A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that describes the universe as a continuum of worlds whose mutual interference gives rise to quantum phenomena. A logical framework is introduced to properly deal with propositions about objects in a multiplicity of worlds. In this logical framework, the continuum of worlds is treated in analogy to the continuum of time points; both “time” and “world” are considered as mutually independent modes of existence. The theory combines elements of Bohmian mechanics and of Everett’s many-worlds interpretation; it has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Probability as given by the Born rule emerges as a consequence of insufficient knowledge of observers about which world it is that they live in. The theory describes a continuum of worlds rather than a single world or a discrete set of worlds, so it is similar in spirit to many-worlds interpretations based on Everett’s approach, without being actually reducible to these. In particular, there is no splitting of worlds, which is a typical feature of Everett-type theories. Altogether, the theory explains (1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, (2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, and (3) the apparently random “collapse of the wavefunction” caused by the measurement, while still being an objectively deterministic theory.
In general, a physical theory is based on some fundamental principles concerning space, time, matter, and the laws prescribing how matter is distributed in space and how it evolves in time, and even how spacetime itself changes in response to the changes of matter. The spectrum of the known theories is very diverse, since they are based on different assumptions. Some theories assume that space and time are totally independent, some that they are warped in a continuum named "spacetime", and some even that there are more dimensions than the usual 3+1. Most theories consider that space and time are continuous, but many recent theories consider them to be discrete. Most dynamical laws of fundamental Physics are deterministic, but apparently Quantum Mechanics shows that they may have an indeterministic component. Despite these distinctions between various theories, our intuition and experience tells us that they have a lot in common. In this paper I will try to capture the common features in a single mathematical structure. This is not a Theory of Everything, but only a mathematical structure which is common to most physical theories known so far. We will see that these theories can be obtained as particular cases of this structure, which I will call "world". In particular, the worlds described by the Classical Mechanics, the Theory of Relativity and the Quantum Mechanics are examples of worlds according to this definition, but also some theories attempting to unify gravity and QM, like String Theory. The purpose of this distillation is to provide a mathematical common background to both physical and metaphysical discussions about the various theories of the World.
A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that combines elements of Bohmian mechanics and of Everett's "many-worlds" interpretation. The resulting theory has the advantage of resolving known issues of both theories, as well as those of standard quantum mechanics. It has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Most importantly, the Born rule can be derived by straightforward application of the Laplacian rule, without reliance on a "quantum equilibrium hypothesis" that is crucial for Bohmian mechanics, and without reliance on a "branch weight" that is crucial for Everett-type theories. The theory describes a continuum of worlds rather than a single world or a discrete set of worlds, so it is similar in spirit to many-worlds interpretations based on Everett's approach, without being actually reducible to these. In particular, there is no "splitting of worlds", which is a typical feature of Everett-type theories. Altogether, the theory explains 1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, 2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, 3) the identification of observables as self-adjoint operators on Hilbert space, and 4) the apparently random "collapse of the wavefunction" caused by the measurement, while still being an objectively deterministic theory.