Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1311.7127

The wave-function is real but nonphysical: A view from counterfactual quantum cryptography

Akshata Shenoy H., R. Srikanth

Published Nov 27, 2013• 6 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Counterfactual quantum cryptography (CQC) is used here as a tool to assess the status of the quantum state: Is it real/ontic (an objective state of Nature) or epistemic (a state of the observer's knowledge)? In contrast to recent approaches to wave function ontology, that are based on realist models of quantum theory, here we recast the question as a problem of communication between a sender (Bob), who uses interaction-free measurements, and a receiver (Alice), who observes an interference pattern in a Mach-Zehnder set-up. An advantage of our approach is that it allows us to define the concept of "physical", apart from "real". In instances of counterfactual quantum communication, reality is ascribed to the interaction-freely measured wave function ($ψ$) because Alice deterministically infers Bob's measurement. On the other hand, $ψ$ does not correspond to the physical transmission of a particle because it produced no detection on Bob's apparatus. We therefore conclude that the wave function in this case (and by extension, generally) is real, but not physical. Characteristically for classical phenomena, the reality and physicality of objects are equivalent, whereas for quantum phenomena, the former is strictly weaker. As a concrete application of this idea, the nonphysical reality of the wavefunction is shown to be the basic nonclassical phenomenon that underlies the security of CQC.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1311.7127

Related papers

What Is a Wave Function?

William J. Mullin

The wave function gives probabilities, but is it a real physical quantity, as in the ontic interpretation of quantum mechanics, or just a measure of human belief about a physical system, as in an epistemic interpretation? These questions are introduced by treating Schrödinger’s cat and Wigner’s friend. An important question is whether quantum mechanics applies to macroscopic objects, for example, cats. SQUID experiments have been performed that see quantum interference in very large objects, whereas with most macroscopic objects quantum interference disappears because of decoherence. Various views of the meaning of quantum mechanics are discussed: the Copenhagen interpretation, continuous spontaneous localization, Everett’s many-worlds interpretation, Bohm’s hidden-variable model, and quantum Bayesianism. The latter holds that the wave function represents one’s best belief about the state of a quantum system, rather than an actual physical property. This leads to discussions of recent theories and experiments explicitly designed to test wave function reality.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Mar 16, 2017•0 citations

The Ontic Necessity of the Quantum Wavefunction: Why Epistemic Views Struggle with the Uncertainty Principle

Bachtiar Rifai, Dwi Satya Palupi, Muhammad Farchani Rosyid

The ontological status of the quantum wavefunction remains one of the most debated questions in quantum theory. While epistemic interpretations regard the wavefunction as a reflection of our knowledge or beliefs, ontic interpretations treat it as a real physical object. In this paper, we argue that epistemic approaches struggle to explain the universality and precision of the uncertainty principle, a core feature of quantum mechanics. By contrast, treating the wave-function as ontic allows a consistent and natural derivation of quantum uncertainty from the mathematical structure of Hilbert space. We examine key interpretations on both sides and highlight why the epistemic view falls short in addressing constraints that appear to be intrinsic to nature.

arXiv:2507.09944•Jul 14, 2025•0 citations

Is a System’s Wave Function in One-to-One Correspondence with Its Elements of Reality?

Roger Colbeck, Renato Renner

Although quantum mechanics is one of our most successful physical theories, there has been a long-standing debate about the interpretation of the wave function--the central object of the theory. Two prominent views are that (i) it corresponds to an element of reality, i.e., an objective attribute that exists before measurement, and (ii) it is a subjective state of knowledge about some underlying reality. A recent result [M. F. Pusey, J. Barrett, and T. Rudolph, arXiv:1111.3328] has placed the subjective interpretation into doubt, showing that it would contradict certain physically plausible assumptions, in particular, that multiple systems can be prepared such that their elements of reality are uncorrelated. Here we show, based only on the assumption that measurement settings can be chosen freely, that a system's wave function is in one-to-one correspondence with its elements of reality. This also eliminates the possibility that it can be interpreted subjectively.

