I distinguish two types of reduction within the context of quantum-classical relations, which I designate "formal" and "empirical". Formal reduction holds or fails to hold solely by virtue of the mathematical relationship between two theories; it is therefore a two-place, a priori relation between theories. Empirical reduction requires one theory to encompass the range of physical behaviors that are well-modeled in another theory; in a certain sense, it is a three-place, a posteriori relation connecting the theories and the domain of physical reality that both serve to describe. Focusing on the relationship between classical and quantum mechanics, I argue that while certain formal results concerning singular limits as Planck's constant goes to zero have been taken to preclude the possibility of reduction between these theories, such results at most block reduction in the formal sense; little if any reason has been given for thinking that they block reduction in the empirical sense. I then briefly outline a strategy for empirical reduction that is suggested by work on decoherence theory, arguing that this sort of account remains a fully viable route to the empirical reduction of classical to quantum mechanics and is unaffected by such singular limits.
I distinguish two types of reduction within the context of quantum-classical relations, which I designate "formal" and "empirical". Formal reduction holds or fails to hold solely by virtue of the mathematical relationship between two theories; it is therefore a two-place, a priori relation between theories. Empirical reduction requires one theory to encompass the range of physical behaviors that are well-modeled in another theory; in a certain sense, it is a three-place, a posteriori relation connecting the theories and the domain of physical reality that both serve to describe. Focusing on the relationship between classical and quantum mechanics, I argue that while certain formal results concerning singular limits as Planck's constant goes to zero have been taken to preclude the possibility of reduction between these theories, such results at most block reduction in the formal sense; little if any reason has been given for thinking that they block reduction in the empirical sense. I then briefly outline a strategy for empirical reduction that is suggested by work on decoherence theory, arguing that this sort of account remains a fully viable route to the empirical reduction of classical to quantum mechanics and is unaffected by such singular limits.
I defend three general claims concerning inter-theoretic reduction in physics. First, the popular notion that a superseded theory in physics is generally a simple limit of the theory that supersedes it paints an oversimplified picture of reductive relations in physics. Second, where reduction specifically between two dynamical systems models of a single system is concerned, reduction requires the existence of a particular sort of function from the state space of the low-level (purportedly more accurate and encompassing) model to that of the high-level (purportedly less accurate and encompassing) model that approximately commutes, in a specific sense, with the rules of dynamical evolution prescribed by the models. The third point addresses a tension between, on the one hand, the frequent need to take into account system-specific details in providing a full derivation of the high-level theory’s success in a particular context, and, on the other hand, a desire to understand the general mechanisms and results that under- write reduction between two theories across a wide and disparate range of different systems; I suggest a reconciliation based on the use of partial proofs of reduction, designed to reveal these general mechanisms of reduction at work across a range of systems, while leaving certain gaps to be filled in on the basis of system-specific details. After discussing these points of general methodology, I go on to demonstrate their application to a number of particular inter-theory reductions in physics involving quantum theory. I consider three reductions: first, connecting classical mechanics and non-relativistic quantum mechanics; second,connecting classical electrodynamics and quantum electrodynamics; and third, connecting non-relativistic quantum mechanics and quantum electrodynamics. I approach these reductions from a realist perspective, and for this reason consider two realist interpretations of quantum theory - the Everett and Bohm theories - as potential bases for these reductions. Nevertheless, many of the technical results concerning these reductions pertain also more generally to the bare, uninterpreted formalism of quantum theory. Throughout my analysis, I make the application of the general methodological claims of the thesis explicit, so as to provide concrete illustration of their validity.
I show explicitly how concerns about wave function collapse and ontology can be decoupled from the bulk of technical analysis necessary to recover localized, approximately Newtonian trajectories from quantum theory. In doing so, I demonstrate that the account of classical behavior provided by decoherence theory can be straightforwardly tailored to give accounts of classical behavior on multiple interpretations of quantum theory, including the Everett, de Broglie-Bohm and GRW interpretations. I further show that this interpretation-neutral, decoherence-based account conforms to a general view of inter-theoretic reduction in physics that I have elaborated elsewhere, which differs from the oversimplified picture that treats reduction as a matter of simply taking limits. This interpretation-neutral account rests on a general three-pronged strategy for reduction between quantum and classical theories that combines decoherence, an appropriate form of Ehrenfest's Theorem, and a decoherence-compatible mechanism for collapse. It also incorporates a novel argument as to why branch-relative trajectories should be approximately Newtonian, which is based on a little-discussed extension of Ehrenfest's Theorem to open systems, rather than on the more commonly cited but less germane closed-systems version. In the Conclusion, I briefly suggest how the strategy for quantum-classical reduction described here might be extended to reduction between other classical and quantum theories, including classical and quantum field theory and classical and quantum gravity.
