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arXiv:0808.1385

Quantum cryptography: theory and practice

Xiongfeng Ma

Published Aug 10, 2008• 9 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

A highly attenuated laser pulse which gives a weak coherent state is widely used in quantum key distribution (QKD) experiments. A weak coherent state has multi-photon components, which opens up a security loophole to the sophisticated eavesdropper. With a small adjustment of the hardware, we prove that the decoy state method can close this loophole and substantially improve the QKD performance. We also propose a few practical decoy state protocols, study statistical fluctuations and perform experimental demonstrations. Moreover, we apply the methods from entanglement distillation protocols based on two-way classical communication to improve the decoy state QKD performance. Furthermore, we study the decoy state methods for other single photon sources, such as triggering parametric down-conversion (PDC) source. We propose a model and post-processing scheme for the entanglement-based QKD with a PDC source. Although the model is proposed to study the entanglement-based QKD, we emphasize that our generic model may also be useful for other non-QKD experiments involving a PDC source. By simulating a real PDC experiment, we show that the entanglement-based QKD can achieve longer maximal secure distance than the single-photon-based QKD schemes. We present a time-shift attack that exploits the efficiency mismatch of two single photon detectors in a QKD system. This eavesdropping strategy can be realized by current technology. We also discuss counter measures against the attack and study the security of a QKD system with efficiency mismatch detectors.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.0808.1385