arXiv:1111.6597•Physical Review Letters•Apr 11, 2012•250 citations

Bell nonlocality and the reality of the quantum wave function

Anandamay Das Bhowmik, Preeti Parashar, Manik Banik

The status of the quantum wave function is one of the most debated issues in quantum foundations---whether it corresponds directly to the reality or just represents knowledge or information about some aspect of reality. We propose a $\ensuremath{\psi}$-ontology theorem that excludes a class of ontological explanations where the quantum wave function is treated as mere information. Our result, unlike the acclaimed Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph's theorem, does not presume the absence of holistic ontological properties for product quantum preparations. At the core of our derivation, we utilize the seminal no-go result by Bell that rules out any local realistic world view for quantum theory. We show that the observed phenomenon of quantum nonlocality cannot be incorporated in a class of $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic models. Using the well-known Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality, we obtain a threshold bound on the degree of epistemicity above which the ontological models are not compatible with quantum statistics.

arXiv:2005.08577•Physical Review A•Aug 25, 2021•2 citations

SOME REMARKS ON KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY ARISING FROM COUNTERFACTUAL QUANTUM EFFECTS

Rossella Lupacchini

Can the mere possibility of a physical phenomenon affect the outcome of an experiment? In fact quantum theory presents us actual physical effects arising from "counterfactuals", that is physical effects brought about by things that might have happened, although they did not happen. How can it be? After a short outline of the quantum-mechanical description of physical reality, the occurrence of such counterfactual effects in quantum theory is illustrated by means of a Mach-Zehnder interferometer. Then these paradoxical phenomena undermining the very notion of physical event and questioning about which knowledge of physical reality can ever be obtained will be analysed using a classical possible-worlds model of knowledge and probability. Finally, a surprising application of counterfactual quantum effects producing a new kind of computing with no classical analogue will be shown.

Conference on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics: Historical Analysis and Open Questions•May 1, 2000•0 citations

Why protective measurement establishes the reality of the wave function

Shan Gao

It has been debated whether protective measurement implies the reality of the wave function. In this paper, I present a new analysis of the relationship between protective measurement and the reality of the wave function. First, I briefly introduce protective measurements and the ontological models framework for them. Second, I give a simple proof of Hardy's theorem in terms of protective measurements. It shows that when assuming the ontic state of the protected system keeps unchanged during a protective measurement, the wave function must be real. Third, I analyze two suggested psi-epistemic models of a protective measurement, in which the ontic state of the system is affected by the measurement. It is shown that although these models can explain the appearance of expectation values of observables in a single measurement, their predictions about the variance of the result of a non-ideal protective measurement are different from those of quantum mechanics. Finally, I argue that no psi-epistemic models exist for an ideal protective measurement in the ontological models framework, and in order to account for the definite result of an ideal protective measurement, the wave function must be a property of the protected system, defined either at a precise instant or during an infinitesimal time interval around an instant. Moreover, this result can also be extended to the wave function of an unprotected system. This new proof of the reality of the wave function does not rely on auxiliary assumptions, and it may help settle the issue about the nature of the wave function.

