Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1412.6813 · Studies in universal logic

Epistemological and Ontological Paraconsistency in Quantum Mechanics: For and Against Bohrian Philosophy

Christian DE RONDE

Published Jan 1, 2015• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-15368-1_27

Related papers

Indivisibility, Complementarity and Ontology: A Bohrian Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Jairo Roldán Charria

Foundations of Physics•Jul 14, 2014•6 citations

Quantum Mechanics Between Ontology and Epistemology

Florian J. Boge

European studies in philosophy of science•Jan 1, 2018•20 citations

Reality Without Realism: On the Ontological and Epistemological Architecture of Quantum Mechanics

Arkady Plotnitsky, Andrei Yu. Khrennikov

arXiv:1502.06310•Foundations of Physics•Jul 23, 2015•53 citations

The Wave-Memory Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

P. G. Castro

Abstract Present quantum mechanics has been a source of puzzlement since its inception in 1927. The theory has been undoubtedly successful predicting results in a large number of experimental situations. However, its heavy epistemological legacy, coming from the initial ideas of Niels Bohr about complementarity and about the possibility for physical description, has turned quantum mechanics in a kind of ontological black box. This work is an attempt to overcome such epistemological opacity, proposing an interpretation that will present Bohrian quantum mechanics formalism and the pilot-wave framework as two complementary and mutually non-exclusive theoretical descriptions of quantum phenomena. The two theories will, hopefully, become the foundations of a new and more complete approach to quantum reality. One that will, simultaneously, serve as a highly efficient predictive formalism and also as an intelligible description about quantum phenomena in four-dimensional spacetime. I will start from the pilot-wave framework, proposing that quantum waves are memory carrying structures that encode probabilistic distributions of the fundamental behaviors of corpuscles. This nomological information, as I will call it, will have a necessitarian weight upon all corpuscles behaviors, in the sense that the only behaviors allowed in Nature are the ones that can be encoded or have been encoded in the quantum wave carriers. Such a picture of quantum physics will imply that corpuscles exchange nomological information with the carrier waves, by means of the guidage or pilot-wave effect. Secondly, I will suggest that the actual Bohrian quantum mechanics formalism, the one used in the Copenhagen School interpretation, describes not the actual states and properties of quantum corpuscular entities, but the nomological information about those states and properties. As such Bohrian quantum mechanics is a description about not the actual physical observable dynamics, but about the dynamics of the nomological information encoded in the carrier quantum waves. The adoption and consistent interplay of both theoretical descriptions, pilot-wave mode and Bohrian mode, will serve epistemological completeness in the study of quantum phenomena.

Boston studies in the philosophy of science•Jan 1, 2024•0 citations

QBism, FAPP and the Quantum Omelette. (Or, Unscrambling Ontological Problems from Epistemological Solutions in QM)

Christian DE RONDE

In this paper we discuss the so called "quantum omelette" created by Bohr and Heisenberg through the mix of (ontic) objective accounts and (epistemic) subjective ones within the analysis of Quantum Mechanics (QM). We will begin by addressing the difficult relation between ontology and epistemology within the history of both physics and philosophy. We will then argue that the present "quantum omelette" is being presently cooked in two opposite directions: the first scrambling ontological problems with epistemological solutions and the second scrambling epistemic approaches with ontological questions. A good example of the former is a new type of argumentation strategy attempting to justify the use of decoherence, namely, the "For All Practical Purposes" (shortly known as FAPP) type of justification. We will argue that 'FAPP-type solutions' remain, at best, epistemological answers which not only escape the ontological questions at stake -regarding the quantum to classical limit- but also turn the original problem completely meaningless. The latter omelette can be witnessed in relation to some criticisms raised against the epistemic Bayesian approach to QM (shortly known as QBism). We will argue that QBists have produced a consistent scheme that might allow us to begin to unscramble -at least part of- the "quantum omelette". In this respect, we will show why the epistemic QBist approach is safe from several (ontological) criticisms it has recently received (see [42, 47, 48]). We end our paper with a discussion about the importance of ontological approaches within foundations of QM.

arXiv:1608.00548•Aug 1, 2016•3 citations

Some Remarks on the Requirements for Scientific Theory in the Context of Many-worlds Models

Карпенко Иван Александрович

The article discusses the problem of a correct description of reality in science and philosophy, taking into account the acceptance of the many-world hypothe­sis. Many-worlds are understood as modern physical hypotheses that allow the existence of other universes (many-world interpretation, chaotic inflation, string landscape, and others). It is shown that these models are likely to chal­lenge the traditional intellectual intuition on which classical science is built: they require new methodological approaches, and perhaps a new epistemology in general. Some requirements of classical logic, based on principles such as the laws of non-contradiction or the excluded middle, may turn out to be incor­rect and even counterintuitive under many-world hypotheses. It is suggested that some logical systems (paraconsistent logic, quantum logic) may in the future be­come an ontological and epistemological foundation for the concepts of many-world physical reality. It is concluded that the considered multi-world models in conjunction with the indicated logics are more intuitively acceptable, since they allow getting rid of not only a number of cosmological problems (for exam­ple, fine tuning), but also problems of a logical and mathematical nature arising from the considered traditional requirements for formal systems.

