In our quantum mechanics courses, measurement is usually taught in passing, as an ad-hoc procedure involving the ugly collapse of the wave function. No wonder we search for more satisfying alternatives to the Copenhagen interpretation. But this overlooks the fact that the approach fits very well with modern measurement theory with its notions of the conditioned state and quantum trajectory. In addition, what we know of as the Copenhagen interpretation is a later 1950s development and some of the earlier pioneers like Bohr did not talk of wave function collapse. In fact, if one takes these earlier ideas and mixes them with later insights of decoherence, a much more satisfying version of Copenhagen quantum mechanics emerges, one for which the collapse of the wave function is seen to be a harmless book keeping device. Along the way, we explain why chaotic systems lead to wave functions that spread out quickly on macroscopic scales implying that Schrödinger cat states are the norm rather than curiosities generated in physicists’ laboratories. We then describe how the conditioned state of a quantum system depends crucially on how the system is monitored illustrating this with the example of a decaying atom monitored with a time of arrival photon detector, leading to Bohr’s quantum jumps. On the other hand, other kinds of detection lead to much smoother behaviour, providing yet another example of complementarity. Finally we explain how classical behaviour emerges, including classical mechanics but also thermodynamics.
In our quantum mechanics courses, measurement is usually taught in passing, as an ad-hoc procedure involving the ugly collapse of the wave function. No wonder we search for more satisfying alternatives to the Copenhagen interpretation. But this overlooks the fact that the approach fits very well with modern measurement theory with its notions of the conditioned state and quantum trajectory. In addition, what we know of as the Copenhagen interpretation is a later 1950s development and some of the earlier pioneers like Bohr did not talk of wave function collapse. In fact, if one takes these earlier ideas and mixes them with later insights of decoherence, a much more satisfying version of Copenhagen quantum mechanics emerges, one for which the collapse of the wave function is seen to be a harmless book keeping device. Along the way, we explain why chaotic systems lead to wave functions that spread out quickly on macroscopic scales implying that Schrödinger cat states are the norm rather than curiosities generated in physicists’ laboratories. We then describe how the conditioned state of a quantum system depends crucially on how the system is monitored illustrating this with the example of a decaying atom monitored with a time of arrival photon detector, leading to Bohr’s quantum jumps. On the other hand, other kinds of detection lead to much smoother behaviour, providing yet another example of complementarity. Finally we explain how classical behaviour emerges, including classical mechanics but also thermodynamics.
The dominance of the Copenhagen interpretation is the result of a historical accident (Cushing, 1994). At the Solvay conference in 1927, Louis de Broglie put forward the deterministic pilot wave theory, described later. Never slow to criticize, Pauli jumped up and demolished de Broglie’s proposal, and de Broglie was so discouraged by this that he did not develop his interpretation any further. The Copenhagen interpretation was then developed by Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli and many others, as described in the previous chapter. It was strongly supported by von Neumann’s proof of the impossibility of hidden variables. Years later, in 1952, Bohm published a deterministic hidden variable theory, showing that there must be something wrong with von Neumann’s proof. The error was found by John Bell in 1966, as described in the last chapter, and he also showed how Pauli’s objections to de Broglie’s original idea can be answered. If this had been done at the conference in 1927, quantum mechanics could have been interpreted deterministically from the beginning. The essential mistake in the Copenhagen interpretation is to treat it as a complete account of the behaviour of each individual system. It is frequently claimed that it enables us to calculate, at least in principle, everything that can be measured. Thus Hooft (1997, p. 11) said that ‘The laws of quantum mechanics have been formulated very accurately. We know exactly how to compute anything we would like to know.’ Also Peierls (1997, p. 25) has said that quantum mechanics ‘had become a complete and consistent scheme capable of giving a unique answer to any questions relating to actual or possible observations’. Even if this were true, it would not imply that it is the final complete theory, for it is always possible that some new phenomenon might be found that cannot be calculated quantum-mechanically. However, it is not true: there are many phenomena such as the time of decay of a radioactive nucleus, or the direction a particle is scattered by a nucleus, that cannot be calculated, even in principle. Quantum mechanics is therefore an incomplete theory. We can only calculate the statistical properties of these systems, such as the half-life of a radioactive decay or the differential scattering cross-section that gives the probabilities that a particle is scattered through various angles. All measurements of quantum systems are of this statistical character. It might be thought that the possibility of making measurements on a single electron provides an exception to this. However, even in such cases the electron is continually bathed in a fluctuating background radiation from nearby atoms. Since this is variable, that electron is a member of an ensemble of electrons subject to different fluctuations. All these examples clearly demonstrate the statistical character of quantum mechanics. ‘I am rather firmly convinced’, Einstein (in Schilpp, 1949, pp. 666, 671) remarked, ‘that