We discuss the connection between a class of distributed quantum games, with remotely located players, to the counter intuitive Braess’ paradox of traffic flow that is an important design consideration in generic networks where the addition of a zero cost edge decreases the efficiency of the network. A quantization scheme applicable to non-atomic routing games is applied to the canonical example of the network used in Braess’ paradox. The quantum players are modeled by simulating repeated game play. The players are allowed to sample their local payoff function and update their strategies based on a selfish routing condition in order to minimize their own cost, leading to the Wardrop equilibrium flow. The equilibrium flow in the classical network has a higher cost than the optimal flow. If the players have access to quantum resources, we find that the cost at equilibrium can be reduced to the optimal cost, resolving the paradox.
We discuss the connection between a class of distributed quantum games, with remotely located players, to the counter intuitive Braess’ paradox of traffic flow that is an important design consideration in generic networks where the addition of a zero cost edge decreases the efficiency of the network. A quantization scheme applicable to non-atomic routing games is applied to the canonical example of the network used in Braess’ paradox. The quantum players are modeled by simulating repeated game play. The players are allowed to sample their local payoff function and update their strategies based on a selfish routing condition in order to minimize their own cost, leading to the Wardrop equilibrium flow. The equilibrium flow in the classical network has a higher cost than the optimal flow. If the players have access to quantum resources, we find that the cost at equilibrium can be reduced to the optimal cost, resolving the paradox.
Classical game theory is a powerful tool focusing on optimized resource distribution, allocation, and sharing in classical wired and wireless networks. As quantum networks are emerging as a means of providing true connectivity between quantum computers, it is imperative and crucial to exploit game theory for addressing challenges such as entanglement distribution and access, routing, topology extraction, and inference. Quantum networks provide the promising opportunity of employing quantum games owing to their inherent capability of generating and sharing quantum states. In addition, quantum games offer enhanced payoffs and winning probabilities, new strategies, and equilibria, which are unimaginable in classical games. Employing quantum game theory to solve fundamental challenges in quantum networks opens a new fundamental research direction necessitating inter-disciplinary efforts. In this article, we introduce a novel game-the-oretical framework for exploiting quantum strategies to solve – as an archetypal example – one of the key functionalities of a quantum network, namely, entanglement distribution. We compare quantum strategies with classical ones by showing the quantum advantages in terms of link fidelity improvement and latency decrease in communication. In the future, we will generalize our game framework to optimize entanglement distribution and access over any quantum network topology. We will also explore how quantum games can be leveraged to address other challenges like routing, optimization of quantum operations, and topology design.
Braess, while working on traffic modeling, noticed that traffic flow in a network can be worsened by adding extra edges to an existing network. This seemingly counterintuitive phenomenon is known as the Braess paradox. We consider a quantum network, where edges represent shared entangled states between spatially separated parties (nodes). The goal is to entangle two previously uncorrelated nodes using entanglement swappings. The amount of entanglement between the distant nodes is quantified by the average concurrence of the states established, as a result of the entanglement swappings. We then introduce an additional edge of maximally entangled Bell states in the network. We show that the introduction of the additional maximally entangled states to this network leads to lower concurrence between the two previously uncorrelated nodes. Thus we demonstrate the occurrence of a phenomenon in a quantum network that is analogous to the Braess paradox in traffic networks.
Because of the sustained growth of information and mobile users transmitting a great amount of data packets, modern network performances are being seriously affected by congestion problems. In fact, congestion management is a challenging task that can be roughly summarized as a trade off between transmission latency and cost. In order to contribute to solve the congestion problem on communication networks, a novel framework based on a quantum game model is proposed, where network packets compete selfishly for their fastest route. Simulations show that final network routing and traveling times achieved with the quantum version outperform those obtained with a classical game model with the same options for packet transmission for both. Pareto optimality and Nash equilibrium are studied as well as the influence of simulated and real noise in the quantum protocol. This leads to the opportunity of developing full-stack protocols that may be capable of taking advantage of the quantum properties for optimizing communication systems. Due to its generality, this game approach can be applied both in classical complex networks and in future quantum networks in order to maximize the performance of the quantum internet.
Abstract Multiplayer quantum games have received growing attention due to the ability of quantum computational models to access enlarged strategic spaces, thereby enabling the emergence of nonclassical Nash equilibria and Pareto-efficient solutions. Concurrently, graph-theoretic representations have become a standard tool for encoding relational dependencies among interacting players. This work establishes a unified formalism that embeds arbitrary graph topologies into parametrized quantum-game circuits, providing a direct mapping between network structure and the strategic interaction space of quantum players. Within this framework, we analytically and computationally evaluate how graph-induced interpersonal couplings modulate payoff distributions over repeated quantum-game iterations. In addition, we integrate a reward-driven adaptation algorithm that allows players to optimize their local strategy parameters dynamically with respect to accumulated payoffs. Experimental results demonstrate that the equilibrium reward landscape is highly sensitive to the players’ graph-theoretic centrality and the weighted structure of their adversarial and cooperative relationships.
The volunteer's dilemma is a well-known game in game theory that models the conflict players face when deciding whether to volunteer for a collective benefit, knowing that volunteering incurs a personal cost. In this work we introduce a quantum variant of the classical volunteer's dilemma, generalizing it by allowing players to utilize quantum strategies. Employing the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein quantization framework, we analyze a multiplayer quantum volunteer's dilemma scenario with an arbitrary number of players, where the cost of volunteering is shared equally among the volunteers. We derive analytical expressions for the players' expected payoffs and demonstrate the quantum game's advantage over the classical game. In particular, we prove that the quantum volunteer's dilemma possesses symmetric Nash equilibria with larger expected payoffs compared to the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the classical game, wherein players use mixed strategies. Furthermore, we show that the quantum Nash equilibria we identify are Pareto optimal. Our findings reveal distinct dynamics in volunteer's dilemma scenarios when players adhere to quantum rules, underscoring a strategic advantage of decision making in quantum settings.
Quantum games extend classical game theory into the quantum realm by incorporating quantum players and quantum strategies. Two-player quantum games have been widely studied and applied, among other areas, in optimization and decision-making. In this work, we introduce, formalize and analyze a novel class of three-player quantum games, referred to as Proxy Quantum Games (PQGs). In this setting, one player, the Controller, influences or governs the strategic operations executed by a second player, the Proxy, who, in turn, competes directly against a third player, the Opponent. The strategic influence is implemented via controlled unitary operations, whereby the Proxy’s available strategies are conditioned on the Controller’s quantum state. We further generalize the PQG framework by incorporating multiple Controllers acting on a common Proxy, thereby enabling the study of higher-order strategic interactions and multi-agent influence structures. The objective under consideration is the maximization of the Controller’s expected payoff, under various configurations of strategic control and entanglement. Comparative analyses are conducted between the PQG formulation and conventional multiplayer quantum games, highlighting key differences in strategic behavior and payoff distributions.