Upon reading Einstein's views on quantum incompleteness in publications or in his correspondence after 1935 (the EPR paradox), one gets a very intense feeling of deja-vu. Einstein presents a quantum hole argument, which somewhat reminds of the hole argument in his 1914 "Entwurf" theory of general relativity. PBR write in their paper, "An important step towards the derivation of our result is the idea that the quantum state is physical if distinct quantum states correspond to non-overlapping distributions for [physical states]". PBR then conclude, "The general notion that two distinct quantum states may describe the same state of reality, however, has a long history. For example, in a letter to Schrödinger containing a variant of the famous EPR (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) argument", and they refer to Einstein's quantum hole argument. This short paper discusses the PBR theorem, and the connection between the PBR argument and Einstein's argument and solution.
Upon reading Einstein's views on quantum incompleteness in publications or in his correspondence after 1935 (the EPR paradox), one gets a very intense feeling of deja-vu. Einstein presents a quantum hole argument, which somewhat reminds of the hole argument in his 1914 "Entwurf" theory of general relativity. PBR write in their paper, "An important step towards the derivation of our result is the idea that the quantum state is physical if distinct quantum states correspond to non-overlapping distributions for [physical states]". PBR then conclude, "The general notion that two distinct quantum states may describe the same state of reality, however, has a long history. For example, in a letter to Schrödinger containing a variant of the famous EPR (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) argument", and they refer to Einstein's quantum hole argument. This short paper discusses the PBR theorem, and the connection between the PBR argument and Einstein's argument and solution.
Einstein's 1927 argument for incompleteness A huge literature arose out of the famous ‘EPR’ paper by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935), entitled ‘Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?’. The EPR paper argued, on the basis of (among other things) the absence of action at a distance, that quantum theory must be incomplete. It is less well-known that a much simpler argument, leading to the same conclusion, was presented by Einstein eight years earlier in the general discussion at the fifth Solvay conference (pp. 440ff.). Einstein compares and contrasts two views about the nature of the wave function ψ , for the specific case of a single electron. According to view I, ψ represents an ensemble (or ‘cloud’) of electrons, while according to view II, ψ is a complete description of an individual electron. Einstein argues that view II is incompatible with locality, and that to avoid this, in addition to ψ there should exist a localised particle (along the lines of de Broglie's theory). Thus, according to this reasoning, if one assumes locality, then quantum theory (as normally understood today) is incomplete. The conclusion of Einstein's argument in 1927 is the same as that of EPR in 1935, even if the form of the argument is rather different. Einstein considers electrons striking a screen with a small hole that diffracts the electron wave, which on the far side of the screen spreads out uniformly in all directions and strikes a photographic film in the shape of a hemisphere with large radius (see Einstein's figure, p. 440).
When it was first put forward, special relativity struck many people as counterintuitive and possibly inconsistent, as we saw when we considered the twin paradox in Chapter 17. Quantum mechanics had a similar effect, only to a much greater and longer lasting degree, from the time of its inception in the mid 1920s until the present. This reaction to quantum theory was not confined to an initial confusion that often accompanies a new subject, but remained a life-long puzzle for Einstein, to mention only the most prominent opponent of what he took to be the reigning orthodoxy. In this chapter we study a famous attempt by Einstein and two of his colleagues to show that quantum mechanics was, if not logically inconsistent, then at least an incomplete theory. This charge of incompleteness is just that raised by Schrödinger's cat paradox (Section 21.4). THE EPR PARADOX In 1935 Einstein, Boris Podolsky (1896–1966) and Nathan Rosen (1909–1995) (hereafter referred to as EPR) published a paper titled ‘Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?’. They take as their criterion for the completeness of a theory that it contains terms corresponding to every relevant entity found in reality. For example, in the classical description of a system, such as a planet going around the sun, there are symbols representing the position r , the momentum p and so forth for the various parts of the system.
The ‘EPR paradox’ is directly related to the 1935 paper of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, even though Einstein did not include the word ‘paradox’ in it. All Einstein and his co authors did was to construct an argument that concluded that quantum mechanics was ‘not complete.’ This EPR conclusion is examined in detail here and found to be based on the erroneous assumption of an ‘all values’ spread in x that leads to an unphysical exact measurement of the momentum p . The word paradox, in relation the second part of the EPR paper, was introduced by Schrödinger in 1936 and popularized by Bohm in the 1950s. Hence, we should not attach responsibility to EPR for the ‘paradox’ situation. It was Schrödinger and Bohm who attached and propagated the term paradox in relation to the EPR paper. And the literature made it famous. This is particularly lamentable since the physics of quantum entanglement is utterly free of paradoxes .
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics involves two assumptions: one about locality and the other about when it is legitimate to infer the existence of an element-of-reality. Using one simple thought experiment, we argue that quantum predictions and the relativity of simultaneity require that both these assumptions fail, whether or not quantum mechanics is complete. EPR’s (1935) argument for the incompleteness of QM turns upon the following sufficient condition: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.“ EPR apply this condition in a case where knowledge gained from measuring one quantum system allows one to predict with certainty a value for a physical quantity on another.
From a phenomenological and experimental viewpoint, quantum mechanics is remarkably successful in explaining effects and processes in the microscopic world. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has revisited the theory's own formal foundations, specifically addressing issues of self-consistency and completeness. As a major historical example of these foundational challenges, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument famously claimed that the theory is incomplete. While many valid criticisms and refutations of the EPR logic exist, they generally rely on a combination of technical results and conceptual objections to EPR's interpretive assumptions, thus transcending the plain quantum framework itself. Motivated by these trends of examining the theory's structural limits, here we revisit the EPR argument. Focusing on elements essential to the EPR reasoning, we first analyze general quantum correlations for EPR states: (i) the fact that their observables are always associated with non-commuting operators, and (ii) the nature of the correlated information obtained through measurement. From these two points alone, and relying strictly on the core rules of quantum mechanics, we demonstrate how to overturn the alleged EPR incompleteness without invoking any extraneous propositions. Consequently, we show that the standard formalism alone suffices to resolve such type of skepticism regarding the theory's physical reach. This offers, at least in a paradigmatic instance, a powerful indication of a structurally well-founded, self-consistent quantum theory.
The famous EPR paradox shows that if we describe quantum particles in the usual way -- by their wave functions -- then we get the following seeming contradiction. If we entangle the states of the two particles, then move them far away from each other, and measure the state of the first particle, then the state of the second particle immediately changes -- which contradicts to special relativity, according to which such immediate-action-at-a-distance is not possible. It is known that, from the physical viewpoint, this is not a real paradox: if we measure any property of the second particle, the results will not change whether we perform the measurement on the first particle or not. What the above argument shows is that the usual wave function description of a quantum state does not always adequately describe the corresponding physics. In this paper, we propose a new, more physically adequate description of a quantum state, a description in which there is no EPR paradox: measurements performed at the first particle does not change the state of the remote second one.