We report an inconsistency found in probability theory (also referred to as measure-theoretic probability). For probability measures induced by real-valued random variables, we deduce an "equality" such that one side of the "equality" is a probability, but the other side is not. For probability measures induced by extended random variables, we deduce an "equality" such that its two sides are unequal probabilities. The deduced expressions are erroneous only when it can be proved that measure-theoretic probability is a theory free from contradiction. However, such a proof does not exist. The inconsistency appears only in the theory rather than in the physical world, and will not affect practical applications as long as ideal events in the theory (which will not occur physically) are not mistaken for observable events in the real world. Nevertheless, unlike known paradoxes in mathematics, the inconsistency cannot be explained away and hence must be resolved. The assumption of infinite additivity in the theory is relevant to the inconsistency, and may cause confusion of ideal events and real events. As illustrated by an example in this article, since abstract properties of mathematical entities in theoretical thinking are not necessarily properties of physical quantities observed in the real world, mistaking the former for the latter may lead to misinterpreting random phenomena observed in experiments with microscopic systems. Actually the inconsistency is due to the notion of "numbers" adopted in conventional mathematics. A possible way to resolve the inconsistency is to treat "numbers" from the viewpoint of constructive mathematics.
We report an inconsistency found in probability theory (also referred to as measure-theoretic probability). For probability measures induced by real-valued random variables, we deduce an "equality" such that one side of the "equality" is a probability, but the other side is not. For probability measures induced by extended random variables, we deduce an "equality" such that its two sides are unequal probabilities. The deduced expressions are erroneous only when it can be proved that measure-theoretic probability is a theory free from contradiction. However, such a proof does not exist. The inconsistency appears only in the theory rather than in the physical world, and will not affect practical applications as long as ideal events in the theory (which will not occur physically) are not mistaken for observable events in the real world. Nevertheless, unlike known paradoxes in mathematics, the inconsistency cannot be explained away and hence must be resolved. The assumption of infinite additivity in the theory is relevant to the inconsistency, and may cause confusion of ideal events and real events. As illustrated by an example in this article, since abstract properties of mathematical entities in theoretical thinking are not necessarily properties of physical quantities observed in the real world, mistaking the former for the latter may lead to misinterpreting random phenomena observed in experiments with microscopic systems. Actually the inconsistency is due to the notion of "numbers" adopted in conventional mathematics. A possible way to resolve the inconsistency is to treat "numbers" from the viewpoint of constructive mathematics.
The article discusses approaches to understanding the nature of probability in mathematics and physics with the consequences of these approaches, as well as the difficulties that arise. The ontological status of probability is discussed. It is shown that probability theory, contrary to R. Mises, should be classified as a mathematical science, using the definition formulated by A.N. Kolmogorov. The application of this definition in practice is provided within the framework of the classical approach, provided that the connection with physical reality is defined through the concept of equal opportunity. To do this, the concepts of simple and complex events are introduced, and the method of decomposing complex events into simple ones is explained. The point of view is substantiated, according to which a mathematical probability determined and related to physical reality in this way can be considered an objective probability, that is, existing independently of any tests. Various interpretations of quantum mechanics and approaches to understanding probability are also revealed. It is shown that in physics today the existing approaches to understanding the nature of probability contradict each other. In the Bohm interpretation, probability is an analogue of the classical approach – statistical objective probability, which has a mathematical formalization, and in quantum Bayesianism, probability quantifies the degree of reliability and depends on the subject conducting the experiment. The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics tries to eliminate the difficulties associated with combining the wave and corpuscular properties of light and electron beams into a single picture by giving the ontological status of probability, which leads to the problem of understanding physical reality. The article argues for the need for a new connection between the mathematical description of probability and physical reality. The empirical (frequency) approach of R. Mises is analyzed, which causes a lot of criticism, as it does not have a clear consistent formalization. The article argues that this approach is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. The probability given by M. Born in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is also considered, which formulates a new definition of probability, which does not exclude the difficulties associated with the physical interpretation of probability. Born’s approach is based on the classical approach and is reduced to a formal axiomatic definition, which assumes the interpretation of probability as a mathematical construct. The connection of probability with physical reality and the consistency of the statistical method of finding probability values remain unresolved problems, which creates a dualism of understanding probability: in mathematics – one thing, in physics – another. If in the mathematical approach, the solution of these problems is carried out through the connection of probability with physical properties, then in quantum mechanics, in the Copenhagen interpretation, problems persist, which is caused by giving the wave function an ontological status.
