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arXiv:1301.6551

Annotated Interview with a QBist in the Making

N. David Mermin

Published Jan 28, 2013• 18 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

These are my published answers to the seventeen questions posed by Max Schlosshauer in his 2011 book "Elegance and Enigma: the Quantum Interviews". I have inserted thirty footnotes into those answers, commenting on them from the perspective of subsequent insights I acquired during six weeks in March and April of 2012 with Chris Fuchs and Ruediger Schack at the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study. Aside from the footnotes and a few introductory paragraphs, the text is identical to my contributions to the Schlosshauer volume.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1301.6551

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Measured responses to quantum Bayesianism

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Mermin replies: Robert Griffiths takes my joke about an undergraduate collapsing a wavepacket to be an attempt to solve the measurement problem. The actual QBist solution—versions of which predate QBism (see, for example, reference 11. J. B. Hartle, Am. J. Phys. 36, 704 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1975096)—is that a quantum state is not an objective property of the world but a compendium of probabilities constructed by an agent. When an agent updates her state assignment, nothing changes in her external world. The only change is in the agent’s expectations for her subsequent experience of that world, and therefore there is no measurement problem. Consistent historians agree that collapse is not a physical process, but for entirely different reasons.QBism takes the “mysterious whatever-it-is” that Griffiths criticizes in quantum orthodoxy to be the experience induced in an agent by the world. That, and the fact that different agents may have different experiences, drains the swamp, slays the dragon, and quiets the maddening paradoxes.QBists hold that any agent can indeed apply quantum mechanics to her own external world, from quarks to quasars. Only an agent’s personal, directly perceived experience is boxed off from the domain of applicability. That exclusion disagrees with most versions of the many-worlds interpretation, but it does not limit the scope of science: Alice can apply quantum mechanics to the experience of another agent, Bob, as represented through his words, writings, or drawings, all of which do belong to her external world.The way in which Bob’s experience impinges on Alice resonates with Niels Bohr’s emphasis on the need to state results of experiments in ordinary language. It also addresses Ching Hung Woo’s question of how different agents can come to agreement on their state assignments.Griffiths correctly notes that QBism violates the first desideratum he quotes from my 15-year-old “Ithaca interpretation.” Like Barack Obama’s view of marriage, my thinking about quantum foundations has evolved. But Griffiths wrongly claims that QBism rejects the other desideratum he quotes: locality. Actually, QBism insists on it. The absurdity of quantum nonlocality provides an independent argument that quantum states cannot be objective internal properties of the systems they describe, whether or not one regards probabilities as subjective. Griffiths is probably right, however, that John Bell would not have been pleased with how QBists fix his shifty split.I would not call QBism an “antiquated approach.” It is younger than Griffiths’ consistent histories and, as I have remarked upon elsewhere,22. M. Schlosshauer, ed., Elegance and Enigma: The Quantum Interviews, Springer, Berlin (2011), pp. 177, 280. taking reality itself to be relative to what he calls a framework, is vastly more radical than taking quantum state assignments to be relative to an agent.But foreshadowings of QBism can indeed be found in antiquity. Since writing my commentary, I came across another striking anticipation in a 1931 letter from Erwin Schrödinger to Arnold Sommerfeld:33. K. von Meyenn, ed., Eine Entdeckung von ganz außerordentlicher Tragweite: Schrödingers Briefwechsel zur Wellenmechanik und zum Katzenparadoxon, Springer, Berlin (2011), p. 490. “Quantum mechanics forbids statements about what really exists—statements about the object. It deals only with the object–subject relation. Although this holds, after all, for any description of nature, it appears to hold in a much more radical and far-reaching sense in quantum mechanics” (translated by N. D. Mermin and Ruediger Schack).When Bell and Michael Nauenberg wrote their delightful article in 1966, there was indeed much less interest in quantum foundations than there is today. Most textbooks have wisely steered clear of the many contemporary interpretive positions, since none of them are held by more than a fraction of those physicists with an interest in such issues.QBists do not reject the Born rule for