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A highly attenuated laser pulse which gives a weak coherent state is widely used in quantum key distribution (QKD) experiments. A weak coherent state has multi-photon components, which opens up a security loophole to the sophisticated eavesdropper. With a small adjustment of the hardware, we prove that the decoy state method can close this loophole and substantially improve the QKD performance. We also propose a few practical decoy state protocols, study statistical fluctuations and perform experimental demonstrations. Moreover, we apply the methods from entanglement distillation protocols based on two-way classical communication to improve the decoy state QKD performance. Furthermore, we study the decoy state methods for other single photon sources, such as triggering parametric down-conversion (PDC) source. We propose a model and post-processing scheme for the entanglement-based QKD with a PDC source. Although the model is proposed to study the entanglement-based QKD, we emphasize that our generic model may also be useful for other non-QKD experiments involving a PDC source. By simulating a real PDC experiment, we show that the entanglement-based QKD can achieve longer maximal secure distance than the single-photon-based QKD schemes. We present a time-shift attack that exploits the efficiency mismatch of two single photon detectors in a QKD system. This eavesdropping strategy can be realized by current technology. We also discuss counter measures against the attack and study the security of a QKD system with efficiency mismatch detectors.
Quantum cryptography or quantum key distribution (QKD) applies fundamental laws of quantum physics to guarantee secure communication. The security of quantum cryptography was proven in the last decade. Many security analyses are based on the assumption that QKD system components are idealized. In practice, inevitable device imperfections may compromise security unless these imperfections are well investigated.\n\nA highly attenuated laser pulse which gives a weak coherent state is widely used in QKD experiments. A weak coherent state has multi-photon components, which opens up a security loophole to the sophisticated eavesdropper. With a small adjustment of the hardware, we will prove that the decoy state method can close this loophole and substantially improve the QKD performance. We also propose a few practical decoy state protocols, study statistical fluctuations and perform experimental demonstrations. Moreover, we will apply the methods from entanglement distillation protocols based on two-way classical communication to improve the decoy state QKD performance. Furthermore, we study the decoy state methods for other single photon sources, such as triggering parametric down-conversion (PDC) source. Note that our work, decoy state protocol, has attracted a lot of scientific and media interest. The decoy state QKD becomes a standard technique for prepare-and-measure QKD schemes.\n\nAside from single-photon-based QKD schemes, there is another type of scheme based on entangled photon sources. A PDC source is commonly used as an entangled photon source. We propose a model and post-processing scheme for the entanglement-based QKD with a PDC source. Although the model is proposed to study the entanglement-based QKD, we emphasize that our generic model may also be useful for other non-QKD experiments involving a PDC source. By simulating a real PDC experiment, we show that the entanglement-based QKD can achieve longer maximal secure distance than the single-photon-based QKD schemes.\n\nWe propose a time-shift attack that exploits the efficiency mismatch of two single photon detectors in a QKD system. This eavesdropping strategy can be realized by current technology. We will also discuss counter measures against the attack and study the security of a QKD system with efficiency mismatch detectors.
Quantum cryptography, or quantum key distribution (QKD), provides a means of unconditionally secure communication. The security is in principle based on the fundamental laws of physics. Security proofs show that if quantum cryptography is appropriately implemented, even the most powerful eavesdropper cannot decrypt the message from a cipher. The implementations of quantum crypto-systems in real life may not fully comply with the assumptions made in the security proofs. Such discrepancy between the experiment and the theory can be fatal to the security of a QKD system. In this thesis we address a number of these discrepancies. A perfect single-photon source is often assumed in many security proofs. However, a weak coherent source is widely used in a real-life QKD implementation. Decoy state protocols have been proposed as a novel approach to dramatically improve the performance of a weak coherent source based QKD implementation without jeopardizing its security. Here, we present the first experimental demonstrations of decoy state protocols. Our experimental scheme was later adopted by most decoy state QKD implementations. In the security proof of decoy state protocols as well as many other QKD protocols, it is widely assumed that a sender generates a phase-randomized coherent state. This assumption has been enforced in few implementations. We close this gap in two steps: First, we implement and verify the phase randomization experimentally; second, we prove the security of a QKD implementation without the coherent state assumption. In many security proofs of QKD, it is assumed that all the detectors on the receiver's side have identical detection efficiencies. We show experimentally that this assumption may be violated in a commercial QKD implementation due to an eavesdropper's malicious manipulation. Moreover, we show that the eavesdropper can learn part of the final key shared by the legitimate users as a consequence of this violation of the assumptions.
The performance of a practical quantum key distribution (QKD) system is often limited by the multi-photon state emission of its source and the dark counts of its detectors. Here, we present two methods to improve its performance. The first method is decoy state QKD: the sender randomly sends out weak coherent states with various average photon numbers (which are named as signal state and decoy states). In [14,15], we have performed the first experimental implementation of decoy state QKD over 15km and 60km respectively, thus dramatically increasing the distance and secure key generation rate of practical QKD systems. Our work has been followed up by many research groups worldwide [16-18]. The second scheme is QKD with "dual detectors" [19]: the legitimate receiver randomly uses either a fast (but noisy) detector or a quiet (but slow) detector to measure the incoming quantum signals. The measurement results from the quiet detector can be used to upper bound the eavesdropper's information, while the measurement results from the fast detector are used to generate a secure key. We applied this idea to various QKD protocols. Simulation results demonstrated significant improvements in both BB84 protocol with ideal single photon source and Gaussian-modulated coherent states protocol.
Problem statement: Quantum key distribution provides unconditional security guaranteed by the fundamental laws of quantum physics. Unfortunately, for real-life experimental set-ups, which mainly based on faint laser pulses, the occasional production of multi-photons and channel loss make it possible for sophisticated eavesdroppers to launch various subtle eavesdropping attacks including the Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attack. The decoy state protocols recently proposed to beat PNS attack and to improve dramatically distance and secure key generation rate of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). Approach: Objective of this study was experimental implementation of weak decoy + vacuum states QKD for increasing the performance of QKD system. To show conceptually how simple it was to apply the weak decoy + vacuum state idea to a commercial QKD system, we chosen ID-3000 commercial quantum key distribution system manufactured by id quantique. To implement the weak decoy + vacuum state protocol, we had to add some new optical and electronics components to id quantique and to attenuate each signal to the intensity of either signal state or weak decoy or vacuum state randomly. Results: In our implementation, the attenuation will be done by placing a VOA (variable optical attenuator) in Alice’s side. Specifically, our QKD system required the polarizations of 2 pulses from the same signal to be orthogonal. Therefore the VOA must be polarization independent so as to attenuate the two pulses equally. The VOA utilized in experiment to attenuate signals dynamically was Intensity Modulator (IM). We had implemented weak + vacuum protocol on a modified commercial QKD system over a 25 km of telecom fibers with an unconditionally secure key rate of 6.2931×10-4 per pulse. Conclusion: By making simple modifications to a commercial quantum key distribution system, we could achieve much better performance with substantially higher key generation rate and longer distance than QKD system without decoy state.
Due to the imperfect single photon source and the loss channel in real-life quantum key distribution systems,most current quantum communication experiments based on attenuated laser pulses are insecure under photon number splitting attack.Decoy state method,which is proposed as a useful and effective way to unconditionally secure quantum key distribution grounded on current technology,has become an important branch of quantum communication in recent years.Combined with the general model of quantum key distribution system,a comprehensive review is presented about typical schemes of decoy state method.Then the experimental research on decoy state method is reviewed briefly and the future direction is prospected in the end.
Quantum key distribution establishes a secret string of bits between two distant parties. Of concern in weak laser pulse schemes is the especially strong photon number splitting attack by an eavesdropper, but the decoy state method can detect this attack with current technology, yielding a high rate of secret bits. In this Letter, we develop rigorous security statements in the case of finite statistics with only a few decoy states, and we present the results of simulations of an experimental setup of a decoy state protocol that can be simply realized with current technology.