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arXiv:1609.05504

Indistinguishability

Simon W. Saunders

Published Sep 18, 2016• 0 citations
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Abstract

This is a systematic review of the concept of indistinguishability in both classical and quantum mechanics, with particular attention to Gibbs' paradox. Section 1 is on the Gibbs paradox; section 2 is a defense of the concept of classical indistinguishability, that addresses (and refutes) the view that classical particles can always be distinguished by their trajectories so are distinguishable. Section 3 is on the notion of object more generally, and on whether indistinguishables should be thought of as objects at all

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1609.05504

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This is a systematic review of the concept of indistinguishability in both classical and quantum mechanics, with particular attention to Gibbs' paradox. Section 1 is on the Gibbs paradox; section 2 is a defense of the concept of classical indistinguishability, that addresses (and refutes) the view that classical particles can always be distinguished by their trajectories so are distinguishable. Section 3 is on the notion of object more generally, and on whether indistinguishables should be thought of as objects at all
The suggestion that particles of the same kind may be indistinguishable in a fundamental sense, even so that challenges to traditional notions of individuality and identity may arise, has first come up in the context of classical statistical mechanics. In particular, the Gibbs paradox has sometimes been interpreted as a sign of the untenability of the classical concept of a particle and as a premonition that quantum theory is needed. This idea of a ‘quantum connection’ stubbornly persists in the literature, even though it has also been criticized frequently. Here we shall argue that although this criticism is justified, the proposed alternative solutions have often been wrong and have not put the paradox in its right perspective. In fact, the Gibbs paradox is unrelated to fundamental issues of particle identity; only distinguishability in a pragmatic sense plays a role (in this we develop ideas of van Kampen [10]), and in principle the paradox always is there as long as the concept of a particle applies at all. In line with this we show that the paradox survives even in quantum mechanics, in spite of the quantum mechanical (anti-)symmetrization postulates.
The Gibbs Paradox is an important question in thermodynamics. In this thesis I search for a solution for the paradox from a classical, philosophical and quantum mechanical point of view. A common way to solve the Gibbs Paradox is by using the reduced entropy. However, this definition of entropy should not be interpreted as an argument for the indistinguishability of identical particles, because all other particles which have unique trajectories through space-time are distinguishable in principle. The Gibbs paradox could be solved in a few ways, but each solution has certain constrains.
The Gibbs paradox has frequently been interpreted as a sign that particles of the same kind are fundamentally indistinguishable; and that quantum mechanics, with its identical fermions and bosons, is indispensable for making sense of this. In this article we shall argue, on the contrary, that analysis of the paradox supports the idea that classical particles are always distinguishable. Perhaps surprisingly, this analysis extends to quantum mechanics: even according to quantum mechanics there can be distinguishable particles of the same kind. Our most important general conclusion will accordingly be that the universally accepted notion that quantum particles of the same kind are necessarily indistinguishable rests on a confusion about how particles are represented in quantum theory.
Gibbs paradox in the context of statistical mechanics addresses the issue of additivity of entropy of mixing gases. The usual discussion attributes the paradoxical situation to classical distinguishability of identical particles and credits quantum theory for enabling indistinguishability of identical particles to solve the problem. We argue that indistinguishability of identical particles is already a feature in classical mechanics and this is clearly brought out when the problem is treated in the language of information and associated entropy. We pinpoint the physical criteria for indistinguishability that is crucial for the treatment of the Gibbs’ problem and the consistency of its solution with conventional thermodynamics. Quantum mechanics provides a quantitative criterion, not possible in the classical picture, for the degree of indistinguishability in terms of visibility of quantum interference, or overlap of the states as pointed out by von Neumann, thereby endowing the entropy expression with mathematical continuity and physical reasonableness.
The Gibbs Paradox is essentially a set of open questions as to how sameness of gases or fluids (or masses, more generally) are to be treated in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. They have a variety of answers, some restricted to quantum theory (there is no classical solution), some to classical theory (the quantum case is different). The solution offered here applies to both in equal measure, and is based on the concept of particle indistinguishability (in the classical case, Gibbs’ notion of ‘generic phase’). Correctly understood, it is the elimination of sequence position as a labelling device, where sequences enter at the level of the tensor (or Cartesian) product of one-particle state spaces. In both cases it amounts to passing to the quotient space under permutations. ‘Distinguishability’, in the sense in which it is usually used in classical statistical mechanics, is a mathematically convenient, but physically muddled, fiction.