calculating probabilities, but they do reject the objective frequentist interpretation of those probabilities presented by Nauenberg and held by most physicists. The frequentist view is notoriously circular. It defines probability using such notions as “equally probable,” “unlikely,” or (with Nauenberg) “identically prepared,” none of which make sense without a prior definition of probability. “Identically prepared” might seem safe from circularity, but two different preparations cannot be strictly identical. It would be more accurate to say they must differ in unimportant ways. Unimportant for what? For the probabilities of the outcomes.When I started to learn about subjective probability, I was surprised to discover that most of the books were not in Cornell University’s physics or mathematics libraries but in the business school library. In our recent election, Americans have been told that business experience is necessary for being president; I would suggest that it may be even more helpful for understanding quantum mechanics.I cannot tell from Nauenberg’s remarks about the Liouville equation whether he agrees with the view of QBists (and many others) that the collapse of the wavefunction is no more than the updating of a collection of probability distributions.Nauenberg’s example of the Rydberg atom does not contradict the QBist resolution of Bell’s shifty split. The Rydberg atom is part of the world external to the agent, and therefore on the quantum side of her split. There are indeed circumstances under which fully quantum mechanical behavior can look very classical.Art Hobson repeats the common view that only mixed states can be associated with subjective probabilities. QBism takes that to be the very mistake that got us lost for so long in the quantum swamp. Hobson also believes that wavefunctions were collapsing before there were physicists. Does he believe that probabilities were updating before there were statisticians?Hobson wrongly claims that Chris Fuchs “might dispute the notion that some kind of physical reality actually exists.” What he and other QBists do deny is that there are properties of the external world—“elements of reality”—that underlie quantum state assignments. (The argument of Matthew Pusey and coauthors that Hobson cites, implying that quantum states are physically real, relies on such hidden variables.) An agent’s state assignment rests entirely on her experience of the external world. It is neither solipsistic nor superstitious to maintain that any agent’s experience comes fully into being only at the moment it is experienced.Hobson’s treatment of Eugene Wigner and his friend relies on decoherence producing an objective mixed state, which both of them must agree on. But since quantum mechanics holds all the way out to infinity (as Griffiths puts it), even from an objective view of quantum states, that switch from superposition to either/or is at best a FAPP solution, to use Bell’s wonderfully sardonic abbreviation of “for all practical purposes.”QBism does not, as Hobson concludes, give up on a realist interpretation of nature. But it does warn us not to confuse nature with the abstractions we have ingeniously constructed to help any agent deal with the very real impact of nature on his or her own internal experience (see my Reference Frame, Physics Today, May 2009, page 8).I’m glad that Blake Stacey has called attention to some of the more applied spinoffs of QBism. I’m also pleased that he mentions Bruno de Finetti, one of the great 20th-century pioneers of subjective probability. Indeed, since there are objective as well as subjective Bayesians, if I had my way, the B in QBism would stand not for Thomas Bayes, but for Bruno de Finetti, who put the crucial point like this: “The abandonment of superstitious beliefs about the existence of Phlogiston, the Cosmic Ether, Absolute Space and Time … , or Fairies and Witches, was an essential step along the road to scientific thinking. Probability, too, if regarded as something endowed with some kind of objective existence, is no less a misleading misconception, an illusory attempt to exteriorize or materialize our [actual (vero)] probabilistic beliefs.”44. B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability, Interscience, New York (1990), preface.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. J. B. Hartle, Am. J. Phys. 36, 704 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1975096, Google ScholarCrossref2. M. Schlosshauer, ed., Elegance and Enigma: The Quantum Interviews, Springer, Berlin (2011), pp. 177, 280. Google ScholarCrossref3. K. von Meyenn, ed., Eine Entdeckung von ganz außerordentlicher Tragweite: Schrödingers Briefwechsel zur Wellenmechanik und zum Katzenparadoxon, Springer, Berlin (2011), p. 490. Google ScholarCrossref4. B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability, Interscience, New York (1990), preface. Google Scholar© 2012 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Nov 30, 2012•6 citations

