arXiv:1507.06528 · Physical Review A

Practical attacks on decoy-state quantum-key-distribution systems with detector efficiency mismatch

Yangyang Fei, Ming Yuan Gao, Weilong Wang, Chaobo Li, Zhi Ma

Published May 6, 2015• 8 citations

Abstract

To the active-basis-choice decoy-state quantum-key-distribution systems with detector efficiency mismatch, we present a modified attack strategy, which is based on the faked states attack, with quantum nondemolition measurement ability to restress the threat of detector efficiency mismatch. Considering that perfect quantum nondemolition measurement ability doesn't exist in real life, we also propose a practical attack strategy using photon number resolving detectors. Theoretical analysis and numerical simulation results show that, without changing the channel, our attack strategies are serious threats to decoy-state quantum-key-distribution systems. The eavesdropper may get some information about the secret key without causing any alarms. Besides, the lower bound of detector efficiency mismatch to run our modified faked states attack successfully with perfect quantum nondemolition measurement ability is also given out, which provides the producers of quantum-key-distribution systems with a reference and can be treated as the approximate secure bound of detector efficiency mismatch in decoy-state quantum-key-distribution systems.

DOI: 10.1103/physreva.91.052305

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