Kang et al. [Chin. Phys. B 24 (2015) 090306] proposed a controlled mutual quantum entity authentication protocol. We find that the proposed protocol is not secure, that is, Charlie can eavesdrop the shared keys between Alice and Bob without being detected.
In this paper, we suggest a controlled mutual quantum entity authentication protocol by which two users mutually certify each other on a quantum network using a sequence of Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger (GHZ)-like states. Unlike existing unidirectional quantum entity authentication, our protocol enables mutual quantum entity authentication utilizing entanglement swapping; moreover, it allows the managing trusted center (TC) or trusted third party (TTP) to effectively control the certification of two users using the nature of the GHZ-like state. We will also analyze the security of the protocol and quantum channel.
Two quantum secret sharing (QSS) protocols in a multiuser quantum direct communication (QDC) network system were put forward by Hong et al. [ Chin. Phys. Lett. 29 (2012) 050303 ]. However, we find that either agent (Bob or Charlie) alone can obtain half the information about the sender's secret without collaboration with the other, which does not satisfy the security requirement of QSS. Moreover, the secret message sent by Alice in the second protocol can be eavesdropped on or its communication can be disturbed by the builder of quantum channels (Trent).
Unconditional security in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) relies on authenticating the identities of users involved in key distribution. While classical identity authentication schemes were initially utilized in QKD implementations, concerns regarding their vulnerability have prompted the exploration of Quantum Identity Authentication (QIA) protocols. In this study, we introduce a new protocol for QIA, derived from the concept of controlled secure direct quantum communication. Our proposed scheme facilitates simultaneous authentication between two users, Alice and Bob, leveraging Bell states with the assistance of a third party, Charlie. Through rigorous security analysis, we demonstrate that the proposed protocol withstands various known attacks, including impersonation, intercept and resend and impersonated fraudulent attacks. Additionally, we establish the relevance of the proposed protocol by comparing it with the existing protocols of similar type.