to the Schrodingerian measurement problem, which had the structure of an anomaly, this dissertation develops the Bohrian Program, which (for lack of a better comparison) has a structure similar to the problem historically associated with Euclid’s fifth postulate. It seeks to keep epistemic constraints as primitive in an onto-epistemic sense. It then seeks new physical conclusions from the joint consideration of quantum mechanics and epistemic constraints, without seeking to derive one from the other. Among other results, this leads to a notion of the probability of instantiability of the Born Rule that specifies when to apply the Born Rule and when to apply a unitary transformation to a quantum state.
This doctoral dissertation on the foundations of quantum theory isolates and then formalizes a physically relevant concept that I have called “Epistemic Constraint.” Here, epistemic constraints are the definite, intersubjectively agreeable, ordinary-language conditions under which experiments are described. The usual formulation of the quantum measurement problem, which I call the Schrodingerian measurement problem, has the structure of an anomaly: if we take quantum theory at face value, we expect no definite values, and yet we see definite values in experiments. The responses to this problem have been either to solve it or to dissolve it. These responses, which have taken the form of interpretation, modification, or reconstruction of quantum mechanics, seek either to derive (conceptually or mathematically) epistemic constraints from within quantum mechanics or suitable modifications of it, as is the case with certain interpretations and modifications, or to posit the epistemic constraint, or parts of it, as a primitive assumption with the goal of deriving quantum mechanics, as is the case in some reconstruction programs. In contrast to the Schrodingerian measurement problem, which had the structure of an anomaly, this dissertation develops the Bohrian Program, which (for lack of a better comparison) has a structure similar to the problem historically associated with Euclid’s fifth postulate. It seeks to keep epistemic constraints as primitive in an onto-epistemic sense. It then seeks new physical conclusions from the joint consideration of quantum mechanics and epistemic constraints, without seeking to derive one from the other. Among other results, this leads to a notion of the probability of instantiability of the Born Rule that specifies when to apply the Born Rule and when to apply a unitary transformation to a quantum state.
This doctoral dissertation on the foundations of quantum theory isolates and then formalizes a physically relevant concept that I have called "Epistemic Constraint." Here, epistemic constraints are the definite, intersubjectively agreeable, ordinary-language conditions under which experiments are described. The usual formulation of the quantum measurement problem, which I call the Schrodingerian measurement problem, has the structure of an anomaly: if we take quantum theory at face value, we expect no definite values, and yet we see definite values in experiments. The responses to this problem have been either to solve it or to dissolve it. These responses, which have taken the form of interpretation, modification, or reconstruction of quantum mechanics, seek either to derive (conceptually or mathematically) epistemic constraints from within quantum mechanics or suitable modifications of it, as is the case with certain interpretations and modifications, or to posit the epistemic constraint, or parts of it, as a primitive assumption with the goal of deriving quantum mechanics, as is the case in some reconstruction programs. In contrast to the Schrodingerian measurement problem, which had the structure of an anomaly, this dissertation develops the Bohrian Program, which (for lack of a better comparison) has a structure similar to the problem historically associated with Euclid's fifth postulate. It seeks to keep epistemic constraints as primitive in an onto-epistemic sense. It then seeks new physical conclusions from the joint consideration of quantum mechanics and epistemic constraints, without seeking to derive one from the other. Among other results, this leads to a notion of the probability of instantiability of the Born Rule that specifies when to apply the Born Rule and when to apply a unitary transformation to a quantum state.
Abstract Where does quantum mechanics part ways with classical mechanics? How does quantum randomness differ fundamentally from classical randomness? We cannot fully explain how the theories differ until we can derive them within a single axiomatic framework, allowing an unambiguous account of how one theory is the limit of the other. Here we derive non-relativistic quantum mechanics and classical statistical mechanics within a common framework. The common axioms include conservation of average energy and conservation of probability current. But two axioms distinguish quantum mechanics from classical statistical mechanics: an “ontic extension” defines a nonseparable (global) random variable that generates physical correlations, and an “epistemic restriction” constrains allowed phase space distributions. The ontic extension and epistemic restriction, with strength on the order of Planck’s constant, imply quantum entanglement and uncertainty relations. This framework suggests that the wave function is epistemic, yet it does not provide an ontic dynamics for individual systems.