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Over many years Edward Teller delivered a course of Physical Science Appreciation Lectures. This book is based on those lectures, which must have been very stimulating. In the preparation of the book, Edward Teller was assisted by his daughter, Wendy Teller, and also by Wilson Talley. On many pages there are footnotes in the form of conversations between 'ET', who explains, and 'WT', who asks intelligent questions. (It is never clear which 'WT' is which.) I mention these footnotes as they contribute enormously to the charm and humour of the book. The book contains numerous anecdotes, many of which were new to me. The verse in the New Yorker, by Harold Furth, recording the famous meeting between Dr Teller and Dr Anti-Teller, is included. Dr Teller's comment is `The remarkable fact is that Harold got paid for the poem'. Dr Anti-Teller's comment is anti-recorded. The topics in the book include simple mechanics, statistical mechanics, electromagnetism, quantum mechanics and 'uses of new knowledge'. Despite its origins, the book does not avoid mathematics ('I will use mathematics because physics without mathematics is meaningless' (p1)), but Teller does attempt to explain the mathematics he uses. In much of the book the mathematics is at school level, but in his treatment of quantum mechanics he uses differential equations. If one skips past the equations then his final chapters are less mathematically demanding. I have enjoyed reading this book. Teller's approach is refreshing, and his coverage comprehensive and generally authoritative. My only disquiet is over his coverage of electrons in solids, where it would be clearer to consider the one-dimensional case first, before treating the three-dimensional case. There is a substantial discussion on the correspondence principle, wave-particle duality and on the uncertainty principle. His disposal of Schrodinger's notorious cat is masterly. There are questions at the end of each chapter. One question is based on a possible experiment suggested by Einstein to measure both energy and time precisely, thus violating the uncertainty principle. (We are reminded that Einstein was unhappy with the uncertainty principle.) The question is to find the flaw in the argument: we are told it took Bohr a (sleepless?) night to find it. Answers to all the questions are included at the end of the book. The last chapter is the epilogue, 'After the Revolution', in which Teller makes clear his belief that there will continue to be new discoveries in the physical sciences for a long time to come. This is a book which all readers of this journal should enjoy. It may give you fresh insight into some of the topics. Buy a copy, read it and then keep it at your bedside for occasional browsing. Make sure your institutional library has a copy, and recommend it to all physics students, both graduates and undergraduates. P Borcherds

