The failure of conventional quantum theory to recognize time as an observable and to admit time operators is addressed. Instead of focusing on the existence of a time operator for a given Hamiltonian, we emphasize the role of the Hamiltonian as the generator of translations in time to construct time states. Taken together, these states constitute what we call a timeline, or quantum history, that is adequate for the representation of any physical state of the system. Such timelines appear to exist even for the semi-bounded and discrete Hamiltonian systems ruled out by Pauli's theorem. However, the step from a timeline to a valid time operator requires additional assumptions that are not always met. Still, this approach illuminates the crucial issue surrounding the construction of time operators, and establishes quantum histories as legitimate alternatives to the familiar coordinate and momentum bases of standard quantum theory.
The failure of conventional quantum theory to recognize time as an observable and to admit time operators is addressed. Instead of focusing on the existence of a time operator for a given Hamiltonian, we emphasize the role of the Hamiltonian as the generator of translations in time to construct time states. Taken together, these states constitute what we call a timeline, or quantum history, that is adequate for the representation of any physical state of the system. Such timelines appear to exist even for the semi-bounded and discrete Hamiltonian systems ruled out by Pauli's theorem. However, the step from a timeline to a valid time operator requires additional assumptions that are not always met. Still, this approach illuminates the crucial issue surrounding the construction of time operators, and establishes quantum histories as legitimate alternatives to the familiar coordinate and momentum bases of standard quantum theory.
Some aspects of the interpretation of quantum theory are discussed.It is emphasized that quantum theory is formulated in a Cartesian coordinate system; in other coordinates the result obtained with the help of the Hamiltonian formalism and commutator relations between 'canonically conjugated' coordinate and momentum operators leads to a wrong version of quantum mechanics.In this connection the Feynman integral formalism is also discussed.In this formalism the measure is not well-defined and there is no idea how to distinguish between the true version of quantum mechanics and an incorrect one; it is rather a mnemonic rule to generate perturbation series from an undefined zero order term.The origin of time is analyzed in detail by the example of atomic collisions.It is shown that the time-dependent Schrödinger equation for the closed three-body (two nuclei + electron) system has no physical meaning since in the high impact energy limit it transforms into an equation with two independent time-like variables; the time appears in the stationary Schrödinger equation as a result of extraction of a classical subsystem (two nuclei) from a closed three-body system.Following the Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky experiment and Bell's inequality the wave function is interpreted as an actual field of information in the elementary form.The relation between physics and mathematics is also discussed.
Schrödinger's equation says that the Hamiltonian is the generator of time translations.This seems to imply that any reasonable definition of time operator must be conjugate to the Hamiltonian.Then both time and energy must have the same spectrum since conjugate operators are unitarily equivalent.Clearly this is not always true: normal Hamiltonians have lower bounded spectrum and often only have discrete eigenvalues, whereas we typically desire that time can take any real value.Pauli concluded that constructing a general a time operator is impossible (although clearly it can be done in specific cases).Here we show how the Pauli argument fails when one uses an external system (a "clock") to track time, so that time arises as correlations between the system and the clock (conditional probability amplitudes framework).In this case, the time operator is conjugate to the clock Hamiltonian and not to the system Hamiltonian, but its eigenvalues still satisfy the Schrödinger equation for arbitrary system Hamiltonians.
The question of time in quantum mechanics has been a topic of intense discussion since its inception.Dating back to the works of the founders of the subject, the notion of time and how it fit in the theory was already a point with a lack of a formal explanation, especially in aspects such as the uncertainty principle and canonical commutation relations.A theorem by Pauli set in stone that any attempt at trying to understand time with the formalism in use at the time for quantum mechanics was impossible.Through studies on the logical basis of the subject and establishing different sets of axioms, more modern works were able to relax sufficiently the impositions on the concept of observables so that time could then be understood as a 'generalized' observable.Not only that, but it was shown that the correct way to interpret eventual time measurements was through the formalism of Positive Operator Valued Measures.Latest works then were focused in the direction of constructing either direct measures and time operators, or, in the case that was followed throughout this work, to establish a procedure to construct measures.This work was then an in-depth study of the work done by Brunetti and Fredenhagen, with the intent to do the first steps in generalizing their ideas by establishing their method to be covariant with respect to Poincaré transformations.
Along with weaving together observations, experiments, and theoretical constructs into a coherent mesh of understanding of the world around us, physics over its past five centuries has continuously refined the base concepts on which the whole framework is built. In quantum physics, first in non-relativistic mechanics and later in quantum field theories, even familiar concepts of position, momentum, wave or particle, are derived constructs from the classical limit in which we live but not intrinsic to the underlying physics. Most crucially, the very idea of the individual, whether an object or an event, distinguished only in a mere label of identity from others identical to it in all the physics, exists only as an approximation, not an element of underlying reality. Failure to recognize this and seeking alternative explanations in many worlds or multiverses leads only to incoherent logic and incorrect physics. As an example, in a physical system such as an atom in a particular state, physics deals with the universal system of all such atoms but makes no meaningful prediction of the position of an electron or the time of decay of any specific atom. Those are incidental, entirely random among all possible positions and times, even while physics makes very precise predictions for the distribution of the outcomes in measurements on atoms in that state. Physics deals with the universal, not the individual.
Along with weaving together observations, experiments, and theoretical constructs into a coherent mesh of understanding of the world around us, physics over its past five centuries has continuously refined the base concepts on which the whole framework is built. In quantum physics, first in nonrelativistic mechanics and later in quantum field theories, even familiar concepts of position, momentum, wave, or particle, are derived constructs from the classical limit in which we live but not intrinsic to the underlying physics. Most crucially, the very idea of the individual, whether an object or an event, distinguished only in a mere label of identity from others identical to it in all the physics, exists only as an approximation, not an element of underlying reality. It is not an element of physics. Failure to recognize this and seeking alternative explanations in many worlds or multiverses leads only to incoherent logic and incorrect physics. As an example, for an atom in a particular state, physics deals with the universal system of all such atoms but makes no meaningful prediction of the position of an electron or the time of decay of any specific atom. Those are incidental, entirely random among all possible positions and times, even while physics makes very precise predictions for the distribution of the outcomes in measurements on atoms in that state. Physics deals with the universal, not the individual.
Quantum mechanics has provided philosophers of science with many counterintuitive insights and interpretive puzzles, but little has been written about the role that time plays in the theory. One reason for this is the celebrated argument of Wolfgang Pauli against the inclusion of time as an observable of the theory, which has been seen as a demonstration that time may only enter the theory as a classical parameter. Against this orthodoxy I argue that there are good reasons to expect certain kinds of 'time observables' to find a representation within quantum theory, including clock operators (which provide the means to measure the passage of time) and event time operators, which provide predictions for the time at which a particular event occurs, such as the appearance of a dot on a luminescent screen. I contend that these time operators deserve full status as observables of the theory, and on reflection provide a uniquely compelling reason to expand the set of observables allowed by the standard formalism of quantum mechanics. In addition, I provide a novel association of event time operators with conditional probabilities, and propose a temporally extended form of quantum theory to better accommodate the time of an event as an observable quantity. This leads to a proposal to interpret quantum theory within an event ontology, inspired by Bertrand Russell's Analysis of Matter. On this basis I mount a defense of Russell's relational theory of time against a recent attack.