A quantum voting system is proposed in the tradition of quantum game theory. It is shown that this system violates the quantum analogy of Arrow's impossibility theorem, which makes claims about dictatorship in a classical electoral system.
In the realm of algorithmic economics, voting systems are evaluated and compared by examining the properties or axioms they satisfy. While this pursuit has yielded valuable insights, it has also led to seminal impossibility results such as Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's Impossibility Theorems, which pose challenges in designing ideal voting systems. Enter the domain of quantum computing: recent advancements have introduced the concept of quantum voting systems, which have many potential applications including in security and blockchain. Building on recent works that bypass Arrow's Impossibility Theorem using quantum voting systems, our research extends Quantum Condorcet Voting (QCV) to counter the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem in a quantum setting. To show this, we introduce a quantum-specific notion of truthfulness, extend ideas like incentive compatibility and the purpose of onto to the quantum domain, and introduce new tools to map social welfare functions to social choice functions in this domain.
We study Arrow's Impossibility Theorem in the quantum setting. Our work is based on the work of Bao and Halpern, in which it is proved that the quantum analogue of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is not valid. However, we feel unsatisfied about the proof presented in Bao and Halpern's work. Moreover, the definition of Quantum Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (QIIA) in Bao and Halpern's work seems not appropriate to us. We give a better definition of QIIA, which properly captures the idea of the independence of irrelevant alternatives, and a detailed proof of the violation of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem in the quantum setting with the modified definition.
Recent advances indicate that quantum computers will soon be reality. Motivated by this ever more realistic threat for existing classical cryptographic protocols, researchers have developed several schemes to resist “quantum attacks.” In particular, for electronic voting (e-voting), several schemes relying on properties of quantum mechanics have been proposed. However, each of these proposals comes with a different and often not well-articulated corruption model, has different objectives, and is accompanied by security claims that are never formalized and are at best justified only against specific attacks. To address this, we propose the first formal security definitions for quantum e-voting protocols. With these at hand, we systematize and evaluate the security of previously proposed quantum e-voting protocols; we examine the claims of these works concerning privacy, correctness, and verifiability, and if they are correctly attributed to the proposed protocols. In all non-trivial cases, we identify specific quantum attacks that violate these properties. We argue that the cause of these failures lies in the absence of formal security models and references to the existing cryptographic literature.
Recent advances at Google, IBM, as well as a number of research groups indicate that quantum computers will soon be reality. Motivated by the ever more realistic threat quantum computers pose to existing classical cryptographic protocols, researchers have developed several schemes to resist "quantum attacks". In particular, for electronic voting, several e-voting schemes relying on properties of quantum mechanics have been proposed. However, each of these proposals comes with a different and often not well-articulated corruption model, has different objectives, and is accompanied by security claims which are never formalized and are at best justified only against specific attacks. In this paper, we systematize and evaluate the security of suggested e-voting protocols based on quantum technology. We examine the claims of these works concerning privacy, correctness and verifiability, and if they are correctly attributed to the proposed protocols. In all non-trivial cases, we identified specific quantum attacks that violate these properties. We argue that the cause of these failures lies in the absence of formal security models and in a more general lack of reference to the existing cryptographic literature.
Quantum voting, inspired by quantum game theory, provides a framework in which the quantum majority rule (QMR) constitution of Bao and Yunger Halpern [Phys. Rev. A 95, 062306 (2017)] violates the quantum analogue of Arrow's impossibility theorem. We evaluate this QMR constitution analytically on classical profile data and implement its final measurement stage as a quantum circuit, running on both noiseless simulators and noisy IBM quantum hardware to map how realistic noise deforms the resulting societal ranking distribution. Moderate-high single-qubit noise does not change the qualitative behavior of QMR, whereas strong noise shifts the distribution toward other dominant winners than the classical one. We quantify this behavior using winner-agreement rates, Condorcet-winner flip rates, and Jensen-Shannon divergence between societal ranking distributions. In a second, exploratory component, we demonstrate an explicitly entanglement-based variant of the QMR constitution that serves as a testbed for multi-voter quantum correlations under noise, which we refer to as the QMR2-inspired variant. There, GHZ-type and separable superpositions over opposite rankings have the same expectation values but respond very differently to noise. Taken together, these two components connect the abstract QMR constitution to concrete implementations on noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) devices and highlight design considerations for future quantum voting protocols.