the essentially statistical character of contemporary quantum theory is solely to be ascribed to fact that this theory operates with an incomplete description of physical systems’. As a result, ‘the c-function is to be understood as the description not of a single system but of an ensemble of systems’. So, ‘if the statistical quantum theory does not pretend to describe the individual system completely, it appears unavoidable to look elsewhere for a complete description of the individual systems’. Thus ‘the difficulties of theoretical interpretation disappear, if one views the quantum-mechanical description as a description of an ensemble of systems’. If this is achieved, ‘the statistical theory would, within the framework of future physics, take an approximately analogous position to statistical mechanics within the framework of classical mechanics’. ‘Thus, essentially, nothing has changed since Galileo or Newton or Faraday concerning the status of the ‘‘observer’’ or our ‘‘consciousness’’ or of our ‘‘information’’ in physics’ (Popper, 1982, p. 46). Once this is accepted, the quantum paradoxes that plagued the Copenhagen interpretation are easily resolved, as described below. In any textbook of quantum mechanics problems such as the calculation of the energy levels of the hydrogen atom are solved as if that hydrogen atom is alone in the universe. As Feynman (1972) remarked, ‘when we solve a quantum-mechanical problem, what we really do is to divide the universe into two parts – the system in which we are interested and the rest of the universe. We then usually act as if the system in which we are interested comprised the whole universe.’ In fact, however, every hydrogen atom on which measurements are made is surrounded by other atoms and exposed to their radiations. Quantum mechanics somehow takes this into account and gives the average behaviour of an ensemble of hydrogen atoms. A more detailed theory takes these influences into account. One attempt to do this is stochastic electrodynamics, described in a later section.
This paper discusses the relation between the decoherent histories approach to quantum mechanics that is based on coarse-grained decoherent histories of a closed system, and the approximate quantum mechanics of measured subsystems, as in the Copenhagen interpretation. We show how the a classical world used in such formulations is not to something to be postulated but rather explained by suitable sets of alternative histories of quasiclassical variables. We discuss the general definition of measurement, the collapse of the wave function, and irreversibility from the perspective of decoherent histories quantum theory..
We introduce a new and conceptually simple interpretation of quantum mechanics based on reduced density matrices of sub-systems from which the standard Copenhagen interpretation emerges as an effective description of macroscopically large systems. This interpretation describes a world in which definite measurement results are obtained with probabilities that reproduce the Born rule. Wave function collapse is seen to be a useful but fundamentally unnecessary piece of prudent book keeping which is only valid for macro-systems. The new interpretation lies in a class of modal interpretations in that it applies to quantum systems that interact with a much larger environment. However, we show that it does not suffer from the problems that have plagued similar modal interpretations like macroscopic superpositions and rapid flipping between macroscopically distinct states. We describe how the interpretation fits neatly together with fully quantum formulations of statistical mechanics and that a measurement process can be viewed as a process of ergodicity breaking analogous to a phase transition. The key feature of the new interpretation is that joint probabilities for the ergodic subsets of states of disjoint macro-systems only arise as emergent quantities. Finally we give an account of the EPR–Bohm thought experiment and show that the interpretation implies the violation of the Bell inequality characteristic of quantum mechanics but in a way that is rather novel. The final conclusion is that the Copenhagen interpretation gives a completely satisfactory phenomenology of macro-systems interacting with micro-systems.
We explore the indeterminacy which arises when quantum mechanics is used to explain state changes of physical systems. According to the Copenhagen interpretation, the end state of a physical system generally has no determinable properties prior to being measured. Quantum mechanics can only predict probabilities of anticipated measurements results. The Copenhagen interpretation remains the most commonly taught interpretation of quantum mechanics. It holds that the act of measurement affects the system, causing the system to reduce to one of several probable states immediately upon measurement. This is known as wave function collapse. We discuss alternatives to the Copenhagen interpretation, including the de Broglie‑Bohm pilot‑wave interpretation, and we offer the spacetime topology interpretation.
All alternative interpretations have at their roots some form of disgust at the Copenhagen–Gottingen philosophy, and all have a desire to seek an alternative truth for the understanding of quantum mechanics. The alternative view is of an intrinsic reality prior to the measurement, as discussed by A. Einstein, and by most of the founders of the wave theory of quantum mechanics. A key point of Neils Bohr’s arguments with Einstein, particularly with regard to the Einstein–B. Podolsky–N. Rosen type of experiments, was that one could not make multiple measurements on the same particle, or quantum system. In his view, the measurement itself defined the quantum system. With the arrival of the Schrodinger equation, quantum mechanics had a causal, deterministic equation of motion for the wave function. Perturbation theory, based upon the Schrodinger equation, provided transition details that undermined the assertions of quantum jumps.