Voprosy filosofii•Jul 1, 2024•0 citations
Abstract Present quantum mechanics has been a source of puzzlement since its inception in 1927. The theory has been undoubtedly successful predicting results in a large number of experimental situations. However, its heavy epistemological legacy, coming from the initial ideas of Niels Bohr about complementarity and about the possibility for physical description, has turned quantum mechanics in a kind of ontological black box. This work is an attempt to overcome such epistemological opacity, proposing an interpretation that will present Bohrian quantum mechanics formalism and the pilot-wave framework as two complementary and mutually non-exclusive theoretical descriptions of quantum phenomena. The two theories will, hopefully, become the foundations of a new and more complete approach to quantum reality. One that will, simultaneously, serve as a highly efficient predictive formalism and also as an intelligible description about quantum phenomena in four-dimensional spacetime. I will start from the pilot-wave framework, proposing that quantum waves are memory carrying structures that encode probabilistic distributions of the fundamental behaviors of corpuscles. This nomological information, as I will call it, will have a necessitarian weight upon all corpuscles behaviors, in the sense that the only behaviors allowed in Nature are the ones that can be encoded or have been encoded in the quantum wave carriers. Such a picture of quantum physics will imply that corpuscles exchange nomological information with the carrier waves, by means of the guidage or pilot-wave effect. Secondly, I will suggest that the actual Bohrian quantum mechanics formalism, the one used in the Copenhagen School interpretation, describes not the actual states and properties of quantum corpuscular entities, but the nomological information about those states and properties. As such Bohrian quantum mechanics is a description about not the actual physical observable dynamics, but about the dynamics of the nomological information encoded in the carrier quantum waves. The adoption and consistent interplay of both theoretical descriptions, pilot-wave mode and Bohrian mode, will serve epistemological completeness in the study of quantum phenomena.
In this paper we discuss the so called "quantum omelette" created by Bohr and Heisenberg through the mix of (ontic) objective accounts and (epistemic) subjective ones within the analysis of Quantum Mechanics (QM). We will begin by addressing the difficult relation between ontology and epistemology within the history of both physics and philosophy. We will then argue that the present "quantum omelette" is being presently cooked in two opposite directions: the first scrambling ontological problems with epistemological solutions and the second scrambling epistemic approaches with ontological questions. A good example of the former is a new type of argumentation strategy attempting to justify the use of decoherence, namely, the "For All Practical Purposes" (shortly known as FAPP) type of justification. We will argue that 'FAPP-type solutions' remain, at best, epistemological answers which not only escape the ontological questions at stake -regarding the quantum to classical limit- but also turn the original problem completely meaningless. The latter omelette can be witnessed in relation to some criticisms raised against the epistemic Bayesian approach to QM (shortly known as QBism). We will argue that QBists have produced a consistent scheme that might allow us to begin to unscramble -at least part of- the "quantum omelette". In this respect, we will show why the epistemic QBist approach is safe from several (ontological) criticisms it has recently received (see [42, 47, 48]). We end our paper with a discussion about the importance of ontological approaches within foundations of QM.
The article discusses the problem of a correct description of reality in science and philosophy, taking into account the acceptance of the many-world hypothe­sis. Many-worlds are understood as modern physical hypotheses that allow the existence of other universes (many-world interpretation, chaotic inflation, string landscape, and others). It is shown that these models are likely to chal­lenge the traditional intellectual intuition on which classical science is built: they require new methodological approaches, and perhaps a new epistemology in general. Some requirements of classical logic, based on principles such as the laws of non-contradiction or the excluded middle, may turn out to be incor­rect and even counterintuitive under many-world hypotheses. It is suggested that some logical systems (paraconsistent logic, quantum logic) may in the future be­come an ontological and epistemological foundation for the concepts of many-world physical reality. It is concluded that the considered multi-world models in conjunction with the indicated logics are more intuitively acceptable, since they allow getting rid of not only a number of cosmological problems (for exam­ple, fine tuning), but also problems of a logical and mathematical nature arising from the considered traditional requirements for formal systems.