European Journal of Physics•Jul 8, 2003•4 citations

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Philosophy of Science•Jun 1, 1983•52 citations

More on the quantum measurement problem

N. David Mermin

Among Art Hobson’s and Gregory Derry’s letters and Sean Carroll’s July Quick Study (page 62), only Derry’s letter addresses the point I was trying to make in my June Quick Study (page 62): Viewing probabilities as personal judgments eliminates the quantum measurement problem and enables one to make better sense of quantum mechanics.Hobson’s letter expounds his own realistic view of quantum states and their collapse. It belongs with the three examples I mention that eliminate the physicist from the story.Carroll takes what I write about the consequences of a personalist interpretation of probability to be an example of an epistemic interpretation of quantum mechanics. That misses my point.In 1926 Max Born noted that the content of quantum states was the probabilities that they enabled one to calculate. It is strange that after thus elevating probability to a new and foundational role, no physicists then or for the next three-quarters of a century thought it important to reexamine the meaning of probability. For most physicists, probabilities are user-independent frequencies, but for most statisticians, they are guides to action by the person who made the probability assignment. If physicists in 1926 had held a personalist view of probability, it would have required them from the very beginning to hold a personalist (“epistemic”) view of quantum states. There would have been no need for an “interpretation.”I have comments on several issues raised by Derry. Max Jammer and many others have indeed written for over half a century that quantum states are nothing more than formal devices for encapsulating probabilities of observation. But nobody before Carlton Caves, Christopher Fuchs, and Rüdiger Schack ever added that if probabilities are viewed as personal judgments of the person who assigns them, then that same view must be taken of quantum states.Derry quotes Niels Bohr’s statement that he does not “appeal to the observing subject.” Later in that paragraph, Bohr adds that “all subjectivity is avoided by proper attention to the circumstances required for the well-defined use of elementary physical concepts.”11. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. That does contradict my reading of the two Bohr quotations that appear in my Quick Study. By “experience,” Bohr must have meant collective rather than individual experience. I doubt that Bohr took a personalist view of probability. That Bohr, however, was a personalist is argued interestingly by Ulrich Mohrhoff.22. U. Mohrhoff, https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.07118.I quote Bruno de Finetti on “Fairies and Witches” only to give a poetic statement of the unfamiliar view of probability that I am inviting physicists to examine. My point is that if de Finetti is correct, then it would profoundly affect our understanding of quantum mechanics. For me, the illumination it sheds on the interpretation of quantum mechanics is all by itself a compelling reason for adopting a personalist view of probability.The expansion of my argument that Derry looks forward to reading can be found in the article of mine33. N. D. Mermin, Rep. Prog. Phys. 82, 012002 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1088/1361-6633/aae2c6 cited in my Quick Study along with the rather more technical article44. C. A. Fuchs, R. Schack, Rev. Mod. Phys. 85, 1693 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.85.1693 by Fuchs and Schack that inspired mine.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. Google Scholar2. U. Mohrhoff, https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.07118. Google Scholar3. N. D. Mermin, Rep. Prog. Phys. 82, 012002 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1088/1361-6633/aae2c6, Google ScholarCrossref4. C. A. Fuchs, R. Schack, Rev. Mod. Phys. 85, 1693 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.85.1693, Google ScholarCrossref, ISI© 2022 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Nov 1, 2022•2 citations
These are my published answers to the seventeen questions posed by Max Schlosshauer in his 2011 book "Elegance and Enigma: the Quantum Interviews". I have inserted thirty footnotes into those answers, commenting on them from the perspective of subsequent insights I acquired during six weeks in March and April of 2012 with Chris Fuchs and Ruediger Schack at the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study. Aside from the footnotes and a few introductory paragraphs, the text is identical to my contributions to the Schlosshauer volume.
Mermin replies: Robert Griffiths takes my joke about an undergraduate collapsing a wavepacket to be an attempt to solve the measurement problem. The actual QBist solution—versions of which predate QBism (see, for example, reference 11. J. B. Hartle, Am. J. Phys. 36, 704 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1975096)—is that a quantum state is not an objective property of the world but a compendium of probabilities constructed by an agent. When an agent updates her state assignment, nothing changes in her external world. The only change is in the agent’s expectations for her subsequent experience of that world, and therefore there is no measurement problem. Consistent historians agree that collapse is not a physical process, but for entirely different reasons.QBism takes the “mysterious whatever-it-is” that Griffiths criticizes in quantum orthodoxy to be the experience induced in an agent by the world. That, and the fact that different agents may have different experiences, drains the swamp, slays the dragon, and quiets the maddening paradoxes.QBists hold that any agent can indeed apply quantum mechanics to her own external world, from quarks to quasars. Only an agent’s personal, directly perceived experience is boxed off from the domain of applicability. That exclusion disagrees with most versions of the many-worlds interpretation, but it does not limit the scope of science: Alice can apply quantum mechanics to the experience of another agent, Bob, as represented through his words, writings, or drawings, all of which do belong to her external world.The way in which Bob’s experience impinges on Alice resonates with Niels Bohr’s emphasis on the need to state results of experiments in ordinary language. It also addresses Ching Hung Woo’s question of how different agents can come to agreement on their state assignments.Griffiths correctly notes that QBism violates the first desideratum he quotes from my 15-year-old “Ithaca interpretation.” Like Barack Obama’s view of marriage, my thinking about quantum foundations has evolved. But Griffiths wrongly claims that