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arXiv:1312.1345

The whole is greater than the sum of the parts: on the possibility of purely statistical interpretations of quantum theory

Joseph Emerson, Dmitry Serbin, Sutherland, Chris, Victor Veitch

Published Dec 4, 2013• 18 citations
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Abstract

The Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem (PBR) claims to rule out the possibility of a purely statistical interpretation of the quantum state under an assumption of how to represent independent operations in any hidden variable model. We show that PBR's assumption of independence encodes an assumption of local causality, which is already known to conflict with the predictions of quantum theory via Bell-type inequalities. We devise a weaker formulation of independence within a general hidden variable model that is empirically indistinguishable from the PBR assumption in situations where certain hidden variables are inaccessible. Under this weaker principle we are able to construct an explicit hidden variable model that is purely statistical and also reproduces the quantum predictions. Our results suggest that the assumption of a purely statistical interpretation is actually an innocent bystander in the PBR argument, rather than the driving force behind their contradiction.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1312.1345

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The Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem (PBR) claims to rule out the possibility of a purely statistical interpretation of the quantum state under an assumption of how to represent independent operations in any hidden variable model. We show that PBR's assumption of independence encodes an assumption of local causality, which is already known to conflict with the predictions of quantum theory via Bell-type inequalities. We devise a weaker formulation of independence within a general hidden variable model that is empirically indistinguishable from the PBR assumption in situations where certain hidden variables are inaccessible. Under this weaker principle we are able to construct an explicit hidden variable model that is purely statistical and also reproduces the quantum predictions. Our results suggest that the assumption of a purely statistical interpretation is actually an innocent bystander in the PBR argument, rather than the driving force behind their contradiction.
Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (PBR) have recently given a completely novel argument that restricts the class of possible models for quantum phenomena (arXiv:1111.3328). In these notes the assumptions used by PBR are considerably weakened, to further restrict the class of possible models. The `factorisability' assumption used by PBR is replaced by a far weaker `compatibility' assumption for uncorrelated quantum subsystems which, moreover, does not require the assignation of separate underlying properties to each subsystem (i.e, reductionism). Further, it is shown that an assumption of measurement independence may be dropped to obtain a related result having the same experimental significance (at the expense of a weaker conceptual significance). The latter is a remarkable feature of the PBR approach, given that Bell inequalities, steering inequalities and Kochen-Specker theorems all require an assumption of this type.
The Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) no-go theorem provides an argument for the reality of the quantum state by ruling out $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic ontological theories, in which the quantum state is of a statistical nature. It applies under an assumption of preparation independence, the validity of which has been subject to debate. We propose two plausible and less restrictive alternatives: a weaker notion allowing for classical correlations, and an even weaker, physically motivated notion of independence, which merely prohibits the possibility of superluminal causal influences in the preparation process. The latter is a minimal requirement for enabling a reasonable treatment of subsystems in any theory. It is demonstrated by means of an explicit $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic ontological model that the argument of PBR becomes invalid under the alternative notions of independence. As an intermediate step, we recover a result which is valid in the presence of classical correlations. Finally, we obtain a theorem which holds under the minimal requirement, approximating the result of PBR. For this, we consider experiments involving randomly sampled preparations and derive bounds on the degree of $\ensuremath{\psi}$ epistemicity that is consistent with the quantum-mechanical predictions. The approximation is exact in the limit as the sample space of preparations becomes infinite.
Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem claims that ψ\psiψ-epistemic understanding of quantum mechanics is in trouble. Not considering whether the theorem only applies for realist understanding of quantum theory, this paper instead shows that the actual issue the theorem exposes is whether every quantum state should be interpreted as representing all sub-ensemble possibilities. For example, if ∣+⟩|+\rangle∣+⟩ was ``measured'' at time t=0t=0t=0 where ∣+⟩=(∣0⟩+∣1⟩)/2|+\rangle = (|0\rangle + |1 \rangle)/\sqrt{2}∣+⟩=(∣0⟩+∣1⟩)/2​, should we consider this quantum state as being solely ∣+⟩|+\rangle∣+⟩, or representing all possible sub-ensembles such as (+,0),(+,1)(+,0), (+,1)(+,0),(+,1)? This question suggests that PBR theorem does not rule out realist/non-realist ψ\psiψ-epistemic theory.
The Pusey--Barrett--Rudolph (PBR) theorem is commonly taken to establish that a pure quantum state represents a physical property of the system to which it is assigned, rather than merely encoding knowledge. In this work, I distinguish between state-first and dynamics-first physical theories, and argue that this reading presupposes the former. These two types of theories support different approaches to causal explanation, and one of PBR's stated assumptions depends on the state-first approach. Using a recent interpretation of quantum theory as a concrete example, I show how a dynamics-first theory can explain the PBR correlations while maintaining a broadly epistemic reading of quantum states. I conclude that the PBR theorem supports a dilemma: either the quantum state is part of reality, or reality is not fundamentally built out of states.
In a recent paper (arXiv:1111.3328), Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph claim to prove that statistical interpretations of quantum mechanics do not work. In fact, their proof assumes that all statistical interpretations must be based on hidden variable realism. Effectively, the authors demand from the start that reality must be decided by mathematics, and not by measurements. If this unjustified assumption is dropped, the quantum formalism has a natural statistical interpretation that fully explains the paradox presented by the authors. It is therefore possible to conclude that the paradox actually supports the statistical interpretation, demonstrating once more that quantum mechanics should not be explained by measurement independent realities that are never observed and therefore lie beyond the reach of empirical tests.