Conceptual and formal problems Many of the problems surrounding the interpretation of quantum mechanics stem from the absence of a sufficiently general and physically transparent analysis of the connection with the domain in which classical concepts are assumed to apply. It is the purpose of this chapter to describe with the aid of a few examples how the quantum potential approach provides a context within which the conceptual and formal issues raised by this problem may be clarified. A key question is to explain how the state or context dependence which is so characteristic of the quantum domain turns into state independence at a certain level, characterized as ‘classical’. To illustrate one aspect of the conceptual problem we recall that in Bohr's interpretation the validity of classical concepts is already presupposed since, it is suggested, it is only in terms of these that one can unambiguously communicate the results of experiments in the quantum domain. Thus, classical physics must be considered as prior to quantum mechanics and the latter is a generalization of the former in that it provides a new set of laws governing the application of classical concepts. According to this view, any procedure by which classical mechanics is recovered from quantum mechanics as a mathematical limit can only be a demonstration of consistency with the already postulated epistemological relation between the two theories and not as a ‘derivation’ of classical mechanics from quantum mechanics (George, Prigogine & Rosenfeld, 1972).
Familiar formulations of classical and quantum mechanics are shown to follow from a general theory of mechanics based on pure states with an intrinsic probability structure. This theory is developed to the stage where theorems from quantum logic enable expression of the state geometry in Hilbert space. Quantum and classical mechanics are then elaborated and applied to subsystems and the measurement process. Consideration is also given to space-time geometry and the constraints this places on the dynamics. Physics and Mathematics, it is argued, are growing apart; the inadequate treatment of approximations in general and localisation in quantum mechanics in particular are seen as contributing factors. In the description of systems, the link between localisation and lack of knowledge shows that quantum mechanics should reflect the domain of applicability. Restricting the class of states provides a means of achieving this goal. Localisation is then shown to have a mathematical expression in terms of compactness, which in turn is applied to yield a topological theory of bound and scattering states. Finally, the thesis questions the validity of classical limits and quantisations in intertheoretic reduction, and demonstrates that a widely accepted classical limit does not constitute a proof of reduction. It proposes a procedure for determining whether classical and quantum mechanics are weakly equivalent over a domain of applicability, and concludes that, in this restricted sense, classical mechanics reduces to quantum mechanics.
The need for a common language If we wish to compare the methods, content, claims and experimental predictions of two physical theories we have to find some common ground between them. What is needed ideally is a language which embraces the essential elements of each theory as parts of a broader structure which transcends them both. There are two components to such a language, which might be called the formal and the informal. Briefly, by ‘formal’ we mean a precisely defined set of concepts and their relationships from which one can deduce unambiguous conclusions by a series of logical steps (mathematics); by ‘informal’ we mean the intuitive concepts and pictures that a theory employs in order to render intelligible the ‘reality’ for which it seeks to account. These two aspects are naturally closely connected. The possibility of constructing a language of this type is not given a priori . It may turn out that it is possible to develop only one of the two components, and the theories we want to compare may or may not be commensurable, or only partly so. We shall examine this question in connection with the relation between two physical theories of matter: classical mechanics and quantum mechanics. This relation is subtle and operates on several levels and we shall return to it throughout the book. For the present we confine ourselves to some general remarks. Roughly speaking, we may say that classical mechanics as a distinct discipline constitutes a language possessing both formal and informal aspects.
I argue that it is possible to give an interpretation of the classical ℏ→0 limit of quantum mechanics that results in a partial explanation of the success of classical mechanics. The interpretation is novel in that it allows one to explain the success of the theoretical structure of classical mechanics. This interpretation clarifies the relationship between physical quantities and propositions in quantum theories and provides a precise notion of a quantum theory holding “approximately on certain scales.”