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arXiv:1608.04149

Reply to Gillis's "On the Analysis of Bell's 1964 Paper by Wiseman, Cavalcanti, and Rieffel"

Howard M. Wiseman, Eleanor Gilbert Rieffel, Eric G. Cavalcanti

Published Aug 14, 2016• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We address Gillis' recent criticism [arXiv:1506.05795] of a series of papers (by different combinations of the present authors) on formulations of Bell's theorem. Those papers intended to address an unfortunate gap of communication between two broad camps in the quantum foundations community that we identify as "operationalists" and "realists". Here, we once again urge the readers to approach the question from an unbiased standpoint, and explain that Gillis' criticism draws too heavily on the philosophical inclinations of one side of that debate -- the realist camp. As part of that explanation we discuss intuition versus proof, look again at Bell's formalizations of locality, and correct misstatements by Gillis of our views, and those of Bell and Einstein.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1608.04149

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We address Gillis' recent criticism [arXiv:1506.05795] of a series of papers (by different combinations of the present authors) on formulations of Bell's theorem. Those papers intended to address an unfortunate gap of communication between two broad camps in the quantum foundations community that we identify as "operationalists" and "realists". Here, we once again urge the readers to approach the question from an unbiased standpoint, and explain that Gillis' criticism draws too heavily on the philosophical inclinations of one side of that debate -- the realist camp. As part of that explanation we discuss intuition versus proof, look again at Bell's formalizations of locality, and correct misstatements by Gillis of our views, and those of Bell and Einstein.
Yes. That is my polemical reply to the titular question in Travis Norsen's self-styled "polemical response to Howard Wiseman's recent paper." Less polemically, I am pleased to see that on two of my positions --- that Bell's 1964 theorem is different from Bell's 1976 theorem, and that the former does not include Bell's one-paragraph heuristic presentation of the EPR argument --- Norsen has made significant concessions. In his response, Norsen admits that "Bell's recapitulation of the EPR argument in [the relevant] paragraph leaves something to be desired," that it "disappoints" and is "problematic". Moreover, Norsen makes other statements that imply, on the face of it, that he should have no objections to the title of my recent paper ("The Two Bell's Theorems of John Bell"). My principle aim in writing that paper was to try to bridge the gap between two interpretational camps, whom I call 'operationalists' and 'realists', by pointing out that they use the phrase "Bell's theorem" to mean different things: his 1964 theorem (assuming locality and determinism) and his 1976 theorem (assuming local causality), respectively. Thus, it is heartening that at least one person from one side has taken one step on my bridge. That said, there are several issues of contention with Norsen, which we (the two authors) address after discussing the extent of our agreement with Norsen. The most significant issues are: the indefiniteness of the word 'locality' prior to 1964; and the assumptions Einstein made in the paper quoted by Bell in 1964 and their relation to Bell's theorem.
Wiseman has claimed that Bell was wrong in stating that determinism was inferred rather than assumed in the summary of the EPR argument in his 1964 paper. The reply of Wiseman and his co-authors to my comment misstates my reasons for disputing this point, and fails to address the central criticism that their claim is based on a seriously flawed formalization of Bell's argument deriving from an unreasonably strong interpretation of the the terms, 'influence', 'affect', and 'depend on'.
This is a polemical response to Howard Wiseman's recent paper, "The two Bell's theorems of John Bell". Wiseman argues that, in 1964, Bell established a conflict between the quantum mechanical predictions and the joint assumptions of determinism and (what is now usually known as) "parameter independence". Only later, in 1976, did Bell, according to Wiseman, first establish a conflict between the quantum mechanical predictions and locality alone (in the specific form that Bell would sometimes call "local causality"). Thus, according to Wiseman, the long-standing disagreements about what, exactly, Bell's theorem does and does not prove can be understood largely as miscommunications resulting from the fact that there are really two quite distinct "Bell's theorems". My goal here is to lay out what Wiseman briefly describes as an "alternate reading" of Bell's 1964 paper, according to which (quoting Wiseman here) "the first paragraph of Bell's `Formulation' section [should be seen] as an essential part of his 1964 theorem, the first part of a two-part argument." I will argue in particular that this "alternate reading" is the correct way to understand Bell's 1964 paper and that Wiseman's reading is strongly inconsistent with the available evidence.
In this paper, I respond to a critique of one of my papers previously published in this journal, entitled “Bell’s Theorem Versus Local Realism in a Quaternionic Model of Physical Space.” That paper presents a local-realistic model of quantum correlations based on a quaternionic 3-sphere, taken as a physical space in which we are confined to perform all our experiments. The critique, on the other hand, considers two entirely different models within a flat Euclidean space, neither related to my quaternionic 3-sphere model. It then criticizes its own flat space models and claims that it has thereby criticized the model presented in my paper. Along the way, without providing evidence or proof, it claims that the results in my paper are based on mistakes. I demonstrate that there are no mistakes of any kind in my paper. On the contrary, I bring out a number of elementary mathematical and conceptual mistakes from the critique and the critiques it relies on.