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arXiv:1703.09353

Contextuality and truth-value assignment

Arkady Bolotin

Published Mar 27, 2017• 0 citations
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Abstract

In the paper, the question whether truth values can be assigned to the propositions before their verification is discussed. To answer this question, a notion of a propositionally noncontextual theory is introduced that in order to explain the verification outcomes provides a map linking each element of a complete lattice identified with a proposition to a truth value. The paper demonstrates that no model obeying such a theory and at the same time the principle of bivalence can be consistent with the occurrence of a non-vanishing "two-path" quantum interference term and the quantum collapse postulate.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1703.09353

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In the paper, the question whether truth values can be assigned to the propositions before their verification is discussed. To answer this question, a notion of a propositionally noncontextual theory is introduced that in order to explain the verification outcomes provides a map linking each element of a complete lattice identified with a proposition to a truth value. The paper demonstrates that no model obeying such a theory and at the same time the principle of bivalence can be consistent with the occurrence of a non-vanishing "two-path" quantum interference term and the quantum collapse postulate.
In the paper, the question whether truth values can be assigned to the propositions about properties of a state of a physical system before the measurement is discussed. To answer this question, a notion that a propositionally noncontextual theory can provide a map linking each element of a bounded lattice to a truth value so as to explain the outcomes of experimental propositions associated with the state of the system is introduced. The paper demonstrates that no model based on the propositionally noncontextual theory can be consistent with the occurrence of a non-vanishing two-path quantum interference term and the quantum collapse postulate.
The structure of a complete lattice formed by closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space (i.e., a Hilbert lattice) entails some unreasonable consequences from the physical point of view. Specifically, this structure seems to contradict to the localized variant of the Kochen-Specker theorem according to which the bivaluation of a proposition represented by a closed linear subspace that does not belong to a Boolean algebra shared by the state, in which a quantum-mechanical system is prepared, must be value indefinite. For this reason, the Hilbert lattice structure seems to be too strong and needs to be weakened. The question is, how should it be weakened so that to support the quantum uncertainty principle and the Kochen-Specker theorem? Which logic will a weakened structure identify? The present paper tries to answer these questions.
Abstract The logic of a physical theory reflects the structure of the propositions referring to the behaviour of a physical system in the domain of the relevant theory. It is argued in relation to classical mechanics that the propositional structure of the theory allows truth-value assignment in conformity with the traditional conception of a correspondence theory of truth. Every proposition in classical mechanics is assigned a definite truth value, either ‘true ’ or ‘false’, describing what is actually the case at a certain moment of time. Truth-value assignment in quantum mechanics, however, differs; it is known, by means of a variety of ‘no go ’ theorems, that it is not possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to a quantum system without generating a Kochen-Specker contradiction. In this respect, the Bub-Clifton ‘uniqueness theorem ’ is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a particular observable to be measured. An account of truth of contextual correspondence is thereby provided that is appropriate to the quantum domain of discourse. The conceptual implications of the resulting account are traced down and analyzed at length. In this light, the traditional conception of correspondence truth may be viewed as a species or as a limit case of the more generic proposed scheme of contextual correspondence when the non-explicit specification of a context of discourse poses no further consequences.
The semantics underlying the propositional structure of Hilbert space quantum mechanics involves an inherent ambiguity concerning the impossibility of assigning definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to a quantum system without generating a Kochen-Specker contradiction. Although the preceding Kochen-Specker result forbids a global, absolute assignment of truth values to quantum mechanical propositions, it does not exclude ones that are contextual. In this respect, the Bub-Clifton “uniqueness theorem” is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a suitable “preferred” observable. It is suggested that the most natural choice of the latter, especially for confronting the problem of truth valuation in quantum mechanics, results in the determinateness of the observable to be measured. An account of truth of contextual correspondence is thereby provided that is appropriate to the quantum domain of discourse. The resulting account of truth is compatible with a realist conception of truth. Such an account essentially denies that there can be a universal context of reference or an Archimedean standpoint from which to evaluate logically the totality of facts of nature.
The paper contains a relatively non-technical summary of some recent work by the author and Jeremy Butterfield. The goal is to find a way of assigning meaningful truth values to propositions in quantum theory: something that is not possible in the normal, instrumentalist interpretation. The key mathematical tool is presheaf theory where multi-valued, contextual truth values arise naturally. We show how this can be applied to quantum theory, with the ‘contexts’ chosen to be Boolean subalgebras of the set of all projection operators.