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arXiv:1509.06692

A classical paradox of choice

J. Finkelstein

Published Sep 22, 2015• 2 citations
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Abstract

A classical analogue of the Adlam-Kent "Quantum paradox of choice" (arXiv:1509.04226) is presented.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1509.06692

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We recently considered the task of summoning an unknown quantum state and proved necessary and sufficient conditions for Alice to be able to guarantee to complete the task when there may be several possible calls, of which she need only respond to one. We showed that these are strictly stronger conditions than those previously established by Hayden and May for the case where Alice knows there will only be one call. We introduced the concept of a {\it quantum paradox of choice} to summarize the implications of these results: Alice is given more options to complete our version of the task, yet one can easily construct examples where our version is impossible and the apparently simpler version considered by Hayden-May is possible. Finkelstein has argued that one can identify analogous classical paradoxes of choice in a relativistic setting. We examine Finkelstein's proposed classical tasks and explain why they seem to us disanalogous.
This paper is an answer to the first part of Adrian Kent's One World versus Many : the Inadequacy of Everettian Accounts of Evolution, Probability, and Scientific Confirmation [arXiv:0905.0624]. We take issue with Kent's arguments against many-world interpretations of quantum mechanics. We argue that his reasons for preferring single-world interpretations are logically flawed and that his proposed singleworld alternative to probability theory suffers from conceptual problems. We use a few thought-experiments which show that the problems he raises for probabilities in multiverses also apply in a single universe.