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arXiv:1503.01137 · Synthese

Laws of nature and the reality of the wave function

Mauro Dorato

Published Mar 23, 2015• 4 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/s11229-015-0696-2

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I combine the idea of a primitive ontology with the metaphysics of laws of nature. In so doing, I examine the theoretical entities that are postulated in Newtonian mechanics, classical electrodynamics, and the de Broglie–Bohm quantum theory. I argue that the existence of mass, forces, fields, and the wave-function depends on the status of laws. The three major theories on laws of nature I treat are Humeanism, dispositionalism, and primitivism about laws. I point out that properties are notoriously ignored in debates on primitive ontologies. In fact, I show that properties, both intrinsic and relational, aren’t needed in physics; therefore, I replace the primitive ontology with a primitive stuff ontology, whose elements have no properties. Recently, a debate has started on the ontological status of forces in classical mechanics; I criticize the major positions and present my own idea that focuses on the status of laws of nature. Another hot topic is the status of the wave-function. Here, I develop a new interpretation in the framework of Humeanism that crucially differs from that advocated by David Albert and Barry Loewer, in that our world is not an illusion of a reality in configuration space. In addition, I propose a hitherto unconsidered way in which the wave–function can be construed as a holistic disposition.
In this paper I review three different positions on the wave function, namely: nomological realism, dispositionalism, and configuration space realism by regarding as essential their capacity to account for the world of our experience. I conclude that the first two positions are committed to regard the wave function as an abstract entity. The third position will be shown to be a merely speculative attempt to derive a primitive ontology from a reified mathematical space. Without entering any discussion about nominalism, I conclude that an elimination of abstract entities from one’s ontology commits one to instrumentalism about the wave function, a position that therefore is not as unmotivated as it has seemed to be to many philosophers.