QBism rejects the other desideratum he quotes: locality. Actually, QBism insists on it. The absurdity of quantum nonlocality provides an independent argument that quantum states cannot be objective internal properties of the systems they describe, whether or not one regards probabilities as subjective. Griffiths is probably right, however, that John Bell would not have been pleased with how QBists fix his shifty split.I would not call QBism an “antiquated approach.” It is younger than Griffiths’ consistent histories and, as I have remarked upon elsewhere,22. M. Schlosshauer, ed., Elegance and Enigma: The Quantum Interviews, Springer, Berlin (2011), pp. 177, 280. taking reality itself to be relative to what he calls a framework, is vastly more radical than taking quantum state assignments to be relative to an agent.But foreshadowings of QBism can indeed be found in antiquity. Since writing my commentary, I came across another striking anticipation in a 1931 letter from Erwin Schrödinger to Arnold Sommerfeld:33. K. von Meyenn, ed., Eine Entdeckung von ganz außerordentlicher Tragweite: Schrödingers Briefwechsel zur Wellenmechanik und zum Katzenparadoxon, Springer, Berlin (2011), p. 490. “Quantum mechanics forbids statements about what really exists—statements about the object. It deals only with the object–subject relation. Although this holds, after all, for any description of nature, it appears to hold in a much more radical and far-reaching sense in quantum mechanics” (translated by N. D. Mermin and Ruediger Schack).When Bell and Michael Nauenberg wrote their delightful article in 1966, there was indeed much less interest in quantum foundations than there is today. Most textbooks have wisely steered clear of the many contemporary interpretive positions, since none of them are held by more than a fraction of those physicists with an interest in such issues.QBists do not reject the Born rule for calculating probabilities, but they do reject the objective frequentist interpretation of those probabilities presented by Nauenberg and held by most physicists. The frequentist view is notoriously circular. It defines probability using such notions as “equally probable,” “unlikely,” or (with Nauenberg) “identically prepared,” none of which make sense without a prior definition of probability. “Identically prepared” might seem safe from circularity, but two different preparations cannot be strictly identical. It would be more accurate to say they must differ in unimportant ways. Unimportant for what? For the probabilities of the outcomes.When I started to learn about subjective probability, I was surprised to discover that most of the books were not in Cornell University’s physics or mathematics libraries but in the business school library. In our recent election, Americans have been told that business experience is necessary for being president; I would suggest that it may be even more helpful for understanding quantum mechanics.I cannot tell from Nauenberg’s remarks about the Liouville equation whether he agrees with the view of QBists (and many others) that the collapse of the wavefunction is no more than the updating of a collection of probability distributions.Nauenberg’s example of the Rydberg atom does not contradict the QBist resolution of Bell’s shifty split. The Rydberg atom is part of the world external to the agent, and therefore on the quantum side of her split. There are indeed circumstances under which fully quantum mechanical behavior can look very classical.Art Hobson repeats the common view that only mixed states can be associated with subjective probabilities. QBism takes that to be the very mistake that got us lost for so long in the quantum swamp. Hobson also believes that wavefunctions were collapsing before there were physicists. Does he believe that probabilities were updating before there were statisticians?Hobson wrongly claims that Chris Fuchs “might dispute the notion that some kind of physical reality actually exists.” What he and other QBists do deny is that there are properties of the external world—“elements of reality”—that underlie quantum state assignments. (The argument of Matthew Pusey and coauthors that Hobson cites, implying that quantum states are physically real, relies on such hidden variables.) An agent’s state assignment rests entirely on her experience of the external world. It is neither solipsistic nor superstitious to maintain that any agent’s experience comes fully into being only at the moment it is experienced.Hobson’s treatment of Eugene Wigner and his friend relies on decoherence producing an objective mixed state, which both of them must agree on. But since quantum mechanics holds all the way out to infinity (as Griffiths puts it), even from an objective view of quantum states, that switch from superposition to either/or is at best a FAPP solution, to use Bell’s wonderfully sardonic abbreviation of “for all practical purposes.”QBism does not, as Hobson concludes, give up on a realist interpretation of nature. But it does warn us not to confuse nature with the abstractions we have ingeniously constructed to help any agent deal with the very real impact of nature on his or her own internal experience (see my Reference Frame, Physics Today, May 2009, page 8).I’m glad that Blake Stacey has called attention to some of the more applied spinoffs of QBism. I’m also pleased that he mentions Bruno de Finetti, one of the great 20th-century pioneers of subjective probability. Indeed, since there are objective as well as subjective Bayesians, if I had my way, the B in QBism would stand not for Thomas Bayes, but for Bruno de Finetti, who put the crucial point like this: “The abandonment of superstitious beliefs about the existence of Phlogiston, the Cosmic Ether, Absolute Space and Time … , or Fairies and Witches, was an essential step along the road to scientific thinking. Probability, too, if regarded as something endowed with some kind of objective existence, is no less a misleading misconception, an illusory attempt to exteriorize or materialize our [actual (vero)] probabilistic beliefs.”44. B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability, Interscience, New York (1990), preface.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. J. B. Hartle, Am. J. Phys. 36, 704 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1975096, Google ScholarCrossref2. M. Schlosshauer, ed., Elegance and Enigma: The Quantum Interviews, Springer, Berlin (2011), pp. 177, 280. Google ScholarCrossref3. K. von Meyenn, ed., Eine Entdeckung von ganz außerordentlicher Tragweite: Schrödingers Briefwechsel zur Wellenmechanik und zum Katzenparadoxon, Springer, Berlin (2011), p. 490. Google ScholarCrossref4. B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability, Interscience, New York (1990), preface. Google Scholar© 2012 American Institute of Physics.