•Aug 26, 2018•1 citation
Counterfactual quantum cryptography (CQC) is used here as a tool to assess the status of the quantum state: Is it real/ontic (an objective state of Nature) or epistemic (a state of the observer's knowledge)? In contrast to recent approaches to wave function ontology, that are based on realist models of quantum theory, here we recast the question as a problem of communication between a sender (Bob), who uses interaction-free measurements, and a receiver (Alice), who observes an interference pattern in a Mach-Zehnder set-up. An advantage of our approach is that it allows us to define the concept of "physical", apart from "real". In instances of counterfactual quantum communication, reality is ascribed to the interaction-freely measured wave function (ψψψ) because Alice deterministically infers Bob's measurement. On the other hand, ψψψ does not correspond to the physical transmission of a particle because it produced no detection on Bob's apparatus. We therefore conclude that the wave function in this case (and by extension, generally) is real, but not physical. Characteristically for classical phenomena, the reality and physicality of objects are equivalent, whereas for quantum phenomena, the former is strictly weaker. As a concrete application of this idea, the nonphysical reality of the wavefunction is shown to be the basic nonclassical phenomenon that underlies the security of CQC.
The wave function gives probabilities, but is it a real physical quantity, as in the ontic interpretation of quantum mechanics, or just a measure of human belief about a physical system, as in an epistemic interpretation? These questions are introduced by treating Schrödinger’s cat and Wigner’s friend. An important question is whether quantum mechanics applies to macroscopic objects, for example, cats. SQUID experiments have been performed that see quantum interference in very large objects, whereas with most macroscopic objects quantum interference disappears because of decoherence. Various views of the meaning of quantum mechanics are discussed: the Copenhagen interpretation, continuous spontaneous localization, Everett’s many-worlds interpretation, Bohm’s hidden-variable model, and quantum Bayesianism. The latter holds that the wave function represents one’s best belief about the state of a quantum system, rather than an actual physical property. This leads to discussions of recent theories and experiments explicitly designed to test wave function reality.
The ontological status of the quantum wavefunction remains one of the most debated questions in quantum theory. While epistemic interpretations regard the wavefunction as a reflection of our knowledge or beliefs, ontic interpretations treat it as a real physical object. In this paper, we argue that epistemic approaches struggle to explain the universality and precision of the uncertainty principle, a core feature of quantum mechanics. By contrast, treating the wave-function as ontic allows a consistent and natural derivation of quantum uncertainty from the mathematical structure of Hilbert space. We examine key interpretations on both sides and highlight why the epistemic view falls short in addressing constraints that appear to be intrinsic to nature.
Although quantum mechanics is one of our most successful physical theories, there has been a long-standing debate about the interpretation of the wave function--the central object of the theory. Two prominent views are that (i) it corresponds to an element of reality, i.e., an objective attribute that exists before measurement, and (ii) it is a subjective state of knowledge about some underlying reality. A recent result [M. F. Pusey, J. Barrett, and T. Rudolph, arXiv:1111.3328] has placed the subjective interpretation into doubt, showing that it would contradict certain physically plausible assumptions, in particular, that multiple systems can be prepared such that their elements of reality are uncorrelated. Here we show, based only on the assumption that measurement settings can be chosen freely, that a system's wave function is in one-to-one correspondence with its elements of reality. This also eliminates the possibility that it can be interpreted subjectively.
The status of the quantum wave function is one of the most debated issues in quantum foundations---whether it corresponds directly to the reality or just represents knowledge or information about some aspect of reality. We propose a $\ensuremath{\psi}$-ontology theorem that excludes a class of ontological explanations where the quantum wave function is treated as mere information. Our result, unlike the acclaimed Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph's theorem, does not presume the absence of holistic ontological properties for product quantum preparations. At the core of our derivation, we utilize the seminal no-go result by Bell that rules out any local realistic world view for quantum theory. We show that the observed phenomenon of quantum nonlocality cannot be incorporated in a class of $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic models. Using the well-known Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality, we obtain a threshold bound on the degree of epistemicity above which the ontological models are not compatible with quantum statistics.
Can the mere possibility of a physical phenomenon affect the outcome of an experiment? In fact quantum theory presents us actual physical effects arising from "counterfactuals", that is physical effects brought about by things that might have happened, although they did not happen. How can it be? After a short outline of the quantum-mechanical description of physical reality, the occurrence of such counterfactual effects in quantum theory is illustrated by means of a Mach-Zehnder interferometer. Then these paradoxical phenomena undermining the very notion of physical event and questioning about which knowledge of physical reality can ever be obtained will be analysed using a classical possible-worlds model of knowledge and probability. Finally, a surprising application of counterfactual quantum effects producing a new kind of computing with no classical analogue will be shown.
It has been debated whether protective measurement implies the reality of the wave function. In this paper, I present a new analysis of the relationship between protective measurement and the reality of the wave function. First, I briefly introduce protective measurements and the ontological models framework for them. Second, I give a simple proof of Hardy's theorem in terms of protective measurements. It shows that when assuming the ontic state of the protected system keeps unchanged during a protective measurement, the wave function must be real. Third, I analyze two suggested psi-epistemic models of a protective measurement, in which the ontic state of the system is affected by the measurement. It is shown that although these models can explain the appearance of expectation values of observables in a single measurement, their predictions about the variance of the result of a non-ideal protective measurement are different from those of quantum mechanics. Finally, I argue that no psi-epistemic models exist for an ideal protective measurement in the ontological models framework, and in order to account for the definite result of an ideal protective measurement, the wave function must be a property of the protected system, defined either at a precise instant or during an infinitesimal time interval around an instant. Moreover, this result can also be extended to the wave function of an unprotected system. This new proof of the reality of the wave function does not rely on auxiliary assumptions, and it may help settle the issue about the nature of the wave function.