Contextuality, the impossibility of assigning a single random variable to represent the outcomes of the same measurement procedure under different experimental conditions, is a central aspect of quantum mechanics. Thus defined, it appears in well-known cases in quantum mechanics, such as the double-slit experiment, the Bell-EPR experiment, and the Kochen-Specker theorem. Here we examine contextuality in such cases, and discuss how each of them bring different conceptual issues when applied to quantum cognition. We then focus on the shortcomings of using quantum probabilities to describe social systems, and explain how negative quasi-probability distributions may address such limitations.
Contextuality, the impossibility of assigning a single random variable to represent the outcomes of the same measurement procedure under different experimental conditions, is a central aspect of quantum mechanics. Thus defined, it appears in well-known cases in quantum mechanics, such as the double-slit experiment, the Bell-EPR experiment, and the Kochen-Specker theorem. Here we examine contextuality in such cases, and discuss how each of them bring different conceptual issues when applied to quantum cognition. We then focus on the shortcomings of using quantum probabilities to describe social systems, and explain how negative quasi-probability distributions may address such limitations.
Contextuality is a central property in comparative analysis of classical, quantum, and supercorrelated systems. We examine and compare two well-motivated approaches to contextuality. One approach ("contextuality-by-default") is based on the idea that one and the same physical property measured under different conditions (contexts) is represented by different random variables. The other approach is based on the idea that while a physical property is represented by a single random variable irrespective of its context, the joint distributions of the random variables describing the system can involve negative (quasi-)probabilities. We show that in the Leggett-Garg and EPR-Bell systems, the two measures essentially coincide.
A central result in the foundations of quantum mechanics is the Kochen-Specker theorem. In short, it states that quantum mechanics is in conflict with classical models in which the result of a measurement does not depend on which other compatible measurements are jointly performed. Here, compatible measurements are those that can be performed simultaneously or in any order without disturbance. This conflict is generically called quantum contextuality. In this article, we present an introduction to this subject and its current status. We review several proofs of the Kochen-Specker theorem and different notions of contextuality. We explain how to experimentally test some of these notions and discuss connections between contextuality and nonlocality or graph theory. Finally, we review some applications of contextuality in quantum information processing.
The origin and basis of the notion of quantum contextuality is identified in the Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics, where context is automatically invoked by its requirement that the experimental arrangement involved in any measurements or set of measurements be taken into account while, in general, the outcome of a measurement may depend on other measurements immediately preceding or jointly performed on the same system. For Bohr, the specification of the experimental situation of any measurement is essential to its significance in light of complementarity and the omnipresence of the quantum of action in physics; for Heisenberg, the incompatibility of pairs of sharp measurements belonging to different situations coheres with both the completeness of the quantum state as an objective physical description and the principle of indeterminacy. Here, context in the Copenhagen approach is taken to be the equivalence class of experimental arrangements corresponding to a set of compatible measurements of quantum observables in standard quantum mechanics; the associated form of contextuality in quantum mechanics arises via the non-commutativity in general of sharp observables, proven by von Neumann, that can appear, providing different contexts. This notion is related to theoretical situations explored later by Bell, by Kochen and Specker, and by others in relation to the classification of hidden-variables theories and elsewhere in physics. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond’.
In quantum physics, the term ‘contextual’ can be used in more than one way. One usage, here called ‘Bell contextual’ since the idea goes back to Bell, is that if A , B and C are three quantum observables, with A compatible (i.e. commuting) with B and also with C , whereas B and C are incompatible, a measurement of A might yield a different result (indicating that quantum mechanics is contextual) depending upon whether A is measured along with B (the { A , B } context) or with C (the { A , C } context). An analysis of what projective quantum measurements measure shows that quantum theory is Bell non-contextual: the outcome of a particular A measurement when A is measured along with B would have been exactly the same if A had, instead, been measured along with C . A different definition, here called ‘globally (non)contextual’ refers to whether or not there is (non-contextual) or is not (contextual) a single joint probability distribution that simultaneously assigns probabilities in a consistent manner to the outcomes of measurements of a certain collection of observables, not all of which are compatible. A simple example shows that such a joint probability distribution can exist even in a situation where the measurement probabilities cannot refer to properties of a quantum system, and hence lack physical significance, even though mathematically well defined. It is noted that the quantum sample space, a projective decomposition of the identity, required for interpreting measurements of incompatible properties in different runs of an experiment using different types of apparatus, has a tensor product structure, a fact sometimes overlooked. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond’.
The presence of contextuality in quantum theory was first highlighted by Bell, Kochen and Specker, who discovered that for quantum systems of three or more dimensions, measurements could not be viewed as deterministically revealing pre-existing properties of the system. More precisely, no model can assign deterministic outcomes to the projectors of a quantum measurement in a way that depends only on the projector and not the context (the full set of projectors) in which it appeared, despite the fact that the Born rule probabilities associated with projectors are independent of the context. A more general, operational definition of contextuality introduced by Spekkens, which we will term 'probabilistic contextuality', drops the assumption of determinism and allows for operations other than measurements to be considered contextual. Even two-dimensional quantum mechanics can be shown to be contextual under this generalised notion. Probabilistic noncontextuality represents the postulate that elements of an operational theory that cannot be distinguished from each other based on the statistics of arbitrarily many repeated experiments (they give rise to the same operational probabilities) are ontologically identical. In this paper, we introduce a framework that enables us to distinguish between different noncontextuality assumptions in terms of the relationships between the ontological representations of objects in the theory given a certain relation between their operational representations. This framework can be used to motivate and define a 'possibilistic' analogue, encapsulating the idea that elements of an operational theory that cannot be unambiguously distinguished operationally can also not be unambiguously distinguished ontologically. We then prove that possibilistic noncontextuality is equivalent to an alternative notion of noncontextuality proposed by Hardy. Finally, we demonstrate that these weaker noncontextuality assumptions are sufficient to prove alternative versions of known 'no-go' theorems that constrain ψ -epistemic models for quantum mechanics.
It is well known that in quantum mechanics we cannot always define consistently properties that are context independent.Many approaches exist to describe contextual properties, such as Contextuality by Default (CbD), sheaf theory, topos theory, and non-standard or signed probabilities.In this paper, we propose a treatment of contextual properties that is specific to quantum mechanics, as it relies on the relationship between contextuality and indistinguishability.In particular, we propose that if we assume the ontological thesis that quantum particles or properties can be indistinguishable yet different, no contradiction arising from a Kochen-Specker-type argument appears: when we repeat an experiment, we are in reality performing an experiment measuring a property that is indistinguishable from the first, but not the same.We will discuss how the consequences of this move may help us understand quantum contextuality.