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arXiv:1307.5646

On the Optimality of Basis Transformations to Secure Entanglement Swapping Based QKD Protocols

Stefan Schauer, Suda, Martin

Published Jul 22, 2013• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In this article, we discuss the optimality of basis transformations as a security measure for quantum key distribution protocols based on entanglement swapping. To estimate the security, we focus on the information an adversary obtains on the raw key bits from a generic version of a collective attack strategy. In the scenario described in this article, the application of general basis transformations serving as a counter measure by one or both legitimate parties is analyzed. In this context, we show that the angles, which describe these basis transformations can be optimized compared to the application of a Hadamard operation, which is the standard basis transformation recurrently found in literature. As a main result, we show that the adversary's information can be reduced to an amount of approximately 0.20752 when using a single basis transformation and to an amount of approximately 0.0548 when combining two different basis transformations. This is less than half the information compared to other protocols using a Hadamard operation and thus represents an advantage regarding the security of entanglement swapping based protocols.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1307.5646

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In this article, we discuss the optimality of basis transformations as a security measure for quantum key distribution protocols based on entanglement swapping. To estimate the security, we focus on the information an adversary obtains on the raw key bits from a generic version of a collective attack strategy. In the scenario described in this article, the application of general basis transformations serving as a counter measure by one or both legitimate parties is analyzed. In this context, we show that the angles, which describe these basis transformations can be optimized compared to the application of a Hadamard operation, which is the standard basis transformation recurrently found in literature. As a main result, we show that the adversary's information can be reduced to an amount of approximately 0.20752 when using a single basis transformation and to an amount of approximately 0.0548 when combining two different basis transformations. This is less than half the information compared to other protocols using a Hadamard operation and thus represents an advantage regarding the security of entanglement swapping based protocols.
Li et al. presented a protocol [International Journal of Quantum Information4(6) (2006) 899–906] for quantum key distribution based on entanglement swapping. In this protocol, they use random and certain bits to construct a classical key, and they claim that this key is secure. In our article, we show that the protocol by Li et al. is insecure, presenting a new type of attack strategy which gives an adversary full information about the key without being detected. This strategy is based on entanglement swapping, too, and manages to preserve the correlation between the measurement results of the legitimate parties. Further, we present a modified version of the protocol and show that it is secure against this new attack strategy.
The goal of quantum key distribution (QKD) is to establish a secure key between two parties connected by an insecure quantum channel. To use a QKD protocol in practice, one has to prove that a finite size key is secure against general attacks: no matter the adversary's attack, they cannot gain useful information about the key. A much simpler task is to prove security against collective attacks, where the adversary is assumed to behave identically and independently in each round. In this work, we provide a formal framework for general QKD protocols and show that for any protocol that can be expressed in this framework, security against general attacks reduces to security against collective attacks, which in turn reduces to a numerical computation. Our proof relies on a recently developed information-theoretic tool called generalised entropy accumulation and can handle generic prepare-and-measure protocols directly without switching to an entanglement-based version.
The goal of quantum key distribution (QKD) is to establish a secure key between two parties connected by an insecure quantum channel. To use a QKD protocol in practice, one has to prove that a finite size key is secure against general attacks: no matter the adversary's attack, they cannot gain useful information about the key. A much simpler task is to prove security against collective attacks, where the adversary is assumed to behave identically and independently in each round. In this work, we provide a formal framework for general QKD protocols and show that for any protocol that can be expressed in this framework, security against general attacks reduces to security against collective attacks, which in turn reduces to a numerical computation. Our proof relies on a recently developed information-theoretic tool called generalised entropy accumulation and can handle generic prepare-and-measure protocols directly without switching to an entanglement-based version.
We present a technique for proving the security of quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocols. It is based on direct information-theoretic arguments and thus also applies if no equivalent entanglement purification scheme can be found. Using this technique, we investigate a general class of QKD protocols with one-way classical post-processing. We show that, in order to analyze the full security of these protocols, it suffices to consider collective attacks. Indeed, we give new lower and upper bounds on the secret-key rate which only involve entropies of two-qubit density operators and which are thus easy to compute. As an illustration of our results, we analyze the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the six-state, and the Bennett 1992 protocols with one-way error correction and privacy amplification. Surprisingly, the performance of these protocols is increased if one of the parties adds noise to the measurement data before the error correction. In particular, this additional noise makes the protocols more robust against noise in the quantum channel.
Abstract The mathematical physical bases are given for quantum cryptographic probes which exploit entanglement to eavesdrop on quantum key distribution. The quantum circuits and designs are presented for two different optimized entangling probes for attacking the BB84 Protocol of quantum key distribution (QKD) and yielding maximum information to the probes. Probe photon polarization states become optimally entangled with the signal states on their way between the legitimate transmitter and receiver. The designs are based on different optimum unitary transformations, each yielding the same maximum information on the pre-privacy amplified key. In each of the designs, the main quantum circuit consists of a single CNOT gate which produces the optimum entanglement between the BB84 signal states and the correlated states of the probe. For each design a different well-defined single-photon polarization state serves as the initial state of the probe, and in each case the probe is projectively measured. Symmetric projective measurements of the probe yield maximum information on the pre-privacy amplified key once basis information becomes available during basis reconciliation.
Quantum Key Distribution is a secure method that implements cryptographic protocols. The applications of quantum key distribution technology have an important role: to enhance the security in communication systems. It is originally inspired by the physical concepts associated with quantum mechanics. It aims to enable a secure exchange of cryptographic keys between two parties through an unsecured quantum communication channel. This work proposes a secure half-duplex bidirectional quantum key distribution protocol. The security of the proposed protocol is proved against collective attacks by estimating the interception of any eavesdropper with high probability in both directions under the control of the two parties. A two-qubit state encodes two pieces of information; the first qubit represents the transmitted bit and the second qubit represents the basis used for measurement. The partial diffusion operator is used to encrypt the transmitted qubit state as an extra layer of security. The predefined symmetry transformations induced by unitary in conjunction with the asymmetrical two-qubit teleportation scheme retain the protocol’s secrecy. Compared to the previous protocols, the proposed protocol has better performance on qubit efficiency.