Over many years Edward Teller delivered a course of Physical Science Appreciation Lectures. This book is based on those lectures, which must have been very stimulating. In the preparation of the book, Edward Teller was assisted by his daughter, Wendy Teller, and also by Wilson Talley. On many pages there are footnotes in the form of conversations between 'ET', who explains, and 'WT', who asks intelligent questions. (It is never clear which 'WT' is which.) I mention these footnotes as they contribute enormously to the charm and humour of the book. The book contains numerous anecdotes, many of which were new to me. The verse in the New Yorker, by Harold Furth, recording the famous meeting between Dr Teller and Dr Anti-Teller, is included. Dr Teller's comment is `The remarkable fact is that Harold got paid for the poem'. Dr Anti-Teller's comment is anti-recorded. The topics in the book include simple mechanics, statistical mechanics, electromagnetism, quantum mechanics and 'uses of new knowledge'. Despite its origins, the book does not avoid mathematics ('I will use mathematics because physics without mathematics is meaningless' (p1)), but Teller does attempt to explain the mathematics he uses. In much of the book the mathematics is at school level, but in his treatment of quantum mechanics he uses differential equations. If one skips past the equations then his final chapters are less mathematically demanding. I have enjoyed reading this book. Teller's approach is refreshing, and his coverage comprehensive and generally authoritative. My only disquiet is over his coverage of electrons in solids, where it would be clearer to consider the one-dimensional case first, before treating the three-dimensional case. There is a substantial discussion on the correspondence principle, wave-particle duality and on the uncertainty principle. His disposal of Schrodinger's notorious cat is masterly. There are questions at the end of each chapter. One question is based on a possible experiment suggested by Einstein to measure both energy and time precisely, thus violating the uncertainty principle. (We are reminded that Einstein was unhappy with the uncertainty principle.) The question is to find the flaw in the argument: we are told it took Bohr a (sleepless?) night to find it. Answers to all the questions are included at the end of the book. The last chapter is the epilogue, 'After the Revolution', in which Teller makes clear his belief that there will continue to be new discoveries in the physical sciences for a long time to come. This is a book which all readers of this journal should enjoy. It may give you fresh insight into some of the topics. Buy a copy, read it and then keep it at your bedside for occasional browsing. Make sure your institutional library has a copy, and recommend it to all physics students, both graduates and undergraduates. P Borcherds
Among Art Hobson’s and Gregory Derry’s letters and Sean Carroll’s July Quick Study (page 62), only Derry’s letter addresses the point I was trying to make in my June Quick Study (page 62): Viewing probabilities as personal judgments eliminates the quantum measurement problem and enables one to make better sense of quantum mechanics.Hobson’s letter expounds his own realistic view of quantum states and their collapse. It belongs with the three examples I mention that eliminate the physicist from the story.Carroll takes what I write about the consequences of a personalist interpretation of probability to be an example of an epistemic interpretation of quantum mechanics. That misses my point.In 1926 Max Born noted that the content of quantum states was the probabilities that they enabled one to calculate. It is strange that after thus elevating probability to a new and foundational role, no physicists then or for the next three-quarters of a century thought it important to reexamine the meaning of probability. For most physicists, probabilities are user-independent frequencies, but for most statisticians, they are guides to action by the person who made the probability assignment. If physicists in 1926 had held a personalist view of probability, it would have required them from the very beginning to hold a personalist (“epistemic”) view of quantum states. There would have been no need for an “interpretation.”I have comments on several issues raised by Derry. Max Jammer and many others have indeed written for over half a century that quantum states are nothing more than formal devices for encapsulating probabilities of observation. But nobody before Carlton Caves, Christopher Fuchs, and Rüdiger Schack ever added that if probabilities are viewed as personal judgments of the person who assigns them, then that same view must be taken of quantum states.Derry quotes Niels Bohr’s statement that he does not “appeal to the observing subject.” Later in that paragraph, Bohr adds that “all subjectivity is avoided by proper attention to the circumstances required for the well-defined use of elementary physical concepts.”11. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. That does contradict my reading of the two Bohr quotations that appear in my Quick Study. By “experience,” Bohr must have meant collective rather than individual experience. I doubt that Bohr took a personalist view of probability. That Bohr, however, was a personalist is argued interestingly by Ulrich Mohrhoff.22. U. Mohrhoff, https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.07118.I quote Bruno de Finetti on “Fairies and Witches” only to give a poetic statement of the unfamiliar view of probability that I am inviting physicists to examine. My point is that if de Finetti is correct, then it would profoundly affect our understanding of quantum mechanics. For me, the illumination it sheds on the interpretation of quantum mechanics is all by itself a compelling reason for adopting a personalist view of probability.The expansion of my argument that Derry looks forward to reading can be found in the article of mine33. N. D. Mermin, Rep. Prog. Phys. 82, 012002 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1088/1361-6633/aae2c6 cited in my Quick Study along with the rather more technical article44. C. A. Fuchs, R. Schack, Rev. Mod. Phys. 85, 1693 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.85.1693 by Fuchs and Schack that inspired mine.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. Google Scholar2. U. Mohrhoff, https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.07118. Google Scholar3. N. D. Mermin, Rep. Prog. Phys. 82, 012002 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1088/1361-6633/aae2c6, Google ScholarCrossref4. C. A. Fuchs, R. Schack, Rev. Mod. Phys. 85, 1693 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.85.1693, Google ScholarCrossref, ISI© 2022 American Institute of Physics.