This article explores the existence of true randomness in the universe, challenging traditional mechanistic and deterministic viewpoints. The article begins by demonstrating the random waviness of electrons without external forces through the double-slit experiment in quantum mechanics, as well as the random distribution when individual electrons are imaged on a screen. It then discusses the theory of hidden variables, which suggests that there are undiscovered variables that could explain the deterministic motion of particles. However, experimental results from Bell's inequality have refuted this theory, proving the correctness of quantum mechanics. The article also mentions nonlinear systems in the macro world, such as the three-body problem in chaos theory, illustrating the uncertainty in the macro world. Finally, the article further explains the counterintuitive and random behavior of particles in quantum mechanics through anti-reflective film and delayed-choice experiments, emphasizing that randomness is ubiquitous even in the macro world. The article concludes that although the universe is full of randomness, this does not mean it is unknowable; humans can still understand and control these random phenomena through probability theory.
We investigate epistemologically the meaning of probability as implied in quantum physics in connection with a proposed direct interpretation of the state function and of the related quantum theoretical quantities in terms of physical systems having physical properties, through an extension of meaning of the notion of physical quantity to complex mathematical expressions not reductible to simple numerical values. We show how the changes occurred in the implication of probabilities in quantum physics, from a penetration tool (probability as statistics and frequencies of occurencies of events) to a theoretical concept (probability given by a physically aimed at «amplitude of probability») actually make this view a somewhat «natural» one.
Mathematics is an artificial symbolic logical system whose evaluation standard lies only in internal self consistency. Its core function is to fit observed phenomena. When deduction hits obstacles, mathematics can expand definitions extend number fields or change calculation frameworks to bypass difficulties. As long as logic forms a closed loop this operation is valid within the scope of mathematics. Imaginary number systems and calculus are typical examples. They are internally self consistent and efficient for calculation as computing tools but the tools themselves do not equal objective reality. Mathematical systems face no punishment from objective reality. When contradictions appear in deduction researchers only need to adjust rules and refit data. Physics takes objective reality and causal chains independent of human cognition as its foundation. The only judging standard comes from the real natural world. Physics cannot bypass fundamental contradictions by makeshift assumptions. This paper clarifies a critical dividing line. Success in engineering application never proves the correctness of the underlying physical theory supporting that engineering. Many technical achievements come from empirical exploration and repeated trial and error. Researchers build devices and obtain effects first. Theories are proposed later to fit collected data. Those theories do not reveal the real causal mechanism in advance. Newtonian mechanics is an approximate description valid under limited conditions. It has clear application boundaries and its underlying causal framework does not deliberately avoid core contradictions. Interpretations such as superposition and Schrodinger cat that describes simultaneous life and death are different. They deliberately bypass microscopic dynamic mechanisms and modify the inherent properties of matter to adapt to mathematical frameworks. These two cases have essential differences. Even if a deviated underlying physical mechanism can produce usable calculation schemes or even drive engineering progress it does not prove the foundation is correct. If basic assumptions depart from reality all derived conclusions must be revised from the root instead of adding surface patches. Part of the difficulties in modern fundamental physics arise from three types of confusion. Confusion between mathematical fitting and physical reality. Confusion between empirical engineering success and the truth of underlying physical mechanism. Confusion between well bounded approximate theories and patchwork assumptions made to avoid contradictions. If researchers keep stacking derived models on a shifted physical foundation the system will accumulate internal inconsistencies. Even with delicate local mathematical fitting the whole theory will eventually collapse logically just like a tall dangerous building built on skewed ground. This paper analyzes the differences between mathematics and physics the long term theoretical risks of bypassing contradictions and the boundary between engineering success and physical theoretical success. It proposes that fundamental physics must stick to objective reality and closed causality.
This paper presents a comprehensive treatement of the problem of measurement in microscopic physics, consistent with the indeterministic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and information theory. It is pointed out that there are serious difficulties in reconciling the deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics, based on the concepts of a universal wave function or hidden variables, with the principle of contiguity. Quantum mechanics is reformulated entirely in terms of observables, represented by matrices, including the statistical matrix, and the utility of information theory is illustrated by a discussion of the EPR paradox. The principle of contiguity is satisfied by all conserved quantities. A theory of the operation of macroscopic measuring devices is given in the interaction repesentation, and the attenuation of the indeterminacy of a microscopic observable in the process of measurement is related to observable changes of entropy.
Abstract Quantum mechanics is acknowledged as the fundamental theory on which the whole fabric of physics is supposed to rely. And yet, the features of quantum measurements, processes that provide information about microscopic objects, seem to contradict the principles of quantum mechanics. We make a qualitative presentation of this long standing problem and give an idea of recent progress in the elucidation of the paradox. Although governed solely by the quantum equations of motion, the dynamical process involving the tested system and the measuring apparatus veils the quantum oddities that oppose our standard logic and gives rise to the expected properties of measurements. In spite of the irreducibly probabilistic nature of the underlying quantum physics, classical concepts emerge, such as standard probabilities, ordinary correlations, disappearance of quantum fluctuations, and the possibility of making statements about individual systems.